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Abstract 
The IMY scheme may be atypical within Uttar Pradesh, but it does demonstrate 
the importance of supporting institutions and the potential value of bureaucratic 
reform for provoking positive change and development. 
During the 1990s there has been a notable shift in governance debates from 
what has been termed the 'Washington' to a post-Washington Consensus. 
Put simply, this shift has involved a move away from the old agenda of 
state 'versus' market to a new discourse based on the notion of state 'and' 
market. A parallel shift has occurred within public administration, from a 
focus based on reducing the role of the state to a reconsideration of the way 
in which the state performs it's roles. The Indian state has initiated 
administrative reforms influenced by new public management (NPM) 
following the adoption of a new economic policy in 1991. The case of 
northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, is particularly significant as 
administrative reforms their have been developed in association with the 
World Bank. Through the case study of the Indira Mahila Yojana 
programme (for women's empowerment), I consider how government 
officials at the various administrative levels, have engaged with the 
processes of change associated with new public management. Despite 
popular criticism of the bureaucracy in India, this study suggests that the 
adoption of specific elements of NPM in specific institutional environments 
can empower government officials, and help facilitate development. The 
case study of the Indira Mahila Yojana scheme demonstrates both the 
importance of suipporting institutions and the potential value of 
bureaucratic reform for provoking positive change and development. 
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PREFACE: 
In March and April 1999, I visited India for the first time in order to do some 
preliminary research that considered how ways of 'doing development' had changed 
in the wake of the New Economic Policy and Civil Service Reform. I was particularly 
interested in the ways in which government officials were engaging with the ideas of 
'new public management' (NPM) and the how aspects of the discourse were being 
adopted and adapted by bureaucrats. 
I had already met a number of government and non-government personnel who had 
been trained through the Credit and Micro Enterprise Development Training Course, 
(CREME) in Durham who were enthusiastic about the new ways of working but who 
also had reservations about the relevance of new public management in the Indian 
context. Some of these men and women were involved in the delivery of a centrally 
sponsored government programme called Indira Mahila Yogana (IMY), which aims 
to achieve women's empowerment through educational as well as economic means. 
The scheme incorporates many aspects of work culture associated with NPM, namely 
localisation, debureaucratisation and externalisation. 
When I arrived in Delhi I spoke to academics, government officials and non-
government representatives to see whether the project would make a viable case 
study. Though I was told the scheme was having some success, it did not, I was told 
'represent anything more than a token gesture' and that there was neither financial nor 
political commitment behind administrative reform or in 'social sector schemes'. 
When I met the Director of the Department of Women and Child Development, 
Sarojini Thakur, on the other hand, she assured me that some notable changes were 
being made in the bureaucratic culture. Though, she also said the grass roots 
realisation of such changes take time and therefore may not be easy to detect. She 
commented that even in a 'bimaru' (sick) State like Uttar Pradesh (UP) some sizeable 
achievements were in fact being made. 
The overwhelming perception of the bureaucracy in India is of a self-seeking network 
of politically affiliated individuals, who wield considerable power. Bardhan ( 1989) 
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famously described government officials as one of the three 'dominant proprietary 
classes' along with the agricultural and political elites. The Indian civil services vary 
considerably in authority, autonomy and prestige. Chatterjee (1993) and Kaviraj 
( 1991 ), amongst others, have argued that there is a dichotomy between the elite 
languages and outlooks of higher ranked officials, and the vernacular languages and 
outlooks of those lower down the administrative hierarchy. If this assertion is correct 
the way in which these different parties understand and engage with the process of 
change associated with NPM are likely to be very different. 
In contrast to dominant precepnons of Indian bureaucratic culture, Peter Evans 
(1996a, 1996b) Merlie Grindle (1996) and Judith Tendler and Sara Freedheim (1994a, 
1994b) who suggest that in cases where development projects are doing well, an 
effective and efficient bureaucracy is a primary factor. In such cases, they argue, 
selective adoption of the working practices of the private sector firms, notably flexible 
working arrangements, innovative practices and customer orientation, have 
contributed to governance successes. But these authors did not associate their findings 
with the new public management discourse, which has its origins in the 1980s shifts 
towards a 'slimming of the state'. Tendler in fact criticised the ways in which NPM 
had been used to reduce the autonomy of the state, whilst the direct opposite approach 
was being taken in the private sector. 
During the 1990s however there has been a notable shift in governance debates from 
what has been termed the 'Washington Consensus' to a Post-Washington consensus. 
Put simply the shift has involved a move away from the old agenda of state versus 
market to a new discourse based on the notion of state and market. A parallel shift has 
occurred within public administration, from a focus based on reducing the role of the 
state to a reconsideration of the way in which the state performs its roles. The shifts 
away from domination of the discourse by public choice theory to more institutional 
forms have led Desai and Imrie ( 1998: 464)) to argue that it may be possible to 
conceive of an emergent 'post-managerial phase'. 
Through this thesis I consider how the government officials involved in the IMY 
programme have engaged with the processes of change associated with the discourse 
of new public management. My research began at the national level, where the IMY 
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scheme was developed, to the State level of Uttar Pradesh, to one District (Rae Bareli) 
within the State, and to six administrative Blocks in the District in which the scheme 
is being implemented. Uttar Pradesh was chosen for several reasons. Whilst I was told 
that Uttar Pradesh was achieveing little in development stakes (an argument supported 
by statistical evidence) this was not the impression given by those who co-ordinate 
the scheme at the State level. I was interested to see why this was apparently possible 
in the face of so many development failures in the State. Uttar Pradesh also has a 
close relationship with the World Bank (one of the main proponents of NPM) which 
offers and interesting additional dimension to the national issues of bureaucratic 
reform. 
In order to get a balanced range of opinions, following Kabeer and Subrahmanian 
(1999: 353), I accessed 'agency', 'expert', and 'beneficiary' perceptions of the nature 
of bureaucratic culture and change through a variety of methodological techniques, 
including interviews, focus groups and work-shadowing. 
The central research questions for this thesis were:-
a) How have the government officials at different levels experienced change 
associated with NPM? 
b) How have 'outsiders' associated with the scheme experienced these changes? 
By researching these questions, I am able to reflect on several areas of wider interest 
and debate within geography, particularly the role and nature of the state in 
development and the hegemony of western ideas in governance, issues to which I 
return in chapter 7. 
Thesis Outline: 
In the first chapter I look at the global 'emergence' of a Post-Washington Consensus 
over the past few years, and consider why this has come about. I then examine the 
implications this has had for the discourse of NPM. I focus specifically on the case 
study of India, looking at the extent to which the New Economic Policy (NEP) was 
adopted and the implications of this for administrative reform. I then briefly outline 
the extent to which India (and UP) have attempted to adopt a form of NPM through its 
civil service reform and in the UP case, 'Renewal'. 
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The Indian bureaucracy has a rich and varied history, which I outline in chapter 2. 
After considering its origins through the East India Company and changes with 
Independence, I discuss the various roles involved within the different ranks of the 
service. I then use Esman' s (1997) identification of three bureaucratic types, the 
'legal-rational', 'the vested-interest' and the 'entrepreneurial' to discuss conflicting 
perceptions of the Indian bureaucracy, paying particular attention to Uttar Pradesh. 
The aim of this chapter is to argue that elements of continuity as well as change are 
important in the culture of the Indian bureaucracy, and that element of all three types 
of 'culture' are likely to be present at any one time, though in changing intensities. 
Chapter 3 outlines the rich history and geography of the State of Uttar Pradesh. As 
later chapters make clear, knowledge of these details not only provides a backdrop to 
the study, but is also essential in understanding the essential factors that either restrict 
or promote bureaucratic change. Particular attention is paid to the low economic and 
social status of the region (and in particular gender inequalities), and the perpetuation 
of a Ma Bap culture throughout much of the area is seen as a key restriction on 
change. The politics of the region and particularly the Gandhi family legacy and 
influence in the Rae Bareli and (adjoining) Amethi constituencies is highlighted. 
In chapter 4 I discuss the different research methodologies that I employed for this 
study, concentrating on the six months intensive fieldwork period I undertook. In 
particular, I show how I sought to ally material at the national, State and District and 
Block levels, to explore whether government officials at different levels had different 
understandings of, and approaches to, bureaucratic change. 
Chapter 5 is the first of two substantive analytical chapters. It discusses the 
perceptions of 'insiders' of the nature of change in bureaucratic culture by examining 
those individuals working on the case study IMY programme. Interviews were 
conducted at national, State, District and Block level, in order to assess the various 
understandings and interpretations of bureaucratic change at the various 
administrative levels. Though bureaucratic change has not been uncontested or 
complete, I argue that, according to those involved in the scheme, there has been 
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considerable change. In this regard, I concentrate on the issues of training at all levels, 
the structure of the scheme, and the nature of accountability and monitoring. 
In chapter 6, I offer an alternative perspective of bureaucratic change as perceived by 
'outsiders'. These outsiders were grouped in two categories. First the 'elite', 
consisting of academics and NGO workers. These individuals had similar education, 
language and understandings of the influences of western discourses on administrative 
working in India. The second group the anganwadi (village level workers) and the 
self-help group members, provided a vernacular interpretation of bureaucratic change, 
at the District and Block implementation levels. Whilst their reasoning for change 
varied considerably, the majority of those interviewed in these groups had also noted 
change within the bureaucracy. Whilst their understanding of NPM varied 
enormously, there was a feeling that whilst cultural elements have the potential to 
have positive results, other elements of the discourse have the potential to threaten the 
role of the state in development. 
Chapter 7 brings together the main descriptive and analytical themes of the study in 
two concluding arguments. The first debate relates to the phenomenon of social 
capital, one of the main elements incorporated in the post-Washington Consensus 
recommendations. I focus particularly on the recent critique by John Harriss. Whilst I 
am sympathetic to certain elements of his argument, I feel that he focuses too heavily 
on research conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s whilst largely ignoring the 
shifts associated with the 'good governance' agenda of the late 1990s onwards. The 
second section in this chapter considers the extent to which the adoption of elements 
of the new public management discourse in India represents neo-imperialism based on 
the hegemony of western 'truths'. 
As I have indicated above, there does appear to be a change in bureaucratic culture in 
the case of IMY along NPM lines. This change though, is negotiated and incomplete 
and has taken a piecemeal and selective approach. My research suggests that though 
NPM is frequently considered to be a western neo-liberal discourse, it can and does 
have the potential to be empowering, particularly in relation to changing attitudes and 
working practices within the bureaucracy. My experience of IMY however, suggests 
there is nothing structural that enforces change - it has to come from the individual. 
XV 
The inescapable conclusion within this work is that key women have played a crucial 
role in empowering lower level officials, and developing a culture of trust with in this 
particular scheme. The social sector, and this scheme in particular, are neither 
prestigious nor financially lucrative departments. Many men in the department 
consider postings in this sector as a 'punishment' to be escaped as quickly as possible. 
It is perhaps this very fact that has left those working within the scheme relatively free 
of transfer and political interference, and that has enabled individuals to concentrate 
on their role as 'civil servants'. 
XVI 
Declaration 
This thesis is the result of my own work and contains nothing which is 
the outcome of work done in collaboration. It does not exceed I 00,000 
words. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from 
it should be published without prior written consent and information 
derived from it should be acknowledged. 
Alison Quirk 
November 2003 
XVII 
Chapter 1: Theoretical Underpinnings of Research 
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF RESEARCH 
1.1: Introduction 
It was not long ago that the collapse of communism and the supposed triumph of a 
new world order were described by Fukuyama (1992) as representing 'the end of 
history'. The 'Washington Consensus', in favour of the market and sceptical of the 
role of the state, had become the order of the day in the late 1980s (Cornia and 
Helleiner, 1994; Gore, 2000). Endorsed by the IMF, World Bank1 and G-7 countries, 
the precepts of the Washington Consensus were adopted, more or less willingly, by a 
significant number of countries (Singh, 2001 ). However, the neo-Iiberal Washington 
Consensus has been seriously challenged not only from outside these international 
development organisations, but also more recently, from within (Fine, 2001). 
Following the Asian crisis, rifts in thinking both within and between the IMF and the 
World Bank have been exposed (Lo, 2001). The World Bank's chief economist, 
Joseph Stiglitz, has been at the forefront of those questioning the legitimacy of the 
conventional wisdom of structural adjustment imposed by the IMF in East Asia2 
(Rigg, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002), under the auspices of the Washington Consensus. 
Within the first section of this chapter, the ideas behind both the Washington 
Consensus and the changes leading to the 'Post-Washington Consensus' are outlined. 
The latter include moves to incorporate civil society, institution building, safety nets 
and (especially important for this thesis) 'good governance' into the conventional 
ideology of open markets, deregulation, liberalisation and structural adjustment. At its 
most simplistic, the shift has involved moves away from the old agenda of state 
versus market to a new discourse based on the notion of state and market (Singh, 
2001 ). Central to this shift has been a focus on people's participation, civil society and 
an attention to institutional strengthening (WDR, 1997; Philips and Higgott, 1999; 
Gore, 2000). 
1 In this chapter I refer to the IMF and World Bank as single institutions, dominated by neo-liberal 
ideas. This is of course an oversimplification as Sender and Smith ( 1985) have noted, and which has 
made too many critics ready to dismiss the work of the Bank. 
2 Within this chapter I refer to the 'East Asian experience', but recognise that the experiences of 
development has varied between and in countries. Singapore for example has relied heavily on foreign 
capital, whereas South Korea has not. However, although the role of the state has varied, as a regional 
group they are distinguishable from the neo-liberal approach (Schiffer, 1991 ). 
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One important element of this change has been the changing role of public 
bureaucracies, and it is this that provides the main focus of this thesis. Over the last 
twenty years numerous reforms have swept the public sectors of developed and 
developing countries, prompting a range of observers to herald the emergence of 'a 
new public management revolution' (Clarke and Newman 1993, 1997; Stren 1991 ). 
The alleged revolution has been based on attempts to redefine the relationships 
between state, market and society in the process of governance. In its earliest forms 
this included an active agenda to slim down the state, reduce high levels of public 
expenditure, increase efficiency in public service provision, and extend the role of 
non-state functionaries in social provision (Hicks, 1991 ). In recent years the contours 
of the traditional debate have begun to shift. No longer is the World Bank arguing 
solely in favour - if it ever did - of the neo-liberal elements of new public 
management. As the World Bank has argued, 'there is no unique model for change' 
nor does managerial governance 'lend itself to clear unambiguous solutions' (1997:3) 
(See Mawdsley and Rigg, 2002). Today the focus of NPM has shifted from the pure 
'New Right' prescriptions to a form allied to a much greater concern for reforming the 
institutions of the state, one of the most important being the bureaucracy. In the 
second part of this chapter, therefore, I discuss the influences on and origins of new 
public management (NPM), before analysing the discourse in light of the Post-
Washington Consensus and exploring the ways in which it has been altered. 
Desai and Imrie (1997) have suggested that NPM does not exist as some end-state, 
but as a complex of interrelated processes that interconnect historically and 
geographically specific socio-institutional, economic, and political structures. As 
such, they suggest further research needs to consider, 
'the different ways in which state and/or governance structures are being 
recast, and to document the role and importance of locally embedded socio-
political and institutional structures and systems in framing governance 
outcomes. It would also be interesting to explore the precise transmission 
mechanisms which lead to the adoption and/or adaptation of managerialist 
ideas from one country to another. Moreover, as our paper suggests, the 
complexities and variations within and between bureaucratic-professional 
regimes are clearly important in interpreting and shaping the ways in which 
the new (governance) arrangements are being constructed. Given this, one 
research task is to explore the contrasts between the old bureaucratic-
professional approaches, and the new managerialist ones, in ways which seek 
to highlight the differences in the old as well as the new. These, and related 
2 
Chapter 1: Theoretical Underpinnings of Research 
ideas, provide possibilities for further research into the changing nature of 
governance systems' (1998: 647, emphasis added). 
India offers an excellent case study of a country that has engaged with the processes 
of bureaucratic change associated with new public management. Following a key 
transition towards liberalisation in 1991, through the adoption of a New Economic 
Policy, the role of the Indian state3 in development has changed, involving, amongst 
other things, a redefinition of the role of government officials. It was not until 1997 
that the government's commitment to managerial governance was officially 
publicised in the discussion note for 'Responsive and Effective Administration' (Goi, 
1997). In the final section of this chapter, I consider the nature and extent of economic 
reform in India, and then analyse the Indian state's adoption of NPM, and discuss the 
implications for the bureaucracy within the case study State of Uttar Pradesh. 
1.2: The Washington Consensus 
For much of the 1980s and 1990s the Washington Consensus dominated 'mainstream' 
development theory and practice (Cook, 1997). The term was coined in the late 1980s 
by John Williamson (Williamson, 1990), and denotes a series of measures that it was 
presumed would lead 'developing' countries to greater economic growth. These 
prescriptions derived from the neoliberal policy framework that already held sway in 
much of the developed world, notably the USA and UK. They included fiscal and 
monetary austerity, reduction in government subsidies, moderate taxation, freeing of 
interest rates, lowering of exchange rates, liberalisation of foreign trade, privatisation, 
deregulation and the pursuit of foreign direct investment (World Bank, 1991 ). 
Fine argues that two factors supported the global legitimisation of the Consensus 
(Fine, 2001 ). First, the global demise of development ideology and practice of the 
1950s and 1960s provided space for the development of a new doctrine. In the 1970s 
and 1980s the leftist policies of government ownership and control of strategic 
industries, import substitution, five year plans, regulation of labour market and state 
control of saving and investment seemed less effective at delivering growth. For 
Paulson (1999) the negative impact of state-led development in relation to sub-
3 To distinguish between them, I use the upper case 'State' when referring to the federal units of India 
(e.g. The State of Uttar Pradesh), and the lower case 'state' when referring to the idea in the abstract 
(e.g. state-society relations, the Indian state). 
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Saharan Africa led to monopoly practices m resource allocation and distribution, 
distorted prices, lack of competition and neglect of the private sector. The policies 
that had gained inspiration primarily from Keynesianism and the Soviet model in the 
inter-war years had lost favour by the 1980s and led to a neo-liberal 'counter-
revolution' (Toye, 1987, 1993, 1994). The final collapse of the Soviet Union appeared 
to symbolise the 'triumph of capitalism' and the 'free market'. Fine (2001) contends 
that Washington was, for many, the undisputed political, economic and ideological 
centre of the world (as the home of the World Bank and the American government). 
The second factor legitimising the Consensus for Fine, was its promotion by the 
International Financial Institutions (IFis), above all the IMF, the World Bank and 
bilateral pressures, that turned neo-liberal ideas into policy in the developing world. 
By the late 1980s, the Consensus had become the orthodoxy within these institutions, 
as well as for the mainly western and western-educated individuals who were 
designing policy for developing nations (Stirrat, 2000). If its intellectual superiority 
was not initially accepted by the developing nations, then aid conditionality would 
force compliance (Toye, 1994; Mkandawire, 1994; Morrison et al. 1994; Haggard and 
Webb, 1993; Wade, 1996). Bandyopadhyay ( 1991) notes that consensus implies 
choice whereas aid conditionality has forced many nations into adopting the dominant 
Washington Consensus agenda. He comments that, 
'It is becoming an in-thing in recent development literature, assiduously 
crafted and hawked by the north, either to deny aid or to use it as leverage in 
securing changes in the system of governance in aid receiving countries' (p. 
3109). 
This process is described by O'Tuathail et al. as one whereby, 
'national institutions, policies and practices become adjusted to the evolving 
structures and dynamics of a world economy of capitalist production' ( 1998: 
13). 
The debt crisis had seriously limited room for manoeuvre for many developing 
nations, so whilst in reality there may never have been a global Consensus there was 
certainly global convergence to the Washington modeL 
For Pereira ( 1995), the 1990s revealed flaws in the Washington Consensus. Fiscal and 
monetary conservatism might have been heralded as capable of securing greater 
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stability in some developing countries, but evidence of successful cases was limited 
(Simon, 1995; Wood, 1997). Critics have suggested that, at best, the benefits of 
privatisation policies have been greatly exaggerated (Cook, 1997; Cook and 
Kirkpatrick, 1995). De Vries argues that the institutions were failing to deliver in 
terms of economic development and stabilisation. 
'After more than fifty years of operations, the Bank still faces a world where 
over I billion people live in deep poverty, with per capita income of less than 
a dollar per day. Many countries suffer poverty rates between 25 and 50 per 
cent of their population. These conditions persist despite important 
improvements in critical social indicators such as life expectancy, infant 
mortality, access to safe water, primary school enrolment and immunisation' 
(1996: 65). 
Growth outcomes were both drastically lower than estimates had predicted and 
typically lower than those experienced in the I 950s and 1960s (Fine, 200 I; Arrighi, 
2002). Poverty reduction had been disappointing even by World Bank calculations. 
The elimination of restrictions on domestic finance and on international capital flows 
resulted in massive global crises, most notably in SE Asia (Rigg, 2002), but had not 
always increased the efficiency of productive investment. For Fine, the transformation 
of the eastern bloc countries into capitalist ones in particular had been an abject 
failure (2001; see also Stiglitz, 2002). 
1.3: The Post-Washington Consensus 
Several key events during the 1990s were fundamental in shifting policy debates from 
a Washington to a Post-Washington Consensus (Singh, 2001). For Arora, until the 
middle of I 997, the 'East Asia Miracle' (World Bank, I 993: 5) attracted little debate 
in public circles (Arora, I 999). Certain South-east and East Asian countries had 
apparently managed to deliver economic development in an impressive manner and 
they had also done well on the equity front. Their outward orientation had given them 
considerable strength to participate in an open international economy (Amsden, 
I 985). In theory, what had marked them out, apart from the sound policies they had 
consistently followed, was their superior institutional capacity. This capacity had been 
used to foster market opportunity that has in turn fostered rapid economic growth. The 
lesson of the 'miracle' was the fit between the market and strong institutional 
capacity. There were, however, some dissenting voices who saw instead a 'miracle' to 
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be emulated, a form of governance which centred primarily on the exploitation of 
labour power (Moore, 1993; Akyuz, Chang and Kozui-Wright, 1998)). 
By the end of 1997 the situation had changed dramatically, and the original doctrine 
lost ground. Whilst previously the Bank had supported the East Asian route to 
development, with only a few fine adjustments recommended for better resource 
allocation, there now appeared to be a need to rethink this strategy (World Bank, 
1997a; 1997b). Where institutional arrangements had elicited more or less uncritical 
acclaim, now scrutiny of the unhealthy nexus between top business people and rent-
seekers seemed essential in order to bolster investor confidence (lain, 1998a; Kaul, 
1994 ). However, the shift was not as dramatic as may have been predicted with the 
scale of the 'crisis' in East Asia (Rigg, 2002; Wade, 1996). The Bank suggested that 
there had been insufficient interaction between the international financial markets and 
the economies in question. They argued for the need to assess where the balance 
should lie between what market participants could, or should, do and what the role of 
the state should have been. Today, according to the Bank, the question is not simply 
about state or market promotion, but fundamentally about balancing the roles of both 
(1997a). 
If a single event can be seen to represent the shift from the old Consensus, it would be 
the speech given by Joseph Stiglitz ( 1998) in early 1998. In his talk, 'More 
instruments and broader goals: Moving towards the Post-Washington Consensus', 
Stiglitz was seeking to establish a new agenda for economic development. He argued 
that, 
'Trying to get government better focused on the fundamentals - economic 
policies, basic education, health, roads, law and order, environmental 
protection- is a vital step. But focusing on the fundamentals is not a recipe for 
a minimalist government. The state has an important role to play in 
appropriate regulation, industrial policy, social protection and welfare. But the 
choice is not whether the state should or should not be involved. Instead, it is 
often a matter of how it gets involved. More importantly, we should not see 
the state and markets as substitutes ... the government should see itself as a 
complement to markets, undertaking those actions that make markets fulfil 
their functions better' ( 1998: 25). 
And indeed, during the late 1990s there was a notable shift away from both the 
intellectual and policy dominance of the Washington Consensus. The changes that 
were introduced were based on the idea that institutions (such as the government and 
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the various branches of the civil service, the legal sector and regulatory environment) 
and non-market factors more generally, are both important and necessary in 
facilitating information flows, lessening transaction costs and providing a stable 
environment for investment and growth (World Bank, 1997b). It should be noted, 
however, that the gradual development of the Post-Washington Consensus remains 
deeply conservative in fiscal and monetary matters; it does not in principle oppose 
liberalisation and deregulation, and it remains broadly in favour of free trade and 
privatisation (Aybar and Lapavitas, 2001 ). Within the Post-Washington Consensus, 
development for the majority of countries, has remained market led, albeit tempered 
by state regulation (Desai and Imrie, 1998). Changes have included the slimming 
down of the state, reduced levels of public expenditure, extension of private sector 
roles in governance and the focus on efficiency within the public sector (Polidano, 
1998). 
It is on changes within the public administration that the interest of this thesis lies. 
Since the 1990s there is much evidence suggesting a general trend towards the 
managerialisation of states. The UK, the US and New Zealand have, in particular, led 
the reform agenda, and adopted it to the greatest extent. However, this process is not 
universal (Desai and Imrie, 1998). Polidano suggests that in fact, most developing 
countries have typically retrenched their civil services and decentralised a range of 
peripheral service functions, but 'have stopped short of the rest of the [new public 
management] agenda' (1998: 9). Support for continued right wing methods of reform 
of the civil services remain (Batley, 1999). As late as 1997 for example, the IMF was 
arguing that there was 'still scope for further downsizing' (Leinart and Modi, 1997: 
32). 
The changes in public administration associated with the 'Post-Washington 
Consensus' parallel attempts made by Prime Minister (Tony) Blair and President 
(Bill) Clinton in the late 1990s to carve out a 'third-way' (Giddens, 1998), between 
the paths of Thatcherite economic liberalism and traditional bureaucratic 
interventionism, through a greater promotion of the role of state as a facilitator of 
economic reform (Minocha, 1999). In many respects the new frameworks promoted 
by international agencies like the World Bank reflect a desire to find a 'third-way' in 
international development (Fine, 2001 ). This is, of course, not surprising, considering 
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the influence of Thatcher and Reagan on the original Washington Consensus 
developments of the 1980s onwards. Similarly, the current changes in multilateral 
policy should be read in conjunction with the emphasis placed on domestic policy by 
the Blair and Clinton administrations in the 1990s4. 
Two elements of the differences between the Washington Consensus and the Post-
Washington Consensus are especially relevant to this study. They are governance, and 
how to foster it; and the promotion of social capital through civil society (taken to 
refer to the sphere of association, outside the state), in which people 'freely' 
participate. How these concepts are defined and understood has critical implications 
for the necessary role and nature of reform of the public bureaucracy. 
Governance is notoriously difficult to define (Agarwal, 19981; Minocha, 1999; 
Abrahamsen, 200 I), but Painter describes it as, 
'the involvement of a wide range of institutions and actors in the production of 
policy outcomes, including non-governmental organisations, quangos, private 
companies, pressure groups, and social movements as well as those state 
institutions traditionally regarded as formally part of the government' (2000: 
317). 
He continues that, 
'Most writers though go further than this and argue that the state has become 
less prominent and non-state organisations have become relatively more 
important within the overall process of governance' (p. 317). 
Critically it encompasses the policy frameworks, rules and institutions that regulate 
the conduct of private and public activity and manage the role of the bureaucracy. 
Examples include financial and corporate accountability, an adequate legal system, 
judicial independence and transparent regulatory bodies. Most of these goals depend 
on building institutional capacity. Whereas the previous Washington Consensus 
demanded the 'shrinking' of the state (Bayliss and Cramer, 200 I), the new policy 
agenda necessitates getting the right institutional mix for optimum functioning of 
markets. 
4 With the recent change of administration in America under Bush it is possible that policy may shift 
slightly to a more Conservative stance. 
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One reason for the popularity of the idea of 'good governance' is the realisation 
within the World Bank, and increasingly within the IMF, that without institutional 
support, reforms are likely to fail (WB, 1997). In part this is due to the impact of 'new 
institutional economics'. The work of Douglas North has been particularly influential 
in this area. North argues that the market system and property rights do not arise 
spontaneously, but are in fact the creations of governments ( 1990). The implication of 
this was to focus attention on the 'supply' of market institutions by governments. One 
area where the emphasis on good governance is being reflected, is in the provision of 
regulatory frameworks in previously deregulated sectors of the economy. Where this 
framework has not been in place, power from the state has sometimes been transferred 
to influential networks of bureaucrats and private actors (including criminal networks) 
it is now argued, who have created cartels in the profitable sectors of the economy, 
derailing the reform programmes. An example often cited is that of Russia. (Stiglitz, 
2002). 
Some commentators have criticised the ambiguous nature of the concept of 'good 
governance' arguing that it can be manipulated to serve the needs of very different 
ideologies (Kiely, 1998). Whilst both the World Bank and UNDP have produced 
publications to highlight its strengths (World Bank, 1997b; UNDP, 1997a, 1997b), the 
phrase is very subjective. UNDP's former Administrator, James Gustave Speth, 
defines it as, 
'participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also 'effective' and 'efficient' 
depending on how these terms are defined. And it promotes the rule of justice 
under law. Good governance ensures that political, social and economic 
priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the 
poorest and most vulnerable are heard in decision making ... (UNDP 1997b: 
2)' 0 
The diverse range of goals outlined above are potentially contradictory. For example, 
if decision-making is participatory, accountable and transparent, it is likely to involve 
the often lengthy processes of negotiation and accommodation. These ends therefore 
do not necessarily fit with the idea of making governance more effective and efficient. 
Kiely ( 1998) has argued that it is the very ambiguity of the concept which has 
promoted its global ascendancy as various divergent actors are able to speak the same 
language whilst taking very different connotations from its meaning. 
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Though this dissertation does not aim to analyse the workings or policies of the World 
Bank in relation to their promotion of good governance, it is interesting to note a 
recent report on their Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) approach. Panos (2002) 
argues that the policies adopted by the Bank over the last three years as a condition 
for debt relief, loans or aid is seriously flawed. The NGO's report suggests that, 
despite the rhetoric, the policies of good governance are too closely related to those of 
Structural Adjustment and are used as a means to justify a reduction in government 
expenditure and the opening of the economies of the countries to which they lend. 
The second element of particular note is the concentration on 'social capital' as the 
'missing link' in development (Grootaert, 1997). Much discussion regarding social 
capital centres on the work of the economist Robert Putman (1993), though its 
antecedents can be seen in particularly in the work of Bourdieu (1980, 1986, 1987) 
and Coleman (1988, 1990). Putnam (1993), in his book, 'Making Democracy Work: 
civic traditions in modern Italy', defines social capital as, 
'Features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust, that 
facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit' (1993: 167). 
The thrust of Putman's argument suggests that if these norms and networks link large 
proportions of civil society, a critical condition for 'good government' is created. In 
short, he states that economic performance relates to the interactive effects of both 
social and economic capital. 
Recently, John Harriss (2002) has produced a scathing critique of the idea of 'social 
capital' as developed by Putnam and employed by the World Bank. He argues that the 
idea of social capital focusing on 'local organisations' and 'self-help', is premised on 
the idea that the most disadvantaged can help themselves, and justifies large-scale 
public expenditure cuts. Harriss argues that Putnam' s concept and use of social capital 
more or less ignores the role of public institutions and the lines of causality run only 
in one direction - from society, specifically horizontal voluntary associations, to 
government performance and presumably the functioning of democracy. He suggests 
that the 'society-centric' argument has come to lend power to the elbow of 
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conservative 'rollers back of the state' 5 both in the United States and in International 
Development. He uses a vast range of examples to suggest that rather than 'civicness' 
providing the 'soil' in which different state structures 'grow', causality runs in the 
opposite direction. Harriss presents evidence to suggest that state institutions can lay 
the basis for generalised trust, citing Brehm and Rahm who argue, 
'a stronger relationship running from trust in institutions to interpersonal trust 
than the other way round suggesting that more trustworthy governmental 
institutions make for greater social trust in society' (cited in Foley and 
Edwards, 1999). 
To support his thesis he draws on the work of Peter Evans (1992, 1995, 1996a) and 
Judith Tendler (1997), who both demonstrates that in cases where development 
projects have done particularly well, state institutions have played a pivotal role. He 
argues that such evidence would support the greater involvement of the state in 
development policy. He notes, 
'Where programmes have been made to work much more effectively than 
before - in the health sector, and in agriculture and drought relief - it has 
substantially been because of changes in work organisations and in the 
commitment of government workers. In many ways patterns have come to 
resemble those of successful private-sector enterprises: flexible, involving 
team-work, and a client centred problem solving approach (rather than the 
delivery of centrally determined 'products') ... It has shown the public what 
should be expected of public employees, and publicity has been given, too, to 
the importance of complaints from members of the public about failures of 
performance (2002: 67, emphasis mine)'. 
As Harriss contends, evidence does point to the fact that, in many cases, effective 
public bureaucracies can play a focal role in development policy. What Harriss 
appears to overlook is the changes that have been made over the last five years, 
particularly in relation to the good governance debates and the nature of bureaucratic 
reform (discussed in the next section). The research he cites was almost exclusively 
carried out in the 1980s or early 1990s, and is part of the body of work that has fed 
into the Post-Washington Consensus recommendations. It is interesting to note that 
when quoting Evans' (1996a) observations regarding the lack of 'embeddedness' 
witnessed in the Indian administration, Harriss concedes that, 
-'Other definitions of this phenomenon include: Rhodes ( 1992), Hollowing out of the State; Peter Se Ifs 
analysis of Government by the Market (1993); David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, (1992) Reinventing 
Government; also Peter Drucker, (1995) Really Reinventing Government. 
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'It is possible that things have changed in India since he (Evans) did his 
research (before the introduction of the economic reform programme in 1991 )' 
(p. 131). 
However Harriss, is unwilling to afford the same flexibility to the possibility that 
· World Bank policies and practices may have changed over the same period. I would 
suggest that rather than the Bank focusing explicitly on the rolling back of the state 
there has, through the Post-Washington Consensus, been a shift in ideology 
refocusing on the nature of state institutions rather than their fundamental role, seen 
through the nature of NPM reforms recently initiated. Despite these specific changes 
from the earlier Consensus, it would be an error to read these as a strict departure 
from the past. The new Consensus can be more accurately understood as the political 
moderation of the earlier economic emphasis on structural reform based on open 
markets, deregulation and less government. Not all are convinced of the World 
Bank's revisionist views, indeed for Kiely, the new views on governance are 
problematic as they, 
'retain commitment to a flawed neo-liberal paradigm which sees states as 
inherently inefficient economic actors and reduces development to a single 
process of technical policy making' ( 1998: 81 ). 
1.4: New Public Management 
In the 1990s, NPM was, and some would argue still is, heavily influenced by public 
choice theory (PCT), and the belief in the efficacy of the market as the primary mode 
of production for economic development. The discourse) rapidly acquired global 
dimensions during this decade with the diffusion of new public management reforms 
through foreign aid policies of Northern governments (mainly through multilateral 
and bilateral aid mechanisms) (Desai and Imrie, 1998). 
Within this section, I outline the traditional conception of new public management 
(NPM) as adopted by one of its exemplars, the USA. I outline some key theoretical 
influences on public management before discussing critiques of new public 
management in practice. The final paragraphs of this section outline other more recent 
influences on NPM, aimed at cultural and institutional change within the 
administration. 
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Table 1.2: Key Features on New Public Management: 
The pri11cipal featur~s of NPM include: 
' . '.. . .· . :' ' . '" -~ 
• An e(liph~sis away~ofl)iss~~~?t~~if't~);\h,t>~O 911\l~pagernent: . . 
• A shift towarqs the'tljsa~?feg~ti<?p:KJ>f':~g1J,l~~!'r!~Hve units; 
• The qeatioh ~:r e~~~,i~it staq4~r4s ~~Ao/~%s~f~~::~rR~rfqrrnarioe; .•. 
• Anemphasis onrescilts:ratherthaa·;pr9ded.tifes; 
. . :. ' "" ., .::·· ' :: '-_ :..~ ~--~~ _·_:t:; .. - ·~:~.:._, __ -·: : 
• The· 4se ·of contract arrangemenJijri~i~~' as well' as out~ide the public 
sector; ·and 
• A general adoption of private seot9r cqrfi~r~.te _pra~tices. 
Massle:, {997: 8; Bu.rns et ai., 1994: 84. 
It is difficult to produce a definitive statement regarding new public management, as it 
has been given different emphases in different countries and has changed over time. 
Two of its leading proponents, Osborne and Gaebler, in their 1992 book 'Reinventing 
Government', describe a positive change in sprawling and wasteful bureaucracies of 
the past to a more streamlined and efficient service. They see new public management 
as enabling the creation of ' entrepreneurial governance' that consists of ten essential 
elements to 'reinvent' public sector organisations: 
'Entrepreneurial governments promote competition between service providers. 
They empower citizens by pushing control out of the bureaucracy, into the 
community. They measure the performance of their agencies, focusing not on 
inputs but on outcomes. They are driven by their goals - their missions - not 
by rules and regulations. They redefine their clients as customers and offer 
them choices - between schools, between training programmes, between 
housing options. They prevent problems before they emerge, rather than 
simply offering services afterwards. They put their energies into eaming 
money, not simply spending it. They decentralise authority, embracing 
participatory management. They prefer market mechanisms to bureaucratic 
mechanisms. And they focus on providing public services but on catalyzing all 
sectors- public, private and voluntary- into action to solve their community's 
problems (Ibid. 19-20)'. 
The 'reinvention' case is that in order to respond creatively to problems, a changing 
perception of the role of state institutions is necessary. Os borne has argued that, 
'many of the tools used to improve the performance of companies- employee 
empowerment, internal competition, and measurement can be marshalled to 
'reinvent' government itself (quoted in Posner and Rothstein, 1994: 133). 
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Exponents of new public management suggest that it can assist the large-scale 
transformation from unresponsive, paternalistic bureaucracies to customer driven, 
flexible, quality orientated and responsive organisations (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). 
The case of the United States in the 1990s exemplifies two important (and often 
contradictory) aspects incorporated in NPM - that of the neo-liberal privatisation 
agenda and the focus on administrative reform. Here change took place under Bill 
Clinton's administration, in the form of the National Performance Review (NPR) 
(Margetts, 1997: 47). During his election campaign, Clinton focused on the need for 
reform based on Osborne and Gaebler's (1992) Reinventing Government, through 
which 'entrepreneurial government' was envisaged. Following these suggestions 
Clinton initiated an intensive six-month study of the federal bureaucracy,6 carried out 
by 250 government employees under the leadership of AI Gore. Changes that 
followed the recommendations included increased competition in service delivery, 
devolved budgets allocated on the basis of outcomes, and community-oriented service 
provision. It was felt that in many cases, policy decisions could be separated from 
service delivery, and they used the metaphors of 'steering' as opposed to 'rowing' 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Government was to be reinvented as a catalyst, 
empowering communities to solve their own problems. 
The NPR took the form of two distinct phases (Margetts, 1997), the first in 1993, the 
second in 1995. In the first phase, it focused primarily on the workings of 
government, rather than its fundamental role. It concentrated on three themes of 
putting the customer first, cutting red tape and empowering employees for results. 
Privatisation was noticeably absent in this instance. The second phase contrasts 
starkly, with privatisation and contracting out brought to the fore. This phase 
concentrated on 'Cutting Back to Basics', which has come to mean a refocusing and, 
importantly, a 'downsizing' of federal government activities (see footnote). The back 
to basics agenda was pursued through a range of measures including 'service 
termination', privatisation, the creation of quasi-government corporations and greater 
reliance on public private partnerships (PPPs). The belief here was that outsourcing 
and competition in service provision would improve services and efficiency. 
6 The American strategy is based on the experiences from the United States' state and local 
governments- it does not tackle the problems found in the US federal government. 
14 
Chapter 1: Theoretical Underpinnings of Research 
The experience of the United States highlights two variant foci of NPM. The first 
points to bureaucratic reform focusing on internal economy and efficiency. The 
second, however, envisages improved performance through the fundamental 
reordering of power equations between the providers and the recipients of public 
goods and services. Whilst couched in the language of 'customer driven bureaucracy' 
many aspects promoted in the US necessitate a fundamental rethjnk of the nature and 
scope of the public bureaucracy (Sharma, 2000). 
As in the US case the NPM philosophy has been associated both implicitly and 
explicitly with a number of divergent approaches. Public choice theory (PCT), as its 
most contentious association, has perhaps received widest attention as a theoretical 
underpinning of the discourse. Niskanen's (1971) foundational text on public choice 
theory suggests that 'vote seeking politicians' and 'budget maximising bureaucrats' 
produce excessive governmental structures. Public choice theorists suggest that state 
actors are rational self-seekers (Tullock, 1965, 1970; Buchanan et a! 1980). These 
analysts promote a political agenda driven by the desire to free citizens from the 
'tyranny' of public bureaucracy, and to make both politicians and civil servants 
responsive to the people they serve (Niskanen, 1971 ). Since politicians and 
bureaucrats are unlikely to promote a reduction in their own authority, so public 
choice theorists suggest, the pressure for reform should come from external forces. It 
aims to limit the damage the public sector can do and focuses on 'externalisation'; 
namely the removal of 'excess' workers, contracting out of service production and 
delivery to non-public providers (or in the immediate sense to arms-length agencies 
within). In order to do this, it argues for a transformed working environment for 
public managers and employees so they operate under business style regimes, with 
incentives to perform7, both to increase efficiency and limit rent seeking opportunity. 
7 This literature is now referred to as the 'new political economy' or, more narrowly, the literature of 
rational choice and rent seeking elites. The key text referring to developing countries is Krueger 
(1974); other more general work includes, Tullock (1965), Niskanen (1971 ), and Buchanan et al. 
(1980). More recent works include La! (1983), Colander (1984), Bates (1988), Gelb et al. (1991 ), and 
Schwartz (1994). Critiques of public choice dominantion of NPM in the developing world are offered 
by Samuels and Mercuro (1984), Grindle (I 991), Fishlow (1989, 1991), Moore (1989), and Streeten 
(1993). For more general critique, see Starr (1988) and Kelman (I 988). 
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While the experiences of new public management differ between and within countries 
there are key contradictory and problematic tendencies associated with the form of 
NPM promoted by PCT. First, contrary to its aim of increased efficiency, PCT-driven 
new public management has seen a proliferation of government and extra government 
agencies generating a potential crisis of governance in terms of accountability 
(Barberis, 1998). It has also been analysed to lead to the problems of re-
bureaucratisation by the new governance agencies (Doig and Wilson, 1998); and 
problems in co-ordination and control of policy development and implementation by 
new managers. Indeed, far from the promise of streamlined, efficient services, some 
evidence suggests the reverse (Cochrane, 1993, Stewart, 1998). The second point 
relates to the idea of market provision of services. Public choice theorists suggest that 
basing the design and development of policies on the idea of market consumerism, 
'offers the possibility of services being more attentive to the issue of social 
diversity in the challenge that it makes to service-led structures of provision' 
(Ciarke and Newman, 1997, p.111 ). 
This idea is potentially positive, as it attempts to move away from the idea of a single 
unified public towards a plurality of user interests and focuses on the notion that the 
specific needs of users will be diverse. Two points of contention, however, can be 
raised in this debate. First, this concept demands the presence of a 'cultivated 
consumer' who is able to demand and access their specific needs, or it is likely to 
descend into an environment in which democratisation of choice is more apparent 
than real (Hadley and Clough, 1996). This type of market provision necessarily 
involves public participation. For Desai this type of participation in India, represents 
little more than (official) rhetoric. In her research on slum housing in Bombay she 
argues relations between state institutions, NGOs and their beneficiaries/consumers 
are increasingly managed by the market in ways which excludes those without control 
over resources, or the ability to demand them ( 1995, 1996). 
The second point relates to the nature of provision through market consumerism. For 
Potter (1994 ), this essentially necessitates an analysis of 'how' services should be 
provided rather than Clarke and Newman's argument for a market that decides 'which 
services should be provided' (1997: 108). Further, just as state provision can be 
flawed, so can that by the market. Through market provision, opportunities have 
emerged for rent-seeking and corruption, whereby contracts may be given to a small 
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dominant elite who contain and maintain existing power structures (Harriss-White, 
1996). 
Clarke and Newman suggest that new public management is premised on the 
management of finite resources in a fragmented policy arena and a retreat from 
'generic fields of public provision' (1997: 79). Through new public management 
under the influence of PCT, organisations outside the state are expected to fill the 
void left by the state in public provision. For Desai and Imrie this can lead to 
problems of 'policy gaps' or increased problems in policy implementation ( 1998). 
Hadley and Clough ( 1996), in their study of the British health care system, note 
problems of overburdened managers and systems highly controlled by central state 
directives through government attempts to oversee devolution of power to the local 
level. Similarly in India, contracting out to NGOs has been commissioned along the 
same strict and inflexible lines. Desai and Howes (1995) cite the example of 
Apnalaya, a Bombay-based NGO providing counselling services for addicts and their 
families, which depended on a central government grant to meet the running costs. 
The grant in turn depended on Apnalaya treating thirty people at any one time, a 
target set by officials who had not visited the Centre, when it only had the capacity to 
deal effectively with fifteen. This, along with other stringent conditions, eventually 
led to the closure of the centre (Desai and Howes, 1995). 
Clarke and Newman refer to the logic of NPM as focusing on 'core business' with the 
'effect of narrowing frameworks for the evaluation of services to assessment of their 
performance and efficiency as a business' (1997: 79). The assessment criteria, based 
on performance indicators, have the effect of providing only partial analysis of 
performance and encourage practices that feed assessment rather than broader policy 
concerns. In his analysis of new public management in the UK, Imrie ( 1999) suggests 
that 'auditing culture' has not only placed importance on narrow economic 
determinants at the expense of broader social issues, but that resources have been 
diverted in the processes and procedures of audit away from service provision. 
Recently, commentators have begun to focus on the potential offered within NPM to 
alter the culture of public institutions without changing their fundamental role. Such 
authors suggest that neither bureaucrats nor politicians make simple profit maximising 
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calculations, though advantages may exist for these individuals in a number of ways. 
Benefits may be based on financial gain, but equally may be through job satisfaction 
created through a sense of empowerment, ownership or status. These NPM goals have 
been promoted through policy measures that include 'localisation' and 'de-
bureaucratisation'. 
Localisation stresses the dual processes of devolution and deconcentration. The 
immediately relevant implication of localisation is that the flow of power (in larger 
societal terms as well as intra-organisational ones) is directed downwards; so too is 
the flow of information. Through this, it is hoped, significant networks and expertise 
can be built up at the lowest practical level within the bureaucracy. These lower 
levels, through the process of power relocation, will gain in strategic importance. 
According to Dunleavy, it is precisely through this dispersal of power that the 
bureaucracy can become more responsive and effective service providers ( 1991 ). 
De-bureaucratisation denotes a shift from the relatively rigid, hierarchical, 
homogenised bureaucracy of the Weberian (1964) idea, to a more fragmented, 
polycentric, fissiparous form8 (Fox and Miller, 1995). De-bureaucratisation has a 
number of (sometimes contradictory) connotations. In an attempt to reduce the 
amount of 'bureaucracy' in public administration, de-bureaucratisation has been used 
to promote delayering of the traditional hierarchy. Some of the possibilities include 
splitting up internally into more autonomous units, decentralisation designed to 
enhance the importance of lower level of the organisational pyramid, and 
empowerment of lower level functionaries (LLF). The term implies an attitudinal 
change, the removal of bureaucratic pathologies including red tape and delays, and 
attempts to open the forms of governance to be more simplistic and transparent. This 
idea of de-bureaucratisation highlights the divergent nature of managerial reform, as 
the term has also been used to advocate small government, devoted to policy 
management, with service provision controlled by non-public providers (Rhodes, 
1994). 
x The extent to which a true Weberian bureaucracy can be said to exist is, of course, highly debateable 
(Esman, 1997). 
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For Sharma (2000) these three (non-exhaustive) influences of externalisation, 
localisation and de-bureaucratisation are important for several reasons. They show 
that the moves towards NPM are neither unidirectional nor a singular process, each 
element implyies alternative types of reform for different administrations. Through 
these divergent changes it is clear that NPM is more than a current whim of individual 
nations, but a manifestation of deeper changes in ideas in national governments, 
international organisations, and in academic institutions (Hood, 1991, 1995, 1998). 
Furthermore the variety of influences on NPM, means the way in which it is realised 
differs between, and even within, countries. Polidano ( 1998) has argued that it can 
'be argued that such a thing as a unified coherent new public management 
model exists only in concept' (p. 373). 
As noted earlier, Desai and Imrie suggest that more research is necessary into the way 
in which new public management has been incorporated in different contexts. This 
thesis investigates the ways in which change associated with NPM has been 
assimilated and resisted in the Indian context. Within the next section I outline and 
analyse the major economic changes over the last decade that have led to the adoption 
of an adapted form of new public management by the Indian state. 
1.5: Indian Economic and Administrative Reform 
Cox ( 1987) has described an increasing 'internationalisation of the state', which refers 
to the growing influence of global forces on the working of individual states, through 
loan conditionalities, multinational companies, and the need of the individual country 
to be part of the global economic environment (p.2). But Clarke and Newman argue 
that whilst the influence of global forces on national systems of governance are 
considerable, shifts to new public management are more complex than the direct 
translation of dominant global agendas to the (sub)national level (Clarke and 
Newman, 1997). They argue in particular that change in local governance structure 
cannot be read off, as some seek to do, 
'as the local effect of a global set of ideas about how to run public 
organisations'. 
They argue that it is possible to over-emphasise global forces in the logic of change, 
'seeing forces such as globalisation, institutional fragmentation, the adoption 
of business ideas and practices in public service delivery, as cascading down 
from the global level of new economic pressures to the world of individual 
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experience and action in a way which suggests simple linear sequences of 
cause and effect' ( 1997: ix) 
The 1990s were marked by considerable change in India, notably following the 
adoption of a New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1991. Whilst events in India were 
certainly influenced by global agendas, they were not dominated by them, neither did 
India accept the neo-liberal agenda to the letter. Some have argued that the piecemeal 
and negotiated way India moved towards liberalisation has enabled it to avoid many 
of the pitfalls witnessed in other developing nations (Corbridge and Harriss, 2002). 
Whilst it is frequently heralded as such, 1991 was not the beginning of the 
liberalisation process in India (Khilnani, 1997). Neither are current moves an 'all or 
nothing' process: confrontation and negotiation have been persistent phenomena 
throughout. The latest thrust however, has been greater in degree and scope than 
anything preceding it, and has shown striking qualitative differences. Despite notable 
achievements during the 'interventionist period',9 as early as the 1960s it was 
becoming evident that the goals of development with social justice had not been 
achieved via the quasi-socialist route. On the contrary, economic power and the 
distribution of economic growth had primarily benefited an elite minority. Poverty in 
India persisted in spite of the proclaimed goals of leadership to regulatory, 
bureaucratic and administrative state model of growth and justice. Roy has argued 
that 'trickle-down' theory had been falsified in the Indian situation (1995). The 
Congress party under Indira Gandhi first moved away from self-reliance in 1971 
when it approached the IMF for a loan of US $5 billion to stabilise fiscal reserves and 
support the Green Revolution strategy. However internal friction opposing the loans 
was so strong that the final instalment was rejected. Both Indira and her son Rajiv 
made efforts to open the Indian economy. They made some changes in licensing 
procedures, and delicensed some industries to provide increased flexibility and 
economic growth. Paranjape ( 1988) observes that Rajiv especially deployed tactics of 
a Janus-faced nature. On one hand he supported some aspects of the Nehruvian legacy 
whilst at the same time trying to reduce the powers and functioning of the powerful 
regulatory, bureaucratic, administrative state. Further, it is argued that Rajiv probably 
9 Achievements under intervention include progress in regard to food production and distribution, 
industrial growth and diversification, self-reliance, poverty alleviation and regional balance (World 
Bank survey, 1989). 
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thought that his term would usher in the policy of liberalisation (Paranjape, 1988). 
Notwithstanding these moves, the model of development remained predominantly 
interventionist, due in no small part to the reaction by elite pressure to maintain the 
status quo. By the end of the 1980s, however, Bhagwati argues that cracks in the 
interventionist armour were becoming irreparable (1993). 
In the summer of 1991, Finance Minister Manmohan Singh introduced reforms that 
have largely been continued by his successors of differing political affiliations. In 
India economic reform has dismantled major sections of industrial licensing, relaxed 
the provisions for the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969, 
provided incentives for foreign equity investment in high priority industries, 
encouraged joint ventures and drastically reduced import taxation. According to 
Stephen Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, the reforms have dismantled 'a considerable 
portion of the Licence Raj', and that they observed 'Nehruvian socialism succumbing 
to history in the same year as the Soviet Union'. As a result they contend that the 
actual growth rate of the Indian economy may have 'increased to more than six per 
cent per year' (Radelet and Sachs 1997: 57). Whilst changes have been substantial, 
they have not been entirely successful. The balance of payments crisis was still 
present in the late 1990s, and the incidence of rural poverty continued to rise despite 
an economic annual growth rate of around six per cent (Corbridge and Harriss, 2002). 
However, the 1990s did mark a substantial shift from the quasi-socialist path to 
development, previously pursued by the Indian government. 
To go back a little, after gaining Independence in 1947, the Indian government 
pursued the Nehru-Mahalanobis model for structural transformation of the economy 
based on Five Year development plans. By 1970, critiques of the model were growing 
more acute, perhaps most notably in the work of Bhagawti and Desai on the industrial 
and trade policies of India since 1951 ( 1970; see also Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1975). 
They argued, in agreement with other neo-liberal studies (see for example Little et al. 
1970), that the focus on planned development and self-sufficiency neglected the 'all 
important' area of economic growth. Bhagwati and Srinivasan, and Roy, suggested 
that India's political and bureaucratic elites, through their 'rent-seeking' practices, had 
allowed endemic corruption and the misallocation of economic resources. The 
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strength of the coalition between the various elites led Roy, as late as the mid 1980s, 
to suggest that the kind of reform which was soon. to occur was all but impossible, 
'Even a limited liberal agenda would appear to be still born. Incumbent 
politicians, government officials and the public-sector unions in general would 
vigorously oppose any reduction in government intervention in the economy 
for fear of losing the rents and sinecures of the status quo' (Roy 1984: 67). 
Neoliberal analysis of the reform of the 1990s points to the fiscal crisis which 
deepened in the late 1980s and early 1990s, under the governments of Rajiv Gandhi, 
V.P. Singh and Chandra Shekhar. The extent of the economic crisis experienced in 
1991 should not be underestimated. In June 1991, India faced a monumental foreign 
exchange crisis, its currency reserves having fallen to $1. 1 billion, representing 
enough for just two weeks of imports. In addition it was unable to service the $70 
billion foreign debt and had been refused further loans (Time Magazine, 1992). The 
situation was compounded by the deterioration of Indian finance from remittance 
payments following the Gulf Crisis ( 1990-1) and the rise of fiscal deficit to nine 
percent of GDP (Fernandez, and Mommen, 1998). Reform was encouraged despite 
the vested interests of elites. Singh chose currency devaluation and a bridging loan, 
with associated liberalisation and stabilisation conditionalities, from the IMF. 
Bhagwati's analysis suggests both the inevitability and continuity elements of shifts 
towards a more open economy. He states, 
'Reform by storm has supplanted the reform by stealth of Mrs. Gandhi's time 
and the reform with reluctance under Rajiv Gandhi' ( 1993: 58). 
For Deepak Lal the perpetuation of high budget deficits in the late 1990s necessitate 
further shifts to liberalisation, in what have been termed 'a second round of reforms'. 
Such moves, including privatisation and labour market reform, have led Lal to 
maintain that in India, 'globalisation is now an irreversible process' (1999: 46). 
Despite Lal's analysis it would be inaccurate to perceive moves to liberalisation in the 
early 1990s, analysed with the benefit of hindsight, as inevitable. Whilst there was a 
clear liquidity crisis, it is not suggested that the Indian state was heading towards 
bankruptcy, or that the earlier planned development strategies had been a complete 
failure. Agricultural growth and industrial output remained largely the same as in 
previous years and inflation levels were not abnormally high during this period 
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(Ghosh, 1998). The World Bank, in its report 'India: An industrialising economy in 
transition', had declared, 
'The 1980s ... are showing that growth of at least 5 per cent a year is 
achievable. Investment is being sustained at nearly 35 per cent of GDP (and) a 
consistent 92-94 per cent of this investment is being financed by domestic 
savings, which have been growing' (World Bank, 1989: 1 ). 
Successes within the economy at this time would suggest that reform was more 
complex than implied by the neo-liberal analysis of change. Corbridge and Harriss 
suggest that, 
'Although stabilisation policies were required in 1991, it is not clear that these 
policies should have led on to structural adjustment. .. The reforms, in short, 
were engineered by and for certain interest groups in India, with the help, of 
course, of the recently elected (minority) Congress government of Narashima 
Rao and the IMF; they were not an inevitable or 'natural' response to the fiscal 
and payment 'shock' of 1991' (2002: 1 07). 
Thus, a reading of history could suggest that India was forced to adopt liberalisation 
policies as a result of loan conditionality, but this is not the case. The government of 
India had, in fact, taken an IMF loan almost a decade earlier (1983) without adopting 
a more open approach to the economy (Surendra, 1999). According to Ashutosh 
Varshney ( 1996), pressures to reform had been building in India among the urban 
middle classes from the 1980s. However the Congress government of Rajiv Gandhi 
was either unwilling, or politically unable at that time, to push through the agenda of 
change. What differed by the early 1990s, was that the coalition government of Rao 
was able to pacify the opposition of the Communists and Janata Dal, in return for 
supporting them in their opposition to the BJP. Perhaps the most significant 
realisation of this support was seen in the adoption of reservation policy which would 
benefit the traditional lower caste support bases of both the Communist and JD 
. 10 parttes . 
Rob Jenkins ( 1997) suggests that moves to reform have been more radical and 
continuous than some accounts suggest. He highlights the fact reforms have continued 
10 In 1990, the National front government (under Prime Minister V.P. Singh) moved to adopt some of 
the recommendations of the Second Backward Classes (or Mandal) Commission. The government 
decided to increase the number of reserved education and government positions for the backward 
castes. Though the BJP has never publicly renounced India's system of reservation, its primary support 
comes from Forward Castes, and it has been reserved in its support for affirmative action. Concurrently 
it has attempted to create a single and undivided Hindu constituency (in line with the Hindutva 
ideology). 
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at both Central and State levels, even where reform would appear to threaten the 
interests of established elites, dominating what Varshney calls the arena of 'mass 
politics' (1996). Jenkins (1999) has identified three dominant sets of political tools, 
which he sees as having been fundamental in the adaptation and sustaining of 
liberalisation in India. Political incentives, Jenkins argues, were used in two ways. 
First, political and administrative elites were involved in the process of liberalisation 
from the outset, so they could shape reform to their benefit. Second, political 
incentives were used to 'divide and rule'. Incentives were used as a tool to manipulate 
individuals to change affiliations, magnifying the support from each group and 
intensifying what he terms the 'feedback of reform'. This analysis has also been 
suggested by Ravi Srivastava (1995), who links the growth of new political 
formations and increasing regionalisation of India's politics as regions press for 
favours from the Union Government or compete for foreign capital. Jenkins cites 
examples in Rajasthan, West Bengal and Orissa to suggest that reform is, 
'Increasingly implemented in the form of successive micro-reforms in 
different States, at different times, and under different political circumstances' 
(1997: 160). 
The manipulation of political institutions, Jenkins argues is the second factor in 
promoting and sustaining liberalisation. Opposition from formal political institutions, 
working within the federal system could be contained at the State level. He also 
claims informal institutions, representing networks of influence, were also identified 
and directly compensated in the process of liberalisation. 
The third factor important in sustaining liberalisation, relates to the political skill of 
key individuals throughout the process. Liberalisation, Jenkins suggests, was not 
expressed as part of a radical transformation, but rather as both a 'natural', and 
necessary 'transformation' within the state. He says the process has been guided by 
politicians experienced in building coalitions, working behind the scenes in India's 
democratic polity to pacify opposition. He notes that, 
'governing elites at many levels of the Indian polity were attracted by the 
potential of liberalisation to provide new sources of patronage to substitute for 
some of those forfeited by the shrinkage of the state's regulatory role' (1997: 
6). 
In Jenkins' view, the Indian state is at once a democratic state and a dirty state, and 
that is why it has been so effective. 
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1.6: New Public Management in India 
Alongside the NEP, the government of India in the 1990s initiated a changing role for 
the state and its functionaries (Veron, 1999). The document for the conference of 
Chief Secretaries of the State governments' in 1996, somewhat coyly termed a 
'Discussion Note', represents the most prominent early example of the direction of 
reforms (Government of India, 1996). The document, prepared by the Department of 
Administrative Reforms, 11 discusses the agenda for effective and responsive 
administration. It refers specifically to working in a context of economic liberalisation 
and argues that the state (and its functionaries) should now function as 'enabler' and 
'facilitator', rather than as a direct provider of goods and services. It praises the merits 
of the private sector, and argues that an objective analysis should be made to identify 
the areas and activities that should be converted to autonomous entities, entrusted to 
the private sector, or shared with voluntary organisations and community 
organisations. An important recommendation concerned the separation of policy 
formulation from policy implementation, the implication being that whereas policy 
formulation was an essentially political process, the last word being with the political 
executive, policy implementation is as a techno-economic exercise for which new 
accountability mechanisms had to be devised. Major sections of the document were 
couched in the currently modish language of 'human rights', 'customer orientation', 
'participation', 'democracy', 'the rights of citizens to information', 'ethics' in 
government, and the public services. 
In its totality, the Discussion Note is a document that is important both for what it 
says, as well as for what it omits, claiming that the limitations of the Nehruvian state-
led project of capitalist development had been exposed. As a consequence, a new role 
for the state, and the civil service as the indispensable institution of the state, had to be 
both formulated and made acceptable to different sections of public, political and 
administrative opinion. In order to achieve consensus, the document is deliberately 
vague. It leaves several statements in the air for the reader to interpret, for example, 
whom and for what purpose does the government enable and facilitate? There are 
hazy references to privatisation, to the objectives of deregulation, to whom to protect, 
how and to what extent. The study is deliberately ambiguous about how the civil 
11 This Department is part of the Ministry of Personnel that reports to the Cabinet Secretary. The 
Cabinet Secretary heads the civil service. 
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service is to be structured and equipped for its new role as an enabler and a facilitator. 
The document rather confusingly offers selective examples, drawing on the public 
administration experience of a range of developed and developing countries of 
enormously different historical and cultural backgrounds. It appears from the 
document that the administrators, as part of the ruling coalition, accept that something 
has to be done to help the faltering service, but cannot fully agree on what or why. 
The diagnosis of the performance of the Indian state by the World Bank at this time 
was unambiguously clear; agreement on the treatment was more problematic (WB, 
1997). A congruence of perspectives in regard to the basic functions of government 
had been developed, evidenced by language in both the World Development Report, 
( 1997) and the report of the Fifth Central Pay Commission of January 1997 (Go I, 
1997a). The Pay Commission is an advisory body, and does not purport to speak on 
behalf of the government. However, its opinions do influence political judgement 
inasmuch as it reflects the current trend of opinion in the Indian policy community. In 
addition to defining the core functions of government, the Commission proposed a 
four-fold test for more efficient organisation. It suggested that the following basic 
questions should be asked about any state activity: 
Does the job need doing? 
2 If so, does the government have to do it? 
3 If so, does it have to carry out the job itself? 
4 If so, is the organisation properly structured for the job? (Goi, 1997a: 127) 
The Indian debate on state reform shifted focus from its original radical stance. 
Debate had begun by questioning the raison d'etre of the state, arguing that as many 
functions as possible should be shifted away from public provision towards the 
private, non-government and community sectors. However, with time, the focus has 
swung back to the politically more acceptable debate of how to accommodate 
measures to reduce the estrangement of the people from the whole system of 
governance. Therefore, by the time of the 1997 Action Plan (Goi, May 1997a), rather 
than altering governance structures in their totality, politicians and administrators 
were looking at ways to regenerate the floundering bureaucratic state. 
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Whilst the radical suggestions of the Pay Commission have not been enacted in full, 
changes greater in extent and scope than anything previously witnessed in the Indian 
context have followed from the 1997 action plan. The title adopted at the Chief 
Ministers' conference was, significantly, the 'Action Plan for Effective and 
Responsive Administration'. Measures outlined in the Action Plan have since been 
adopted for implementation by both Union and State governments. The 
Administrative Reform package covers a diverse range of initiatives directed at 
achieving reform of the country's bureaucracy. Whilst there is an element of overlap 
between each, three sets of measures are discernible and provide a useful point of 
departure. These measures include, first, accountability fostering measures; second 
measures to promote transparency and openness; and finally those measures directed 
at civil service peiformance and integrity 12• 
The first category, that of bureaucratic accountability, is comprised of the introduction 
of citizen's charters, measures to strengthen and streamline procedures for redressal of 
public grievance, and steps directed at reviewing the existing legislations, rules and 
procedures. These changes are essentially aimed at establishing or developing 
'frameworks' for responsive government. In the pursuit of transparency and openness, 
'freedom of information' legislation forms the cornerstone of reform. Whilst many of 
the States have enacted this legislation, it remains to be established at central 
government level. 
Other initiatives undertaken by the government include the computerisation of 
departments, and measures to secure the wide dissemination of information. The aim 
of computerisation is to track receipts and files effectively, to enable easy access to 
information and to promote greater co-ordination between departments. Other means 
of increasing information include user-guides, notice board displays, publications and 
the creation of information and facilitation counters. 
In order to increase civil service performance and integrity, a number of measures 
have been adopted. These include measures to curb corruption, efforts towards 
12 The description of 'initiatives' in the present section is based on the Government of India's best 
practice compendium. See GOI, Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances, 
Initiatives and Best Practices ( 1997). 
27 
Chapter 1: Theoretical Underpinnings of Research 
evolving a civil service code of ethics, contracting out of public services and steps 
towards simplification of procedures. Many important central government initiatives 
in the realm of corruption have been made since the 1996 Chief Secretaries 
Conference. These include the establishment of a unit to monitor agencies dealing 
with corruption, the initiation of steps to process the Vohra Committee report 13 
(1993), and vigorous monitoring of corruption cases. Further to this, time-limited 
completion for disciplinary proceedings, and special drives against corruption, 
including surprise-raids and trap laying, were also endorsed. 
Regulations to govern the workings of the bureaucracy have always been in existence 
at the Central and State level, in the form of what should and shouldn't be done by 
bureaucrats, but these do not represent a positive statement of values and beliefs. The 
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions have now developed a draft 
'Code of Ethics' which, having been agreed upon at the Chief Ministers' conference, 
is undergoing legalities. The Code outlines the standards of conduct expected within 
the civil service. 
Support for outsourcing government functions rest on the well-versed arguments in 
favour of the concentration of government on its core functions to help to 'right-size' 
a bloated bureaucracy and to bring about enhanced productivity. Areas recommended 
for outsourcing by the Fifth Central Pay Commission ( 1997) include construction and 
maintenance of government offices, residential colonies, factories and railway 
stations, housekeeping, sanitation, postal delivery, printing, computer-related services, 
and many others. However the restrictive nature of the 1970 Contract Labour 
(Regulation Abolition) Act, has limited the numbers of redundancies. 
To try to make the system more transparent and to ensure enforcement of 
accountability, a comprehensive revamp of the existing procedures, including an 
13 The seriousness of the problem of criminalisation of politics and of the nexus among criminals, 
politicians and bureaucrats was brought out by the former Union Home Secretary, N. N. Vohra, in a 
report submitted in October 1993. It contains several sensational observations made by official 
agencies including work on the network of the matia virtually running a parallel government and on 
criminal gangs enjoying the patronage of politicians, cutting across party lines. It looked at the 
protection of government functionaries and on political leaders becoming leaders of gangs, armed 
Senas and, over the years getting themselves elected to local bodies, State Assemblies and Parliament. 
The unpublished annexures to the Vohra report were believed to contain potentially damaging material, 
and were suppressed by elements of the political elite. 
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exercise designed to achieve simplification of the different variety of 'forms' in use 
by various ministries has commenced. To ensure that the various ministry-level 
reviews of procedures were vigorous, the Department of Administrative Reforms and 
Public Grievances issued a set of guidelines in December 1996. These procedures are 
'customer focused', including on-the-spot scrutiny of forms to ensure that the 
customer could be immediately advised of any deficiencies, informing the customer 
periodically of the status of the application, and review of working hours to ascertain 
if these are convenient for the customer. 
Early reports would suggest that the Indian state has encompassed at least some of the 
new public management discourse Veron (1999) has traced the changing poverty 
discourses in India since Independence and argues that the government has moved 
from the broad role of 'provider', to one of 'supplementary provider' or 'facilitator' in 
the 1990s. 
'[The Government in India] enables, or 'empowers', self-help groups and 
voluntary organisations to strengthen people's opportunities for development' 
(1999: 5). 
He continues, 
'The state defines its role increasingly as supplementary provider of services 
that are not offered by the private sector, voluntary organisations and the 
community. In line with current World Bank thinking, India's government is 
concentrating its efforts, besides promoting economic growth, on the provision 
of basic education and primary health care because in these areas, private 
initiatives and the market are unlikely to play a significant role ... 
Development responsibility is shared with, and delegated to, other institutions 
such as community groups and the private sector. This also signifies the state's 
changing relationship to these institutions' (ibid: 1 0-12). 
As stated earlier the aim of this project is to analyse the ways m which the 
bureaucracy in Uttar Pradesh have engaged with the processes of change associated 
with new public management. Change associated with NPM in Uttar Pradesh is of 
particular interest as, in 1997, it became the first State in India to take a sub-national 
single tranche adjustment loan for a Fiscal and Public Sector Restructuring 
Programme from the World Bank. This restructuring programme has focused heavily 
on the nature of the civil service (World Bank, 1997a). Alongside policies promoted 
by the Union government, Uttar Pradesh has developed its own 'Reforms in 
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Governance in the State of Uttar Pradesh' agenda, in direct conjunction with the Bank 
(U.P. Academy of Administration, 1999) 14. 
The discussion paper for 'Reforms in Governance in the State of Uttar Pradesh' 
( 1999) was prepared on behalf of the Government of UP, with assistance from the 
World Bank, for its 'Programme on Economic and Fiscal Restructuring of Uttar 
Pradesh and Civil Service Renewal'. This was not a government document, but fed 
into the Civil Service Reforms (CSR) of the Government of UP 2000, and was a clear 
indication of the way in which government was thinking. Subjects covered in this 
paper include Public Enterprise Reforms, Deregulation, Participation and Information 
Technology for Improved Governance. However, in line with the interests of this 
thesis, two further issues, Civil Service Renewal and Anti Corruption Strategy are of 
particular note. 
Civil Service Renewal (CSR) (Gol, 1999) 
Clarke and Newman have suggested that one of the most important tools of NPM 
proponents is the use of specific language to promote the discourse ( 1997). This is 
apparent in the Indian case, as even the title of the paper implies the advancement or 
moving forward of the civil service, making criticism of the recommendations 
difficult. The introduction to the 'Civil Service Renewal' section of the reforms 
emphasises the importance of restructuring the lower levels of the bureaucracy, 
'Civil Service, in the Indian context, has hitherto been normally associated 
with the superior civil services such as the All-India services 15 ... However, if 
the subject of restructuring of the civil service is to be treated in its proper 
perspective, then the subject civil service must include not only the superior 
civil services but also the subordinate civil services. The cutting edge or the 
contact level between the government and others is the subordinate civil 
services, especially in the States. It is indeed very surprising to discern how 
little, if any, attention has actually been devoted to the issue of restructuring 
the bottom of the administrative pyramid ' (1999: 12). 
This is particularly important, as it signals the importance of those individuals 
working at the implementation stage. This idea is one promoted through NPM in the 
form of localisation. 
14 The Department of Personnel, Government of Uttar Pradesh have also published the 'Uttar Pradesh, 
Civil Service Reforms Policy', 2000 
15 For discussion of the various elements of the Indian bureaucracy see chapter 2. 
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In the budget statement of June 1998, the Government of Uttar Pradesh (Go UP) stated 
its intention to improve the quality of governance in the State, increase accountability, 
and reduce the incidence of administrative misconduct or corruption. According to 
this section of the Reforms, in line with the promotion of 'de-bureaucratisation' and 
attitudinal change, the aim of the CSR is to improve, 
'the delivery of services to the people, by energising the administration and 
development of a new work-culture in the civil services' ( 1999: 12). 
The areas covered in the UP paper cover similar ground to that of the national 
discussion note including a) accountability, transparency and rule of law; b) 
management information systems and c) the need for downsizing and/or right-sizing. 
This last element is important as it supports the 'retrenchment/ redeployment' of staff. 
The WB language in this section is interesting because each of the two sets of words 
have different connotations. Whilst there are approximately one million state 
employees in Uttar Pradesh, compared with the size of the total population, per capita 
rates are relatively low. It could be argued, therefore, that to 'right size' (to the per 
capita rates of those developed nations they wish to emulate) would involve 
increasing the numbers employed rather than 'down-sizing' (Rowat, 1990). The 
'retrench/redeploy' idea is of a similar ilk. If staff are redeployed this implies they are 
retrained and are used more effectively. Retrenchment, on the other hand, implies 
redundancy. 
As with the national literature the role of bureaucracy as facilitators is promoted. It 
notes devolution to lower layers of the administrative hierarchy, but at the same time 
posits the idea promoted by Public Choice theorists of 'externalisation'. It suggests 
that at the level of the department, 
'only such functions should remain as are concerned with policy work and 
facilitating role of the department. The option of removing such work from the 
department as can be done by private sector or non-government agencies may 
be considered seriously. Similarly, some work can be transferred to District 
level, Kshetra Panchayat16 level or village level under the decentralisation 
system (1999: 19)'. 
111 Kshetra (also spelt Kshetriya) or Block level panchayats. 
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A commitment to 'sub-state' decentralisation is now prominent in state discourse, 
envisaged by the 73rct and 741h constitutional amendments, which clearly demarcate 
certain functions and responsibilities as belonging to local bodies 17 • Those supporting 
decentralisation through the Panchayati Raj Act, which aims to vest more powers in 
the villages and municipal bodies of India, suggest that devolution of government 
authority to local levels will increase accountability and be more effective as 
participation grows (in relation to India see Mishra, 1992). David Korten has 
suggested that this may be achieved through a 'learning process approach' ( 1981 ). 
However, this idea is contested. Decentralisation can also serve the neo-liberal agenda 
of 'cutting back the state' and can be made to serve the interests of the power holding 
minority. This led Slater ( 1989: 519) to argue that the promotion of decentralisation is 
simply a means of pushing forward 'the angel of privatisation' under the guise of a 
people-friendly policy label. The way decentralisation works clearly depends on the 
interpretation and implementation placed upon it by the elected and non-elected 
institutions of the States (for critical analysis see Chambers, 1983, 1993), the regional 
parliament and importantly the bureaucracy itself. International research has shown 
that the outcomes of decentralisation are crucially influenced by the political 
relationship between the 'Centre' and the 'locality', and by configurations of power, 
which means that similar schemes can have dramatically different results (Tend1er, 
1997b; Crook and Sverrisson, 1999). 
Other key elements included in the Uttar Pradesh reform focus on 'Training and 
Development' at 'all levels' and the need for 'capacity building'. The CSR suggests 
that complaints should be dealt with fairly and promptly, 'with a view to making 
government functioning people-oriented and beneficiary-centred' ( 1999: 24), and that 
departments should create 'citizen's charters' so that people know the roles and 
obligations of each department (to aid accountability). It stresses the need for 
innovation and that those who are innovators should be highlighted and praised. 
Examples are given of the World Bank funded programmes of Land Reclamation and 
Water Sanitation Projects (p.26) that have, according to them, been successful through 
the development of partnerships between government, non-government organisations 
17 For recent work on the functioning of local government panchayata, see for example, Lieten, 1996; 
Lieten and Srivastava 1999; Williams, 1997; Webster, 1992. 
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and beneficiary groups. It also suggests that innovative programme, and financial 
management projects, be mainstreamed. 
Whilst suggesting 'best practice' examples be followed, it also discusses problems of 
the bureaucracy that should be curbed. In particular the document, prepared with the 
World Bank, discusses problems associated with the rapid, and often politically 
motivated, movement of officers (discussed in detail in chapter 2). The paper suggests 
that, 
'For ensuring improvements in the quality of governance and sustammg 
reforms, it is essential that civil servants be protected from capriciousness and 
arbitrariness in the matter of appointments, postings and transfers ... Every year 
policy guidelines on transfers are issued but there have been cases where the 
instruments of transfer has also been misused. Very often, transfer is also used 
as an instrument of punishment' ( 1999: 27). 
This is an important point, particularly in the light of the Bank threatening to 
withdraw funding from the State of Uttar Pradesh if the practice is not halted 
immediately (Financial Times, Nov 101h 2002). 
These recommendations were officially incorporated into the Uttar Pradesh Civil 
Service Reforms Policy of 2000. However, the state often makes claims of 
commitment to various agendas, which are not initiated for a variety of reasons, 
including lack of political commitment, resources or resistance by the bureaucracy in 
the process of implementation. Over a decade ago, Nelson (1989: 9) identified the 
potential problems of reform, acknowledging both the 'anti-state nature of many of 
the reforms', and the irony that successful policy implementation, to a large extent, 
remains dependant on the bureaucracy. She refers to the dilemma as the 'orthodox 
paradox, whereby the aim of reform is to create a more skilled, motivated and 
effective civil service. It is the current bureaucracy that is expected to implement 
changes, that in many cases will lead to a reduction in their own autonomy. 
1.7: Conclusions: 
In this chapter I have tried to detail the major changes in development policy and 
debate that have influenced this research. There have clearly been significant changes 
in mainstream development theory and practice over the past two decades, notably the 
shift from a Washington to a Post-Washington Consensus. Building on the insights of 
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several key authors (notably Evans, Grindle, and Tendler) this has led to a focus on 
civil service reforms in order to promote a more professional and facilitating 
bureaucracy. The focus of this work is to investigate the impact of new public 
management discourses and practices on bureaucratic culture in Uttar Pradesh, with 
special reference to the Indira Mahila Y ojana scheme. As already stated the key 
questions for this research are: 
a) How have the government officials at different levels experienced change 
associated with NPM? 
b) How have 'outsiders' associated with the scheme experienced changes? 
Policy alone clearly does not determine outcomes. The structure of the implementing 
organisation and culture of the institutions and individuals within, are also 
fundamental in determining how policy is realised. The Indian bureaucracy, as one 
such institution, has been the subject of much negative press of late, particularly in 
the areas of corruption (Agrawal, 1996; Harriss-White, 1996; Jeffrey, 2002), inertia 
(Dhar, 1997), politicisation (Bhattacharya, 1998; Kashyap, 2001) and nepotism 
(Agarwal, 1995). But whilst it is true the public bureaucracy has often been a serious 
obstruction to development, it has also promoted and supported many achievements 
that are not reflected in the current dominant view (Joshi, 1997; Tendler, 1997). In 
the next chapter therefore I consider the various conflicting perceptions of the Indian 
bureaucracy and discuss how the various 'cultures' of the Indian bureaucracy may 
affect the way in new public management is adopted and adapted in reality. 
A central perspective that informs this work is that the bureaucracy is not monolithic 
- it needs to be sectorally, hierarchically and even individually disaggregated. 
Moreover, different levels and sectors of the bureaucracy have agency - they will, 
within certain constraints and limitations, negotiate both 'external' impositions 
(including changing rules, norms and procedures) and 'grounded' demands and 
conditions. 
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CHAPTER 2: KAUN BANEGA KROREPATI1? PERCEPTIONS OF 
BUREAUCRATIC CULTURES IN INDIA 
2.1: Introduction 
The thoughts and actions of 'development' bureaucrats are poweifully shaped 
by the world of acceptable statements and utterances within which they live; 
and what they do and do not do is a product not only of the interests of various 
nations, classes and international agencies, but also of a working out of this 
complex structure of knowledge (Ferguson, 1990: 18). 
The previous chapter outlined shifts in development debates from a Washington to a 
post-Washington Consensus. This has involved moves from the promotion of state 
versus market, to being centred on the creation of an appropriate balance of state and 
market for effective governance with a focus on institutions. Paralleling this has been 
the shift of NPM from a form (almost exclusively) dominated by public choice 
prescriptions concerning 'rolling back the state', to a reappraisal of the nature of state 
institutions. India has initiated reform of its administration along NPM lines, 
following the adoption of a New Economic Policy in 1991. 
Public Choice prescriptions for public administration in India have broadly been 
based on the perception that bureaucrats are a rent-seeking elite whose powers should 
be restricted. This is also a feeling evident in public opinion. However, this pejorative 
view of the public administration has been challenged by those who have seen the 
Indian bureaucracy as a 'steel frame' without which development achievements 
would not have been made; and those who have seen the opportunities offered by the 
entrepreneurial mould promoted in private sector firms. Clearly the 'nature' or 
'culture' of the administration will have fundamental implications for the way(s) in 
which policy is adopted and adapted and in which change occurs. There is no doubt 
that the subjective values of government officials have impacted development policy 
in India from the point of inception through to implementation. The structure, norms 
and working practices of the bureaucracy all clearly contribute to this culture. It is 
perhaps the impact of these values at the implementation level, which are most 
important, as the values of the administrator can, and will, have an impact on the 
outcome for the beneficiary. 
1 Kaun Banega Krorepati? is the Indian Version of the British game show, 'Who wants to be a 
Millionaire?' 
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This chapter is divided into two substantive sections that together make up a critical 
overview of the Indian bureaucracy. The first part begins with a brief history of the 
Indian bureaucracy, analysing the implications of its structure for today's 
administrators. I examine who actually makes up the Indian bureaucracy, offer a 
detailed description of the various branches and hierarchical levels within the Indian 
administration, and discuss the way in which the system is organised. The second part 
of the chapter is concerned with the 'culture' of bureaucracy. Incorporating various 
interpretations of 'the bureaucracy', Milton Esman ( 1997) outlines three critical 
images of bureaucratic behaviour, which I present in this section. 
The first type of the rational-legal bureaucrat conforms to the Weberian model that is 
marked by excessive formalism, hierarchical style of functioning and rule orientation, 
and seeks to preserve political neutrality. To classical scholars such as Adam Smith 
(1976, 1776: Book V, Chapter I) and J. S. Mill (1987: 1909: Book V), a well-
organised state was a pre-requisite to the 'frictionless' market system. However, 
whilst the Weberian construct suggests government officials should be politically 
neutral, and follow rules, without concern to their own personal beliefs, for Public 
Choice theorists, the personality of government officials is based on selfish 
opportunism (Magill and Quinzii, 1995) leading to problems of corruption, nepotism 
and the like. This is the essence of Esman's second categorisation, the vested interest 
image bureaucrats, who act as 'maximisers of their self-interest in pursuit of security, 
income and power' (1997: 49). In this case, bureaucrats are more interested in self-
service than public service and primarily operate as an interest group. 
The vested interest model of the bureaucracy is flawed in several respects. 
Government officials in theory at least, must follow the rule of some higher authority. 
Furthermore, if public choice theorists are correct in assuming that corruption and 
self-benefit is standard practice in bureaucratic behaviour, it seems unusual that when 
cases of such corruption are highlighted, they are still referred to as 'deviant' as 
opposed to the norm. Bureaucratic culture is clearly more complex than public choice 
analysts suggest. It is necessary to consider the more flexible and complex concept of 
'meta-preferences' and their change, in order to understand more deeply the values 
and behaviour of government officials. A third type of bureaucrat is therefore 
36 
Chapter 2: Kaun Banega Krorepati? Perceptions of bureaucratic cultures in India. 
highlighted by Esman - those who work like private sector employees m an 
entrepreneurial image. 
The third type projects bureaucrats as innovative, flexible, service orientated and 
responsive to publjc needs and convenience. The ways in which government officials 
act is likely to be multi-causal, contradictory and negotiated, rather than the 
(relatively) straightforward result of cause and effect. Elements of each bureaucratic 
type are ]jkely to exist at any one time, as Braibanti ( 1976) argues, 
'The enormity of the task of tracing the flow of values and the interaction of 
institution, structure, and participants .. .is immediately apparent' ( 143). 
Esman's analysis of three bureaucratic types is used as a point of departure to discuss 
the contemporary traits and changes within the Indian bureaucracy. In its totality, this 
chapter aims to emphasise both elements of continuation and change within the Indian 
civil service in recent years and to suggest that an historical-managerial-evolutionary 
approach is essential to understand how NPM has, and can, be adopted and adapted in 
the Indian context. 
2.2: The Indian Civil Services: Antecedents and Influences 
The word bureau (French) literally means desk, and the word 'bureaucracy' was first 
coined in 1745 by M. de Gourney (Giddens, 1989) as a reference to rule conducted 
from a desk or office, by the preparation and dispatch of written documents - or, these 
days, their electronic equivalent. Not only government service but also political 
parties, churches, educational institutions, private businesses, and many other 
institutions have bureaucracies. That is, they all have a professional staff for keeping 
records and sending communications that will be regarded, at least by other staff of 
the same institution, as authoritative directions. However, in common parlance, 
bureaucracy is equated with public administration. Bureaucratic rule is of course not a 
form of government. Rather, as 'civil servants', bureaucrats provide a means by 
which government rules. Both in theory and reality, some higher force must provide 
direction and support for the bureaucracy. In this regard Weber noted, 
'At the top of a bureaucratic organisation, there is necessarily an element which is at 
least not purely bureaucratic', (1947: 335 translation, Henderson and Parsons) 
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For many newly independent countries, the relative permanence of bureaucratic 
postings compared with the transient nature of political careers has meant the 
bureaucracy can, theoretically, provide stability in policy making and implementation 
(Zafarullah and Huque 1998). In India the dominant and most influential government 
officials belong to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) (for details on the service, 
including the Indian Civil Service (ICS), its predecessor, see Woodruff (1964) and 
Taub (1969)). The ICS, the 'steel frame' 2 of the British Empire in India, 
'began on the pattern established by the administrative system of the Moghul 
rulers, whom the British replaced in India', and 'enabled India's colonial 
rulers to maintain power in India with only a handful of men for more than 
150 years' (Taub, 6: 1969). 
The ICS was inherited by independent India and renamed the IAS. Usually, a 
country's public administration is an instrument designed by a political system with 
the object of executing that system's aims efficiently (Maheshwari, 1990a). At 
Independence, India was faced with an apparent imbalance between the new political 
framework, and the structure of its public administration. The British government had, 
during its rule, shaped the public administration in accordance with its own colonial 
needs and tasks (Rao and Sofi, 1990; Maheshwari, 1990b, 1990c). These included the 
maintenance of law and order, the collection of revenue necessary to meet its 
expenditure, perpetuation of power under the British and subservience of the 
administration to the needs of Britain3. This is not to say that the public administration 
is immutable or that it has remained static over the years, but rather that India's 
colonial history continues to influence the India of today (Maheswari, 1996). 
For one hundred and fifty years, the East India Compan/ had a civil service 
responsible for carrying out commercial and control functions. This was not a 'public' 
administration, as these men did not work for an elected government and, whilst it did 
rule areas did not deal directly with the Indian population. The East India Company 
2 Lloyd George is accredited with this label, quoted in Maheswari ( 1996). 
3 This is not to suggest that the British raj was absolutely uninterested in developmental activities. It 
was to some extent particularly after the inauguration of the Government of India Act 1919. Elected 
ministers were given portfolios like education or health, agriculture etc, following which the intensity 
of development efforts increased. Rather the British government did not have an ideological priority to 
development and it was taken up only on a modest scale. The scale, range and intensity of 
developmental programmes have escalated in independent India. 
4 For an excellent summary of the role of the East India Company, the role of Emperor of Delhi and the 
change to the ICS see E.P.Moon ( 1990) or Misra ( 1976). 
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was taken over by, and absorbed into the British government apparatus in 1860s. The 
earliest British civil service in India however, was part of a police state, its major task 
to carry out law and order functions. The system was disjointed, with no code of 
conduct, and had different civil services in the various provinces. Higher officials 
were able to choose appointees, from both military and civilian fields, and their pay 
and allowances were subject to the discretion of the Company. In the latter part of the 
nineteenth century the British government in 'The Punjab' used the term 'civil 
service' to distinguish between government and army officials. It was from this origin 
that the word entered the discipline of public administration (Maheshwari, 1994). 
The British government set up the Indian Civil Service in 1911, to strengthen the 
administration of its colonial territories in India (Arora, 1996). Initially, the 
recruitment to the Indian Civil Service was confined to the British. The minimum age 
of entry was nineteen years and the maximum age, twenty-one years. From 1858, a 
new breed of civil servants, nicknamed in India as the competition wallahs, came into 
existence (Trevelyan, 1964). Examinations only took place once a year, in English, in 
London. However, due to pressures raised notably from the Indian National Congress, 
by 1921 Indians were allowed to take the exam (Potter, 1996). The first Indian entered 
the ICS the following year. Later, based on the recommendations of the Aitchison 
Committee ( 1929), half of all new recruits were to be Indian, with examinations held 
in India as well as London (Dwivedi and Jain, 1985). 
In 1935 the British government established interim rule in various provinces of India. 
The Second World War (1939-45) followed shortly afterwards, leading to steep 
inflation and limited supplies of essential items like food-grains. As rationing was 
introduced, the public administration was given the task of regulating the supply and 
distribution of food grains. This role necessitated the rapid expansion of the 
administrative machinery and the mass recruitment of staff at short notice. 
Maheshwari ( 1996) argues that both the time span of change and the lack of training 
available to these individuals led to a fall in the calibre in public administration. He 
further contests that due to the shortages within the economy, corruption began to 
spread within the service. 
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At Independence, the IAS was retained to perform a wide range of tasks thanks to 
political support from both Pate] (first Home Minister) and Nehru (first Prime 
Minister), and because there was no other institution available that was capable of 
fulfilling these roles. This meant that, not only did the IAS retain its pre-eminent 
position, but it was also able to penetrate new areas of influence, such as control over 
major public corporations. The dominant position of the bureaucracy at Independence 
was further enhanced by the weakness of the new pluralist democratic institutions, 
and the ability of government officials to persuade politicians to devolve 
responsibility for managing the economy to them. However Singh and Bhandarkar 
(1994) highlight the incredibly challenging role given to the, primarily senior, 
bureaucrats at Independence. Partition had led to widespread communal riots in many 
parts of the country that the administration had been required to quell. Concurrently, 
huge numbers of experienced personnel were leaving the administration, including 
most Muslims and a very large number of European civil servants who resigned 
(Misra, 1996). The strength of the ICS, which numbered 1064 civil servants in 1945, 
was reduced to only 422 after the gaining of independence in 194 7. 
The onset of economic planning in India in 1951, with the launch of its First Five-
Year Plan, gave the Indian Civil Service the senior role in development 
administration5. In this new mould, they were expected to a) accept the ideological 
paradigm of development by the state, b) design appropriate policy, and c) implement 
policy. Cast in the Weberian model, the Indian bureaucracy was supposed to be 
neutral in the execution of their roles, but as Jackson (1983: 216) states, this is an, 
'extremely romantic, idealised view of the bureaucrat and the bureaucratic process'. 
Hirschmann called for reform of development bureaucracies in 1981 , arguing that the 
situation had become 'deadlocked' ( 1981, 1999). However, attempts at reform of the 
Indian administration are not new. Over the years in India, many consultants' 
committees and commissions have been set up to revamp bureaucratic administration 
(Bhattacharya, 1997b). Even a century ago, The Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, was 
5 Schaffer ( 1973: 245) defines Development Administration as being, 'about development programmes, 
policies and projects, those conditions in which there are unusually wide and new demands and in 
which there are peculiarly low capacities and sever obstacles to meeting them'. 
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anxious to cut 'red tapism' within the service and reduce interdepartmental rivalries 
(Pachauri, 1997). Subsequent reforms under colonialism include parts of the 1909 
Morley Minto reforms and the disastrous Montague-Chelmsford reforms (Pachauri, 
1997). With Independence, reforms include the consultation with Paul Appleby and 
AD. Gorwala in the 1950s; the Santhanam Report; the monumental Administrative 
Reforms in the 1960s which submitted 20 reports; L. K. Jha's report in 1983; the 
report of the National Police Commission; and the Sarkaria Commission report on 
Centre-State relations in the 1980s, which included a section on the bureaucracy. 
There have also been numerous studies by the Staff Inspection Unit, the Organisation 
and Methods Directorate, the Department of Administrative Reforms, the work study 
units and various ministries, as well as studies at the state level. 
However many commentators maintain that only cosmetic changes have occurred, 
and that the bureaucracy still retained its structure, nature and overarching powers 
(Narain, 1990; Maheshwari, 1990l The Fifth Pay Commission noted that too many 
executive functions and tasks remained at the central government level that should 
otherwise be delegated to the State level. There were too many hierarchical levels 
through which to pass before decisions were taken, and final decisions were made at 
too high a level. There was, for them, too much bureaucracy in administration, 
meaning too little effective monitoring despite numerous audit reports and inspections 
and poor inter and intra-departmental coordination. As the Fifth Central Pay 
Commission noted, 
'Organisational reforms have tended to be more in form than in real substance, 
leaving little impact on the efficiency of the system' (1997: I 06). 
However, it is the perceived decline7 of the public bureaucracy in the last two decades 
that has caused most debates, and on which the focus of this thesis lies. In 1982 
Bhagwati (p. 217) described government officials as 'ficticious devices'. By this, he 
meant that the traditional perception of government employees, as 'servants of the 
people', had become fraudulent and that the majority of bureaucrats now worked in a 
self-serving manner. At the same time, the Indian state was experiencing a severe 
resource crunch that had deepened by the end of the 1980s. This helped prompt a new 
6 For suggestions for change in India, see various chapters in Agnihotri (eds.) ( 1995) 
7 Of course narratives of decline are very common. It is perhaps difficult to establish 'objective' 
decline. 
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economic policy in 1991 8, which saw a rolling-back of the state in economic activities 
both at the macro and micro levels, encouraging private sector growth and contracting 
out of public services. Thus, by the 1990s, there were moves towards reorientation of 
the Indian civil services. 
India remained until the 1990s, and some would argue still remains, a classic case of a 
bureaucratic and protectionist regime (Toye, 1993). It was a predominant example of 
rent seeking arrangements for vested interests, of the type which neoliberal structural 
adjustment policies were seeking to overturn (Bardhan, 1984; Toye, 1987). As a part 
of the new economic policy, the central government decided in 1991 to cut back the 
role of the bureaucracy to reduce costs (this included for example the reduction of the 
number of posts of Joint Secretary and above by I 0% ). The suggestions of the Fifth 
Pay Commission's report ( 1997) supported 'right sizing9' the Indian bureaucracy, 
with a reduction of at least 30% of total staff. This massive cut back was suggested in 
response to analysis that the government had spent Rs. I 0,000 crore (about $3 billion) 
per annum as the pay and perks before 1997 (Mishra, 1997). 
However, in the year following the report, total expenditure actually rose to around 
Rs. 15,000 crore ($4 billion) or 1.5% of GDP, with the introduction of pay increases. 
The provincial governments also spend a comparable amount, which means civil-
service pay alone accounts for about 3% of GDP. Despite 'right sizing' 
recommendations, the drastic cuts in total numbers of the bureaucracy are unlikely in 
the short-term, due to the restrictive nature of employment law in India. One of the 
solutions suggested is to reduce the number of permanent posts to the bare minimum 
and incorporate a provision for contract posts and the political pressures working 
against lay-offs - something that will be discussed in this thesis (World Bank, 1999). 
With liberalisation and the subsequent adoption of new public management 
initiatives, the bureaucracy have, in theory, been apportioned a less powerful role in 
development and administration. Economic restructuring has meant the administration 
is increasingly seen as a promoter andfacilitator, rather than direct provider, of goods 
8 Detailed in chapter I. 
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and services (Veron, 1999). In keeping with the philosophy of economic 
liberalisation, the Tenth Finance Commission has opined that, 
'Viable methods of reducing the strength of government employees must be 
explored, otherwise economic reform may loose its way in a new bureaucratic 
maze' (quoted in The Times oflndia, November 15: 1995). 
These changes have been adopted, rhetorically at least, by the government of India 
and implemented in the States, and at the Centre, to varying degrees. The structure of 
the Indian bureaucracy is diverse, with differing roles and status apportioned to 
officers at different levels, in different departments and fulfilling different roles. The 
make-up of the Indian bureaucracy is also interesting. It has a low percentage of 
women, as in many other countries both developed and developing, and an increasing 
number of recruits coming from the backward castes, following the adoption of the 
Mandal Commission recommendations in 1992. The next few paragraphs are 
therefore dedicated to an appraisal of the structure of the Indian bureaucracy, so that 
elucidation of change, or lack of it, made later, can be understood in relation to the 
nature and hierarchy of the system. 
2.3: The Steel Frame? Structure of the Indian Public Administration 
The Indian civil services are characterised by open entry based on academic 
achievement, exam performance and once recruited, elaborate training arrangements. 
There are both 'generalist' and 'specialist' posts at Central, State and District levels 
reserved for the IAS cadre alone. A regular graduated scale of pay with pensions and 
other benefits exist, together with a system of promotion and rapid transfers, based 
variously on seniority, merit and political considerations (Banik, 200 I). The services 
are divided into three categories. First, the State services, whereby each State has its 
own administrative service, normally headed by the Chief Secretary to the State 
government. At the State level, there are also various technical, secretariat, and local 
government services. Second, there are the Central services, more than fifty in 
number, which include the Indian Foreign Service, the Central Secretariat Service, the 
Postal Service, and the Indian Revenue Service. Finally, the important Ali-India 
services include the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), the Indian Police Service 
Y 'Right sizing' is a term popularised by the World Bank to mean the downsizing of an organisation to 
its 'optimum size'. However, others have argued (Rowat, 1990) that in some cases this may actually 
mean expanding the public administration. 
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and the Indian Forest Service (IFS). The Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) is 
responsible for the recruitment and service conditions of civil servants in India which 
are categorised as Group A, B, C and D 10 (See Annex I). 
Out of more than 17 million government employees in India, the IAS comprises only 
five thousand officers (Thakur, 1995). Recruitment takes place on the basis of aii-
India competitive examinations followed by interview of short-listed candidates. 
Approximately ten thousand candidates appear for the Preliminary Examination each 
year, I 0% of which appear in the Main Examination. About 15% of these candidates 
are selected to appear for the personal interview, half of which become recruits of the 
various Indian administrative and central services. 
IAS officers occupy the highest administrative positions at the policy-making level 
and serve as administrative heads of ministries and departments. A few are also 
appointed as chief executives of public sector enterprises and Chairs of Statutory 
Boards. At the sub-State level, they are the chief executive officers (Collectors/ 
District Magistrates/Deputy Commissioners) of the Districts. The IAS has been 
considered to be the only 'multifunctional' government service, as an IAS officer is in 
charge of running virtually every sector in the country. The emoluments and terms of 
service of the IAS are attractive in comparison with other services, with perks and 
fringe benefits including accommodation, holiday and travel costs being covered. The 
IAS is made up of State cadres and there is no Central cadre. Upon selection IAS 
recruits are assigned to a particular State. They may be deputed by their States to 
work for the Central government, but must return to their State at the end of their 
work in the Centre. The rationale for such an aii-India Service is that, given India's 
federal set up, joint action, co-operation and co-ordination between Central and State 
governments will facilitate effective governance. Further, it is argued, officers with 
experience from the Districts can project grass-roots realities into the policy-making 
process. Half of the IAS cadre in each State comes from other States, and at least one 
fifth of the cadre must be recruited or promoted from within the State's own 
administrative service. Those who are promoted from the State civil service to IAS 
10 The categories represent the relative skill and income of the administrators. D, the lowest category 
refers to non-skilled workers, B refers to mainly office workers, Band A are the higher civil servants, 
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ranks are popularly referred to as 'promotees'. They enjoy the same rank and 
theoretically the same status as IAS officers, although they normally achieve this at 
the end of their careers. 
The head of all the civil services of the central government is the Cabinet Secretary. 
Between the Cabinet Secretary and the lowest ranking Secretaries, are the ranks of 
Under Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Director, Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary, 
and Secretary. In the Group A services of the provincial governments, the lowest rank 
is that of Assistant Collector and the highest rank is Chief Secretary. The 
functionaries in between include the ranks of Deputy Secretary, Joint Secretary, 
Secretary, Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Member of the Board of Revenue and 
Cabinet Secretary. The civil service officers belonging to the IAS start on a junior 
scale and move up to a senior scale, selection grade, super-time scale, Additional 
Secretary, and Cabinet Secretary. The relative size of the provincial cadre for each 
State is determined by their total population. Uttar Pradesh, as India's most populous 
State has 540 officers in the IAS, as compared to 41 in the least populous state, 
Sikkim (Government of India, 1996). 
For the first four decades after Independence, the Civil Service was seen as an 
aspiration for many of the best educated young people in India (Shurmer-Smith, 
2000). Traditionally in India the pay of civil servants has been high, both in terms of 
salary and perks, in relation to private sector employment. However, as multinationals 
have increasingly come to the region, the trend is changing. Despite generous pay 
revisions in 1998 through the Fifth Pay Commission, government officials are not as 
wealthy as they once were in relative terms. In the mid-1990s, senior management 
jobs in the private sector were commanding salary increases of an average of 17% per 
annum, and considerable perks. Das (1998: 165) suggests that graduates with an MBA 
can expect starting salaries two-and-a-half times that of government employees, and 
that at retirement, managers can be 200 times that of senior civil servants. 
Furthermore, preparation for the IAS exams can take in excess of a year, with no 
guarantee of success. With the numbers of total posts for the traditional IAS 
appointees from the high castes reduced through reservation policy, and opportunities 
in the provincial and all-India services. After the Third Pay Commission Report, 1973 the categories of 
A-D, replaced the earlier I-IV classifications. 
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increasingly offered by multinational companies overseas, many of the urban middle 
and upper classes are choosing not to follow a civil service career route (Shurmer-
Smith, 2000). 
Restrictions on application to the civil services are two-fold. First that of age, 
applicants must be between 21 and 28 years of age 11 • Second, candidates must have 
sat the examination no more than three times. As a result, the Indian civil service has 
the capacity, theoretically at least, to represent the diversity of the nation 
(Bhattacharya, 1989), and this is institutionalised through reserved places for tribal 
people, OBCs or backward castes and handicapped people. 
Positive discrimination has existed in India since the 1940s, but it was the decision 
made by the government of V.P. Singh (1989-1990) to adopt some of the 
recommendations of the Second Backward Classes Commission ( 1979-1980: 
chairman B. P. Mandal) that is seen as a turning point for reservation policy. The 
Mandal Commission Report advised that the existing system of reservation in central 
government should be extended from just the Scheduled Castes and Tribes of India12 
to include a broader collection of Socially and Economically Backward Classes. By 
August 1990 it was politically viable for V.P. Singh to accept Mandal's 
recommendations that up to 49.5% 13 of all jobs in central government services and 
public undertakings should be reserved for the Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled 
Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Classes (OBCs). 14 
11 The upper age for open candidates (as opposed to reserved category entrants) is two years lower. 
12 These account for approximately 15 and 7.5% of the population respectively (Corbridge, 2000). 
Scheduled Castes legislation was first enacted in 1943; and for the Scheduled Tribes in 1950. This 
system was intended to provide economic 'uplift' to disadvantaged communities by 1960. However, 
this has arguably failed to materialise. 
13 In the case of the various provinces of the Union, this figure varies from 50 to 69%. 
14 22.5% of these jobs were already reserved for the Scheduled communities. Singh's proposal 
suggested another 27% reservation for members of the Other Backward Classes. Among Hindu OBCs, 
caste or jati (sub-caste), defines membership of a 'class' grouping. Most Hindu OBCs come from the 
rural Sudra communities. In the 1980s and 1990s India's political landscapes were changed with the 
rise of power of political parties representing the OBCs. As I discuss in chapter 3, this phenomenon is 
most apparent in the north Indian States like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. However, it is not confined to 
these areas, see Brass 1994, Chandra (2000); Jaffrelot (2000); Yadav (L 997). See also Shah, 1991. 
Educational concessions (but never reserved posts) for Other Backward Classes actually began in U.P. 
in 1948' (Galanter 1991, 161) and the Government of Bihar issued a list of Backward Classes as early 
as 1951. 
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Singh's Janata Dal party had considerable political support behind reservation (or 
Mandalisation as it is commonly known). 15 For Corbridge (2000), the range of various 
high-caste retaliations that followed Singh's decision was quite predictable. Corbridge 
cites the fact that public sector jobs in India are much sought after, and are regarded 
by many high caste individuals as a buffer against the unpredictability of economic 
development. Joshi and Little (1994) have described how workers in public sector 
steel plants have been provided with dearness allowances, sick pay and guaranteed 
holidays in addition to a quite reasonable wage. Jonathan Parry was told in relation to 
working for the state, whilst researching at Bhilai steel plant in Madhya Pradesh, there 
was, 'no mother or father like it' (1999). Corbridge maintains that the situation is 
similar in the Indian banking system that was nationalised by Indira Gandhi in 1971. 
Singh's reservation package has threatened high caste Indians with increased 
competition for university places and government jobs (Corbridge, 2000). 
In reality, entry to the services is discriminatory in a number of ways. In each State 
there are certain groups who control land, wealth and power, these groups have 
traditionally also dominated the selections in the Indian civil service (Chaudhury, 
1990; Subramanian, 1990a)16. This is also true within the reserved categories. In 
Meghalaya, for example, the Khasi tribe has dominated over other tribes in terms of 
the number of civil service entrants (Chandresekaran, 1998). In terms of religion, 
Hindus have dominated the selection disproportionately, even when their relative 
dominance of the population is taken into consideration. Additionally, English 
speakers tend to be more successful, as do individuals with physics, mathematics and 
geology backgrounds. Bhatnagar's study of the financial backgrounds of candidates 
illustrated that most come from upper middle income group families. Further, a 
majority of the candidates selected had parents working in government (1989). 
Reservation, according to Shurmer-Smith (2000), was necessary so that the hold of 
traditional elites could be broken. However, in reality, it has not always led to the 
general improvement that was intended. She argues, 
'Whatever their caste background, only highly educated people can come 
through as a result of ability and hard work, most recruits come from the so-
15 Singh gained a disproportionate number of votes from the 3,743 castes, tribes or communities 
(52.4% of the Indian population) that the Mandal Commission Report identified as Backward 
(Si varammaya 1996: 22; see also Brass 1994 ). 
16 See chapter 3 for Uttar Pradesh situation. 
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called 'creamy layer'. These people are often more concerned to draw close to 
politicians of their own community than to work with the poor' (p. 169). 
Though there is no official discrimination in terms of gender, the fifty years of the 
Indian civil service show that women candidates on the whole do not exceed 10% of 
the total entrants. Anne-Marie Goetz has criticised the male dominance of 
administration, 
'Public Administration is, in itself, a gendered and gendering process, such 
that the outcomes, internal organisation and culture reflect and promote the 
interests of men' ( 1992:6). 
These include institutional, organisational and cultural norms preventing women 
rising up the administrative ladder. Menon ( 1991) notes the dual problems of 'mal-
administration' and 'male administration' that can adversely affect the quality of 
development work. In her recent study of the IAS, Thakur ( 1999) suggests that even if 
women overcome broader societal norms that have prevented them entering in the 
past, they still face bias in conditions of service, and gender interpretations of rules. 
These gender biases mean that whilst women actually fair better in the entrance 
examination, they fail to rise through the ranks at the same speed as their male 
counterparts (Thakur, 1999). Of women in the Indian Administrative Service, 60% of 
respondants to her questionnaire felt that gender had been an obstructing factor in 
their careers (Thakur, 1999). As organisational processes determine the manner in 
which the bureaucracy is constituted and perpetuated, the bureaucracy therefore 
reinforces the gender bias of society. In 1981, the UN Assistant General echoed the 
view that development could not fully succeed, 
'Until there were more women involved in the planning process, m the 
administration at all levels, and in all sectors' (quoted in Co I 1991: 71 ). 
Col (1991) has shown various barriers and opportunities to women's advancement in 
public services. This is an area of interest to which I return in chapter Five. 
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Table 2.1: Barriers and opportunities for women's advancement in the public 
service (adapted from Col, 1991) 
D 
PROMOTION 
DDDD 
Objective evaluation Effective Performance Visibility in Opportunities for training 
Workplace 
STRUCTURAL SUPPORT 
Job segregation 
Salary Differentials 
Careers: Ladders/ Bridges 
Promotional Rules 
Distribution of positions 
Career Planning 
Evaluation systems 
Management by Objectives 
Rotational Assignments 
Non Discrimination Laws 
SUPPORT 
House Care 
Child Care 
Orientation 
Mentors/Sponsors 
Collegial Peers 
Solidarity amongst Women 
Women's Organisations 
Professional Organisations 
FACTORS IN WORK LIFE 
BEHAVIOURAL 
Role modelling 
Contacts 
Training 
Success Seeking 
Risk Taking 
Flexibility 
Positive Attitude 
Supervisory Skills 
Team Building Skills 
WOMEN CLUSTERED IN LOWER RANKS 
D 
Employers Believe 
Women Can Get 
Along With Men 
ENTRY POSITION 
D 
Employers Provide 
Maternity Leave 
D 
Employers Believe 
Women Can Do the 
Job 
CREATES LABOUR POOL OF QUALIFIED WOMEN 
D 
Parents decision 
To educate girls 
D 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
D 
Availability of 
Subjects for girls 
D 
Girls Decision to 
develop and pursue 
Their goals 
BASIC SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND VALUES 
D DDD D 
Media Family Religion Community Culture 
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2.4: Bureaucratic Cultures 
I have already briefly outlined the history, structure and recent policy changes in 
relation to the Indian bureaucracy. It is, however, also the 'culture' of individuals 
within institutions that impacts upon the outcome of policy. Dutta-Choudhuri (1990) 
has highlighted how the culture of government officials has implications for the 
implementation of development policy, 
'the entire implementation mechanism (of economic policy in India has been) 
based on the hope that civil servants would use their discretion in an 
enlightened manner' ( 1990:30). 
Bardhan (1989) describes the bureaucracy as one of the three 'dominant proprietary 
classes' that have been deeply influential in determining the post-Independence 
political economy of the Indian state. Bardhan, in explaining the reasoning behind this 
dominance argues, 
'The elevation of the public bureaucracy to the status of an independent and 
indeed dominant class is based on two separate arguments. One argument 
focuses on the bureaucrat's possession of scarce human capital in the form of 
education, skill, and technical expertise. The second argument focuses on the 
bureaucracy's possession of an independent power base due to their control 
over the state's regulatory instruments (licensing etc.) and their control over 
the large public sector enterprises' (1989: 155) 17 • 
Here Bardhan is referring to the higher civil services (predominantly the IAS). Lower 
level officials are unlikely to wield comparable power to those higher up. Since the 
mid-1980s a number of scholars have tried to explain political discourse from a 
broadly post-colonial perspective. Sudipta Kaviraj, Satish Saberwal and Partha 
Chatterjee have all argued that the core dichotomy in India today is between the 
'modern' discourse of the elites, and a public 'vernacular', 'community' or 'lower' 
discourse (Chatterjee, 1993; Kaviraj, 1984, 1991; Saberwal; 1986). 
Kaviraj, (1991) argues that divisions in Indian society primarily relate to the 
'modernizing development discourse' of the elite, and the 'lower discourse' of the 
masses, created by colonial policy in the nineteenth century. Chatterjee ( 1993) 
focuses on the differences between capitalist and pre-capitalist social forms and 
discourses, arguing that the elites uncritically adopted an orientalist, externalist 
construction of society and its destiny, reflected in the symbolism of the 'discovery of 
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India'. Saberwal goes as far as to argue that different level bureaucrats have 
conflicting moral, political and institutional codes, one European and one Indian, 
which affect the nature of the bureaucracy and the implementation of policies 
(Saberwal, 1986: 27). If this dichotomy is evident, it would suggest that the reactions 
and uptake of change would be starkly different at differing levels within the 
bureaucracy. 
In this thesis, I am concerned with how the culture of the bureaucracy is likely to 
affect the way in which change, associated with NPM, is adopted and adapted by the 
Indian bureaucracy and how NPM might variously impact upon bureaucratic culture. 
Hirschmann (1999) has argued that failing to see that bureaucrats are stakeholders and 
actors, and elite ones at that, has been a central factor of reform failure in India. In this 
section, using Esman's categorisations, I will consider the main perceptions of the 
Indian bureaucracy and suggest how these types are likely to affect the ways 
government officials engage with processes of change associated with NPM. 
Whilst Esman' s ( 1997) work suggests that bureaucratic behaviour can be divided into 
three broad categories of the 'rational legal', the 'self-seeker' and 'entrepreneurial' 
bureaucrat, he acknowledges that these categorisations are idealised and never occur 
in pure forms, rather elements of each are likely to coexist at any one time. Gabris has 
highlighted the fact that meta-preferences do not remain fixed, but that choices of the 
individual are context specific. 
'whatever dominant value system exists at a given time defines the acceptable 
boundaries of ethical behaviour, and those boundaries may expand, contract, 
and change depending on who has power and what they value' ( 1991: 216). 
Not only are 'cultures' context specific, but broader societal factors lead these values 
to change over time, 
'It is history that most effectively reveals the time dimensions of values in the 
system, illuminating the evolution of the value' (Braibanti, 1976: 136). 
Within this section, I argue that, whilst historically the structure of the Indian civil 
service has been based on the rational legal model, the work cultures of government 
officials are negotiated and transient, with elements of rationality, self-seeking and 
17 For a critique see Pederson, 1992. 
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entrepreneurship present at any one time. Significant for this study are both the 
relative dominance of each 'bureaucratic type' and the implications this has for 
bureaucratic change. 
2.4.1: The Rational Legal Bureaucrat 
The 'rational legal bureaucrat', for Esman, is based on the Weberian ideal. It is 
characterised by an elaborate hierarchical division of labour directed by explicit rules, 
impersonally applied, staffed by full-time, lifetime professionals. Weber wrote of 
officers being given income-yielding property for the duration of their employment, 
for example a farm, with its modern day equivalent being a salary. In accepting this 
'payment', bureaucrats in Weber's view, should not take any other fees or gifts for 
service. The bureaucrat does not own their job (Weber, 1947 translation, p. 332), nor 
do they own the 'means of administration' - the computers, files or furniture. For 
Weber, the level of bureaucrats' salary should be sufficiently high to retain the 
individual for their working life. This idea derives from the perception that efficiency 
is affected if a bureaucrat leaves the organisation, due to the time and experience 
required for the task and the structures' dependence on elaborate divisions of labour 
(Beetham, 1974). Due to the nature of bureaucratic work, and also perhaps because of 
the importance of training and co-ordination in the job, Weber's idealised bureaucracy 
demands educated recruits. 
Another feature of this type of bureaucracy is the impersonal way its rules are applied, 
to citizens, organisations and even its own staff. For Weber, the strict adherence to 
rules is the most important feature of bureaucracy. In 'Economy and Society' he 
wrote of bureaucracy under the heading of Types of Legitimate Authority. There are 
three types: rational, traditional and charismatic. Charismatic authority is regarded as 
legitimate, and works because followers are personally devoted to the 'gifted' leader. 
Second, traditional authority is that which has never been questioned so retains its 
legitimacy, for example hereditary monarchs. Third, rational authority represents the 
'rule of law', which is respected by a particular community and has come to be seen by 
those individuals as legitimate. 
Although Weber regarded bureaucracy as supremely efficient, he did not support what 
he saw as its 'inevitable triumph'. He highlighted the distinction between 'goal-
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rational' and 'value-rational'. In the pursuit of goals it may be rational, for example to 
lie, this may not however fit with the values of an individual. He saw another 
contradiction in the distinction between 'formal' and 'substantive' rationality. Society 
is 'formally' rational if it aims to maximise the attainment of people's goals, but at the 
same time may not be 'substantively' rational. One example is personal freedom, to 
which bureaucracy is inimical. Weber notes that to succeed in bureaucracy it may 
mean curtailing personal freedom of expression, 
'The quality which best guarantees promotion [in a bureaucracy] is a measure 
of pliancy toward the apparatus ... of "convenience" for his superior' (Economy 
and Society, 1968 translation, p. 1449). 
There have been numerous criticisms of both the idealised Weberian model and its 
workings in reality. Robert Parker ( 1993) indicates that popular anti-bureaucratic 
sentiment trades on two dramatic and often contradictory representations of 
bureaucrats as 'inert' and 'strictly hierarchical'. 'Bureaucracy bashing' has become a 
common phenomena in current literature (see Peters and Waterman, 1982; Peters, 
1987, 1992, 1994 ). In Mintzberg' s classic (1979) text, he referred to the limitations of 
what he sees as a 'machine bureaucracy', unable to adapt to particular circumstances. 
Others have questioned its transferability to developing nations (Weidner, 1964, more 
recently Gupta and Ferguson 1996). Post-modern variants of bureaucratic critique are 
offered by Bauman (1989, 1993) and Burrell ( 1997). Feminist critiques on the male 
domination of the typical Weberian bureaucracy are also common (Ferguson 1984; 
Pringle, 1989; various chapters in Savage and Witz, 1994 ). Crozier captured many of 
the key areas of criticism arguing that, 
'[Weberian bureaucracy] evokes the slowness, the ponderousness, the routine, 
the complication of procedures, and the maladapted response of 'bureaucratic' 
organisations to the needs which they should satisfy, and the frustrations 
which their members, clients or subjects consequently endure' (Crozier, 1964: 
3). 
The traditional model of civil services in India saw the bureaucrat as legal-rational, 
hierarchically organised, generalist, technically competent and expected to remain 
politically neutral. Following an impersonal style of work, rules, regulations and 
procedures govern the working of the system (Arora, 1996). The 'license permit raj' 
was primarily dominated by government officers, and allowed little room for private 
initiative and enterprise. Traditional recommendations to improve the Weberian 
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construct include the flattening of hierarchies, an alternative relationship with the 
public, flexible task force approaches and an emphasis on field offices rather than 
headquarters (Esman, 1974; Gross, 1974; Panandiker, 1967; Raphaeli, 1967; 
Panandiker et al., 1983). More recently, Ferguson (1996) has argued that routine 
taking precedence over creativity is inappropriate in environments in which policy 
needs to be adapted in relation to specific circumstances. As seniority is regarded as 
more important than merit, and income rises with longevity of service, Sodhi, ( 1999) 
theorises that there is little incentive for administrators to excel. Arora ( 1990) has 
argued that as hierarchy acts as the backbone of the system, decisions do not emerge 
from discussion and consensus, rather orders flow top down. He has also suggested 
that this has resulted in a lack of communication, conveying the ideas of the 
functionaries at the bottom. Strict adherence to hierarchy has been argued to lead to 
subservience by Akerlof (1991 ). 
2.4.2: The Vested Interest Bureaucrat 
The second bureaucratic type for Esman is that of 'vested interest'. This theory has 
been dominated by public choice and neo-classical theorists. They suggest 'utility 
maximising' government officials will tend to be self-serving rather than public 
servants, all other things being equal. As Fox and Miller have discussed, the concept 
of personal gain for bureaucrats is rather complex ( 1995). Whilst neo-classical and 
public choice theorists suggest this would be based on financial gain, other benefits 
including ties to kith and kin and even 'job satisfaction' can feature in bureaucratic 
personal gain. Problems associated with this bureaucratic type include nepotism and 
clientelism, with individuals hired and fired on the basis of political and kin relations 
rather than merit. Public officials are seen as lacking adequate training and believe 
their own rhetoric regarding their superiority (Chaubey, 1997). In this model, 
programmes are often centrally conceived and inappropriate, and the dense 
bureaucratic hierarchy offers opportunity for bribery and corruption. All these 
arguments are well documented. In addition, within this theory, beneficiaries of public 
programmes are left in poverty due to the mismanagement and ineptitude of the 
bureaucracy (Mathur, 1991 ). Such 'undeniable' evidence on the rent-seeking nature of 
bureaucrats has led to policy influenced by advice based on the minimization of the 
ills of bureaucracy in the Civil Service Reforms in India. The body of advice 
developed from public choice literature prescribes limiting the 'damage' of the public 
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sector and advocates reducing both its size and scope, in order to reduce opportunity 
for corruption and encourage market intervention. 
In the past, the ICS and early IAS have been characterised as honest and dedicated 
being portrayed as the 'steel frame' (Nigam, 1985) of the British Empire and the new 
Indian State. The current structure, in contrast, has been scathingly compared to a 
'bamboo frame' (Sinha, 1997). Trying to put the current situation in historical 
perspective, Trivedi ( 1997) argues that in the years after Independence, the political 
neutrality of the civil service was, by and large, respected. He contends that, 
'It can be said without any fear of contradiction that the first two decades of 
Independence saw the blooming of a service, highly dedicated and devoted not 
only to the requirements of a democratic and welfare state, but also to being an 
effective instrument of social change through responsible and responsive 
functioning' (1997: 72). 
Subramanian (1997) argues that political interference is the mam cause of 
bureaucratic corruption, and that one party domination by the Indian National 
Congress, both at the Centre, and in most States during this period, meant those civil 
servants were not faced with the same temptations which exist today. However 
Hughes-Jones argues that the 'steel frame' never really existed, and the bureaucracy 
in India has always suffered elitism, paternalism and inequality. Stephen Hugh-Jones 
says that the idea that the ICS were devoted servants of the people is a fallacy, 
'Accepting that imperialism itself is a lost cause, we are mythicizing its 
administrators, the Indian Civil Service,' with the consequence that, 'in 
retrospect these oligarchs have been uniformly incorruptible, far seeing, all 
competent: stern but devoted servants of India, whose life work found its 
fulfillment in Indian Independence ... ' (1966: 842). 
Evidence from the former Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, would appear to 
support this assertion. The note on 'Basic Economic Issues', submitted to the Ali-
Indian Congress Committee held in Delhi in November 1969, complained; 
'The present bureaucracy under the orthodox and conservative leadership of 
the Indian Civil Service with its upper-class prejudices, can hardly be expected 
to meet the requirements of social and economic change along socialist lines. 
The creation of an administrative cadre committed to national objectives and 
responsive to our social needs is an urgent necessity' (Quoted in the Hindustan 
Times, 91h November 1969). 18 
IX Of course, Indira Gandhi had her own reasons for undermining political institutions and reshaping 
the civil service to her own ends. 
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Mathur suggests it was specifically the period after Indira Gandhi took over as Prime 
Minister, in 1966, that was a turning point in the po1iticisation of the bureaucracy, as 
she attempted to use the bureaucracy to strengthen her position both in the party and 
in government ( 1996). Whilst the nature of the early Indian bureaucracy continues to 
be debated, contemporary perceptions overwhelmingly mirror the vested interest 
model. It is difficult to open a newspaper or turn on the television without hearing 
about 'politicisation', whether based on party, caste or communal lines (frequently 
associated with transfers), 'corruption' (in its various forms) and 'authoritarianism' 
within the public administration. It is on these specific points that I will concentrate in 
this instance. 
Politicisation: 
For Edwards and Hulme ( 1997), inefficiency within the Weberian model is often 
viewed as a result of 'rational' problems whether it relates to lack of skill, funding or 
'irrational' elements grouped under the title of culture (including familial ties, religion 
and cultural norms and values). However as they assert, this represents an incomplete 
assessment, as there are frequently important political elements at work. This may be 
in visible forms such as lobbying, but may also be discrete measures of promotion or 
subjugation of orders, or inaction that tend to be less visible. Shastri ( 1999) has 
described two related but distinct trends regarding the role of the civil service in the 
Indian administrative system which have dominated in recent years. First, he claims 
that increasing politicisation of the civil service has undermined the credibility of the 
administration. Saxena (a retired bureaucrat himself) concurs with this analysis, 
suggesting that the idea of an Indian civil service based on 'neutral competence' and 
the integration of 'group objectives' have been all but abandoned (1997). Politicians 
have achieved increasing power by placing in their 'better posts', bureaucrats who are 
willing to bow to their wishes, rather than to remain faithful to their oath of allegiance 
to the Indian Constitution (Bhambhri, 1997). 
Second, Shastri contends that controversies involving minister-civil-servant 
relationships have raised doubts as to who controls and directs governmental activity, 
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and tor what end~. He notes that the relati've power or politician~ can be judged b) the 
acronym used by bureaucrats to de::.cribe the ·government of the clay·: GOD ( 1999). 
The Director of the Lal Bahadur Sha~tri Academy of Admini~trution. 8 S Ba~\\'an. 
describe:-. the nexu~ between the civil servant!> and politician~. 
·unfortunately many ... officers are accepting a dimini'ihed role of them~elvc~ 
by becoming agents of exploitation in a state structure which is callous to the 
needs of the poor. In the process. they \VOuld become totally im1i-;tingui~hable 
from other rent seeking parasites - politicians, in!->pectors ... they arc taking too 
much from the system and contributing too little' (quoted in Set h. 1999: 154 ). 
In this context. Brarnbhri claim~ that civil senant~ are induced to k.eep their political 
masters in good humour by whatever mean~ nece!->sury ( Bhambhri. 1971. 1997 ~ ~ee 
al~o Rudolph and Ruuolph. I YH7. Bhattacharya. M .. 1989 ). 
Figure 23: (Right) 
·REf-ORMING BUREAUCRACY., 
(Indian Expre~s 16'h November 1999). 
The caricature depicts a BJP Politician 
with the civil .servants a~ ·puppets on hi.., 
hand. 
Figure 1.]: (Left) 
·UNIFIED ADMI 'ISTRATIOt\ 
CODE·, (Pioneer, 21 '{ Sept. 1999 ). 
Depicts Union Public Sen ice 
Commi~~ion being as~aulted hy 
higher service~. Thi~ ca11oon 
exemplifies the idea that power 
relations between rank are highl> 
differentiated (Vanaik. 19901. 
Political affiliations are c.:learly not the only influence that impact \\Orking culture .... or 
government otJicials. AccorcJing to Hyden ( 1983) ·r he economy of affect ion·. name I) 
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religious, class, caste, political, kinship or ethnic ties, can influence and even override 
the 'rational' behaviour of a bureaucrat. Patronage ties are seen as having a sweeping 
influence on the workings of the bureaucracy according to Beteille. He asks, 
'Why has it proven so difficult to keep administration insulated from the small 
and large demands of patronage? Part of the answer lies in the turn taken by 
democratic politics in India. But there are deeper causes, embedded in the 
structure of Indian society. Ours is a society in which claims of kinship, caste 
and community are strong, not to say irresistible, and ties of patronage often 
emerge as concessions to those claims' (1996:3). 
Figure 2.4: (right) 
'WHIPPING BOYS WHO 
HOLD WHIPHAND', ET lOth 
June, 1997. 
Depicts the relationship 
between powerful politicians 
and subservient public 
officials. The politician 
oversees what the bureaucrat 
does and controls the work of 
officials. 
For Koh)j, in India, the 'interventionist democratic state has facilitated rapid political 
mobilisation of various castes, classes, and religious and language groups' ( 1990: 20). 
The role of such values has been analysed by Huntington (1993), Tripathi (200 1) and 
Kuran ( 1995), among others. In India as Ali ( 1979: 315) points out, 
'caste, language and religion are still very decisive factors in political 
affiliations; administrators always are divided into groups and cliques based 
on caste and language'. 
This has perhaps become more frequent after 1979, when a change in the Civil 
Service Examination system de-emphasised the English language. However the extent 
to which regional candidates are more vernacular than elite, is debatable. Such 
tendencies lead to lack of confidence among the public in the neutrality of the 
administration and hence foster social discontent. 
A recent (2001) survey of U.P. bureaucrats would seem to support the 'sweeping 
influence' of caste factors. Whilst the majority of interviewees felt that issues of caste 
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were detrimental to the efficient working of the bureaucracy, 96% of bureaucrats said 
that their decisions were influenced by 'caste considerations' (Lucknow University 
and the Indian Council of Social Science Research, 2001 ). Despite this research, 
Honadle and Rosengard (1983) argue to the contrary, that while cultural factors are 
important, their role is frequently overemphasised to justify programme failure. 
The Indian civil service system, at both central and provincial levels, has provided 
very short tenures to civil servants (Banik, 2001). In the past, frequent transfers of 
civil servants characterised the colonial Indian Civil Service (ICS), and Potter (1996a) 
finds that, in particular, District Collectors were very mobile 19• Transfers were also 
due to posts becoming vacant due to illness, travel, accident or death. The logic 
underlying such a policy was primarily to prevent officials becoming stale in their 
posts, to ensure that there was fresh blood at the Centre, and to give all members of 
the ICS a fair share of what had always been regarded as prize appointments (Potter, 
1987). Transfers can, for instance, prevent the growth of excess 'embeddedness' in 
local society by creating some distance between civil servants and private citizens. By 
transferring civil servants at regular intervals, it is hoped that the influence of 
'ascribed' relationships (of family, caste, and propinquity) and 'achieved' 
relationships (with friends, acquaintances, and clients) will be neutralised. 
However, many officers have written about the phenomenon, noting that their lives 
have been constantly disrupted (Arora, 1998, Dhar, 1997). Chambers (1983) has 
called transfers the 'slipping clutch' of rural development. Today, according to Banik 
(2001), the crucial determinant for transfers seems to be political culture and the 
nature of the political leadership in place. According to de Zwart, (1994), the power to 
transfer officials is a, 'very important political favour' at the disposal of a Chief 
Minister of a State. It can be a useful tool for politicians to extract obedience and 
compliance, since transfers offer the least line of resistance and can enable the most 
malleable officials to gain key positions. It is also a symbolic gesture that politicians 
use to convey to the bureaucracy, as well as to the masses, that 'their own people' 
have been put in charge of posts. 
19 Collectors are the chief executive officers of a district within an Indian State. Given the data 
available on movement of these officers in 1936, Potter finds that almost two-thirds of Collectors held 
their posts for less than a year (Potter 1996a: 27). 
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There has been acknowledgement of the problem, starting with the Santhanam 
Committee Report ( 1964 ), which pointed out the connection between transfers and 
corruption. The Planning Commission of India urged State governments not to 
transfer able Collectors whilst implementing the Sixth Five Year Plan (Potter 1996a: 
253). A study of IAS movement patterns shows that, for the country as a whole, more 
than 50% of officers serve for less than one year (Potter, 1987). The officers putting 
in one or two years of service are about 25% of the total strength of the IAS in the 
country, and the number of IAS officers putting in two or three years of service has 
been, on average, about I 0% of their total number. Tenures are so short that, on 
average, less than I% of officers remain in their posts for more than three years. 
Banik (200 I) identifies three broad categories of transfers at the State level: transfers 
prior to elections; mass transfers immediately after elections; and the transfers of 
'difficult' officers. Needless to say, there are many overlapping features within each 
of these categories. Although this is a trend across many States, Banik argues that 
Uttar Pradesh offers a prime example of all these factors, particularly as the State had 
a dozen changes of government between 1977 and 1999. Successive Chief Ministers 
have mastered the art of wielding carrots and sticks particularly to IAS officers. When 
a new government assumed office in Uttar Pradesh in 1990, Collectors were 
transferred in 56 of the 63 Districts (Mathur, 1991 ). Between July 1991 and 
December 1992, Chief Minister Kalyan Singh transferred 293 IAS officers. His 
successor Mu la yam Singh Y adav transferred 321 IAS officers in the period, 
December 1992 to June 1995. Chief Minister Mayawati then outdid Yadav by 
transferring 284 IAS officers between June and October 199520 (The Indian Express, 
1998). 
The coalition between the BJP and BSP was reformed in Uttar Pradesh in 1997, and 
the trend of mass transfer of officers in the State became even more pronounced. Raju 
Sharma, former Labour Commissioner, highlighted four extra costs involved in 
transfer; namely travel costs of transferred personnel, 'premiums' (rental value of 
20 According to another article Mayawati transferred an average of seven officers per day. After twelve 
months in office Kalyan Singh had, on an average, transferred sixteen officers a day (Indian Express, 
5th Oct 1997). 
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post) 'quality loss cost' and 'delay costs'. He calculates that, for UP the alone, these 
total approximately Rs. 28 billion each year. This factor has recently come to a head 
in UP, with the World Bank threatening to cease loaning to the State if the practice 
isn't halted (Financial Times, 2002). 
Using basic organisational theory, Potter (1987: 853) has argued efficiency is reduced 
where there is a high turnover of personnel. This is certainly the case with transfers 
that postpone, stop, or even reverse decisions. Furthermore, new appointees are likely 
to take quite some time to learn the working nature and culture of a new department. 
Rapid transfers can also have a demoralising effect, dampening the enthusiasm of IAS 
officers, as they are seldom able to witness the result of their efforts. Some see 
transfer as humiliating as it can be assumed they were not competent enough to 
perform the task assigned, others see certain postings as 'punishment' from powerful 
individuals (Bhattacharya, M., 1989, Potter 1996a). 
The rapid transfer of officers is important for this research, as it may have adverse 
effects on administrative performance and ability to develop new ways of working. 
Chambers ( 1983) describes transfers as the 'slipping clutch' of rural development 
efforts, since they incapacitate field organisations of government. Kohli ( 1991: 5) 
argues that India faces a 'crisis of governability' since its 'capacity to govern (i.e. its 
capacity to simultaneously promote development and accommodate diverse interests) 
has declined'. 
The Sarkaria Commission into Centre-State relations, pointed out that the practice of 
allotting at least 50% of the all-India officers to a cadre from outside the state (for the 
purpose of promoting national integration) was not working successfully (Goi, 1988). 
It argued that those individuals who were 'outsiders' generally prefer to go to the 
Centre on deputation, and prefer not to return to the State (Report 1988). 
Consequently, among the officers 
'holding senior posts in the State governments, the insiders outnumber 
outsiders ... (and) this is a serious deviation from the All India character of 
these Services' (1988: 225, Quoted in Gupta 1990). 
The Sarkaria Commission recommendations came alongside the stand taken by the 
Sub Committee of the Inter State Council to ensure strict enforcement of the rules 
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relating to deputation of officers belonging to the All India Services to the Centre 
(The Times of India 16, 1992). However, it has been reported by the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Personnel and Public Grievances that 57% of the 2900 IAS 
officers working in the State have never been posted on deputation to the Centre. This 
implies that insiders are staying in the State and outsiders remain at the Centre 
(Hindu, September 4, 1996). The fact that, despite government rulings, bureaucrats 
have managed to avoid compliance, could give support to Shastri' s argument that 
bureaucrats in fact control and direct government activity (1997). 
Of course there are considerable variations to the pressure politicians are able to put 
on civil servants both regionally, and based on the relative power of the politician and 
bureaucrat. Vanaik ( 1990) suggests that, 
'Bureaucratic elites at the Centre are far less susceptible to the pressure of the 
agrarian bourgeoisie ... [while] in the States, the more localised bureaucracy, 
the more subordinate it is to the power of the rural rich. The industrial 
bourgeoisie clearly exercises greater authority on the bureaucracy at the 
Centre'. 
Corruption: 
Over the past few years there has been growing attention to the problem of 
bureaucratic corruption by the World Bank, IMF, NGOs, as well as academics. There 
is not sufficient time within this thesis to discuss the issue of corruption within Indian 
administration or otherwise, but it is necessary here to explain that corruption is one 
of the main traits of a 'vested interest' bureaucrat. There is general acceptance that the 
phenomena involves, 'the abuse of public office for private gain' (Gray and Kaufman 
1998, Rose-Ackerman, Zakiuddin, 1998). Breton and Wintrobe argue that what 
constitutes corruption is much broader than direct financial benefit, 
'The issue of corruption becomes even more clouded when we realise that 
within bureaucracies, it is not only money that can be used to compensate a 
pliant bureaucrat', but also other things like, 'access to villas and fishing 
lodges, free lunches, trips abroad, interest-free loans, gifts' (1982: 26). 
Definitions of the phenomenon and how it is interpreted are dependent on social and 
cultural norms. Tanzi argues, 
'to argue that the personal relationships that come to be established between 
public sector employees and individuals who deal with them, reflects a 
'corrupt' society may be correct in a legalistic sense, but it misses the point 
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that these relationships simply reflect different social and moral norms' ( 1995: 
44). 
Although corruption IS often interpreted as having negative distributional 
consequences, others have argued that corruption has positive effects; it 'humanisises' 
the working of the bureaucracy (Ward, 1989). Ward suggests networks of personal 
relationships, which lead bureaucrats to be corrupt, demonstrate that bureaucrats are 
not only legal-rational, but that 'the bureaucracy' like other institutions is made up of 
a number of different people with differing and often conflicting personal traits and 
objectives. 
Akhil Gupta ( 1995) examined how lower level officials execute their duties and found 
the conventional distinction between private and public inapplicable to the Indian 
context. He argued that the case of Shamaji, an Indian lower level official, 'poses an 
interesting challenge to Western notions of the boundary between 'state' and 'society' 
in some obvious ways (Gupta, 1995:384). Shamanji's ways of working show little 
resemblance to western experiences. First, his office was located in the same building 
in which he lived. Second, when performing his duties he constantly discussed 
matters with those around him. Third, money was demanded for the completion of his 
duties. When locals complained about the corruption of the state, it was not because 
they had to pay bribes, but rather that certain networks were required to be accessed in 
dealing with officials. Gupta concludes that, 'the discourse of corruption varies a great 
deal from one country to another, dependent as it is on particular trajectories and the 
specific grammars of public culture' (op. cit.: 392). In other words, social boundaries 
that delineate what is acceptable behaviour, and what is not, are socially produced and 
case specific. 
Corruption, argues Harris-White (1996), is a social phenomenon, part of a broader, 
institutionalised process of redistribution and accumulation, of new forms of property 
relation. She claims in India, decades of tax evasion, black investment (Kabra, 1982) 
and corruption have resulted in relations and institutions involving elite groups, which 
create serious obstacles to the outcome of reforms predicted by economic 
deregulation and liberalisation. 
63 
Chapter 2: Kaun Banega Krorepati? Perceptions of bureaucratic cultures in India. 
Robbins (2000) suggests that the presence of corruption in the Indian bureaucracy 
does not represent the absence of rules but the presence of alternative norms. It is not 
the absence of a strong state, but the presence of different institutions that vie for 
legitimacy and trust among diverse players within state and civil society. He suggests 
that these institutions are bound together by persisting social actions (or social 
capital). Such relations are persistent in that they require energy, effort, and other 
transaction 'costs'. They are the product of state rules and cultural norms. Robbins' 
work on the Latwara reserve in India suggests that in reality state rules are porous, 
and that civil society and state are interwoven. 
Furthermore, the ways in which similar phenomena are interpreted and understood is 
also important in how the effects of change are perceived. In his work on South Indian 
canal irrigation, Wade ( 1982, 1984) has described a network of politicians, middle-
men and lower level officers who gain money from bribes, supporting transfers and 
getting kickbacks from contracts. This, he claims, is central to the poor performance 
of this type of agriculture. Paul (1997), in his study of five Indian cities calculated that 
one in ten households had given 'speed money' to bureaucrats for an essential service, 
whilst, Gopakumar, ( 1997) estimates that India manufacturing industries may be 
'paying' 35 billion Rupees a year to government inspectors to keep them pacified. 
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Figure 2.5 (Left): 
'BUREAUCRACY NEEDS 
REALIGNMENT': 
Pioneer, March 61h 1999. 
Depicts government officials 
as vermin who eat away at 
development policies for 
their own personal 
satisfaction. 
However, Sissener ( 1999) has analysed these bonds and networks in a different way. 
Between family, friends and neighbours in Bangladesh he argues there exists an 
almost general 'obligation' of mutual assistance. It isn't possible to refuse a service, a 
favour or 'string-pulling' without severe social consequences. In this context, making 
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use of solidarity networks is a vital and legitimate part of everyday life. When this 
'mutual assistance' is witnessed, in the form of getting access to resources or posts, it 
is seen as 'corruption'. However, if for example these networks lead to the 
development of 'micro-credit' enterprise it is likely to be perceived as the effective 
development of 'social capital'. 
Authoritarianism: 
In India, many have traditionally believed, and some continue to believe, that 
government should be a benevolent ruler and benign provider. This aspiration of 
dependence on government for deliverance is described as Ma-Ba/ 1 Sarkar 
(government as the mother and father). In the case of India, Rothermund (1993: 196) 
argues that, 'The Indian people tend to look up to Sarkar, the omnipotent 
government'. 
Veron et al. have suggested that for fifty years the idea of state as mother and father 
has been developed, making change, and as such participatory democracy that will 
enfranchise the people very difficult (2002). Beteille argues that this culture has been 
perpetuated through the role of District Officer as the final arbiter of the destinies of 
those in his care (1999). Mohit Bhattacharya (1989) also details the historical 
tendency towards autonomy of the bureaucracy from the highest to lowest levels, and 
the tendency towards authoritarianism that was seen most notably during the 
Emergency (1975 - 1977). Jalal (1995), in her analysis of democracy and 
authoritarianism in South Asia, studies the role the bureaucracy has played in shaping 
postcolonial polities. She argues that the practice of bureaucratic authoritarianism 
inherited from the colonial state has largely persisted, despite the adoption of a 
Westminster style parliamentary democracy. She notes specifically that, 
'The nurturing of the parliamentary form of government through the 
meticulous observances of the ritual of elections in India enabled a partnership 
between the political leadership and the non elected institutions of the state to 
preside over a democratic authoritarianism' (1995, 249-50). 
Here J ala I is referring primarily to authoritarianism demonstrated by IAS officials 
with considerable access to the political elite. However, in his work on street-level 
bureaucrats or Lower Level Functionaries (LLF) in America, Michael Lipsky ( 1980) 
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notes that those officials also have considerable discretion to accept or resist 
instructions from higher authorities. This may lead to them acting in an authoritarian 
manner or, as I discuss in relation to the entrepreneurial model, may allow room for 
innovation and customer orientation. The loss of 'political cohesion' identified by 
Manor (1982) and Kaviraj (1991), and the fairly transient nature of many political 
careers, has meant the bureaucracy has been well positioned to maintain this 
autonomy (Zafarullah and Huque, 1998). 
It is necessary to highlight both the corruption, and the continuing honesty, of many 
government officials. A possible attempt can be made in the framework of changing 
metapreferences (Kuran, 1995). Using the dual personality model of Schelling (1984), 
it is possible to consider government officials as torn between conflicting objectives. 
These may include maximisation of state power and wealth versus personal and 
family wealth and welfare, commitment to colleagues versus personal glory, or social 
and media acceptance versus truth and nobility. 
Shastri ( 1999) claims two important developments have encouraged a backlash 
against the vested interest bureaucrat. First, he cites 'bureaucratic activism' as having 
become popular, being viewed favourably by both the media and public. Godbole 
claims that 'activist bureaucrats' have assumed the role of educators to people at large 
on the corrupting influence of 'corroding moral and ethical standards' of the 
bureaucracy ( 1999). One such activist, T N Seshan, once Chief Election Minister has 
referred to senior bureaucrats as 'backbone-less wonders' (Indian Express, June 14, 
1994). In Uttar Pradesh, the problems of politicisation and corruption were perceived 
to be bad enough to warrant a vigilante poll of bureaucrats to highlight the three worst 
offenders in the IAS (Trivedi, 1997). This 'name and shame' policy parallels 
observations made by Judith Tendler (1997), which will be discussed further in 
chapter 5. 
The second development Shastri describes as 'judicial activism' leading to a series of 
landmark judgements against bureaucrats. For Saxena, just as the Bofors22 represented 
21 Though this term is rather antiquated it is still used in some rural areas. 
22 The Bofors case, was a case of criminal conspiracy, bribery, criminal misconduct by public servants, 
cheating, criminal breach of trust, forgery for the purpose of cheating and, using as genuine, forged 
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a turning point which legitimised corruption, the arrest of senior bureaucrats like 
Chandraswami, HKL Bhagat, Kalpanath Rai and Sanjeev Rao has to some extent 
restored the faith of the common person in the rule of law (1996). Recently such 
activism has been facilitated through the use of information technology. Villagers in 
the Dhar District in Madhya Pradesh can use the new Gyandoot cyberkiosks to get 
birth certificates, land records and driving licenses without the need to use officials as 
intermediaries, and hence cutting corruption. The internet can also be used to 
complain about local issues, including roads and schools, and the conduct of 
individual officers (BBC Radio 4, 21st June, 2002). Such activism is of limited effect 
for Singh (1994). He suggests that whilst scapegoat prosecutions are taking place, in 
the early 1990s the Supreme Court alone reportedly had a backlog of half a million 
cases. For the majority of corrupt bureaucrats the chance of punishment remains slim. 
A neo-classical interpretation of bureaucratic behaviour would suggest that bad policy 
causes bad values, such as licensing to rent-seeking behaviour. However, this 
conception does not quite explain the observed phenomena that I shall presently 
discuss. A more powerful perspective would be that changes in culture and social 
environment impact on values over time, and hence on policy. It has been 
demonstrated by Grief (1994) that entire institutions can behave differently depending 
on the cultural beliefs of the society/ individual. The causality here runs as follows: 
change in culture leads to change in values, which in turn affects institutional 
objectives. This then leads to change in policy. The focus of this thesis is the values of 
the government officials involved in the Indira Mahila Project. Values, however 
formed, affect the commitment (Sen, 1977) which a bureaucrat feels towards the work 
(s)he performs. Even a simple commitment to hard work or national development 
could have the potential to override much of the self-interest from which NC models 
seek to extrapolate behaviour. 
Despite popular perception the government officials in India have not always been 
'status quoist' in the pursuit of maintenance of power. Some of the earliest and 
staunchest supporters of liberalisation were in fact bureaucrats. 
documents in respect of the Bofors-India howitzer (the Swedish arms manufacturer) contract of March 
26, 1986. Those implicated in the affair were senior members ofRajiv Gandhi's government (including 
the former Defence Secretary) and the business magnates the Hinduja Brothers. 
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'Within the government, report after report put together by bureaucrats and 
specialists had, since the 1970s, been recommending liberalisation of one or 
another aspect of the economy' (Kohli, 1990: 312). 
2.4.3: The Entrepreneurial Bureaucrat 
In her book, 'Good Government in the Tropics', Judith Tendler (1997) argues that the 
'rent seeking' depictions of the bureaucracy (and as such, prescriptions) in developing 
countries is flawed for several reasons. First, she argues that mainstream advice about 
public sector reform is based on examples of poor performance. She argues that 
through focusing on cases of bad practice, the World Bank23 , amongst others, have 
promoted the reform of bureaucracy primarily based on public choice prescriptions, 
namely to 'slim down the state'. Some scholars, including Colclough (1983) in his 
work on Sub Saharan Africa, have disputed the idea that developing countries 
bureaucracies are over extended compared with developed. Others, for example 
O'Donnell (1993) for Latin America and Mkandawire (1994) for Africa, have argued 
that 'down-sizing' of the state and stripping away the prestige of the public service 
have actually increased corruption and decreased quality in public bureaucracies. 
Second, Tendler argues, ideas of 'best practice' in development policy too frequently 
support the importing of ideas and practices from industrialised countries to the 
developing world. Nunberg ( 1995, 1996) notes the very different experiences of NPM 
in different countries. Tendler argues that, too often, a neo-liberal model of NPM is 
imported into the developing world based on 'classic caricatures of the bloated 
bureaucracy and galloping wage bill syndrome' (1996: 6). Further she notes that 'the 
jury is still out' on some of the more extreme elements on NPM, such as widespread 
contractual employment in core civil services and market mechanisms incorporating 
performance pay (p. 12). 
Much work on development bureaucracies has focused on the lack of worker 
dedication, or what Charles Sa bel calls 'the science of suspicion' ( 1997). Tendler 
criticises the fact that whilst Industrial Performance and Workplace Transformation 
(IPWT) research on firms tries to see how to encourage cultural change to increase 
worker dedication, donor communities have traditionally started with the assumption 
23 The term 'good' or 'bad' as 'success' or 'failure' refer to the World Bank's own criteria, which is 
narrowly concerned with economic growth. 
68 
Chapter 2: Kaun Banega Krorepati? Perceptions of bureaucratic cultures in India. 
that civil servants are self-interested, rent seeking, and dishonest until proven 
otherwise. The IPWT literature prescribes greater worker autonomy and discretion as 
a way of obtaining better performance, whilst the development community tends to 
prescribe just the opposite. Elements of NPM, including downsizing, are used by 
restructuring firms to increase productivity. Lindauer and Nunberg ( 1995) have 
highlighted how frequently the donor community has focused its attention on 
downsizing government, to the exclusion of other NPM measures aimed at fostering 
increase performance. 
Finally, Tendler argues that current public sector reform through NPM relies too 
heavily on the 'user' or 'client' of public services. She argues that the development 
community now views consultations with, and pressures from, the client as a key to 
fixing government. Central to this new faith is the obsession with decentralisation so 
that government can be closer to the people and the unquestioning promotion of civil 
society and NGO groups who provide services and demand accountability from 
government. Tendler questions the extent to which this kind of relationship between 
the state and other groups is possible, or desirable, in every development situation 
(see also Harriss, 2002). 
Part ha Chatterjee (1998, 2001) argues that the concept of civil society, emphasising 
equality, individual rights and freedoms and the autonomy of the state, does not fit 
well with the social realities in post-Independence India. In India, it was not that civil 
society demanded the creation of democratic state, but rather that the latter was 
created to bring into existence a civil society in India (Rudolph, 2000). Even if, as 
Chatterjee contests, the Nehruvian project of modernisation aimed to 'create' civil 
society (1998: 1 0-11), the theoretically politically neutral development programmes 
were 
'reinvented at the District and Block levels by politicians and lower-level 
bureaucrats who did not always share the world views of their English-
educated, metropolitan superiors' (1998: 10-11 ). 
The mainstream development community, has instead, demanded highly structured 
relationships between the various parts of the bureaucratic chain, and almost 
obsessive interest with a report and monitoring culture. The public sector has been 
singled out as the instigator of development failure, and to improve performance it 
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should be avoided, circumvented and undermined. At the same time, other types of 
partnership and association are encouraged to trust each other and work together for 
the common good. Tendler questions the logic supports the promotion of common 
good through NGOs, private sector and civil society groups, whilst not having the 
same faith in possibilities offered by the public bureaucracy. In research on significant 
recent advances made in the public management of India's forests, Joshi (1997) 
discovered, to her surprise, that the public sector workers' association - the West 
Bengal Subordinate Forest Employees Association - played a key role in advocating 
and implementing these reforms. 
Within the private sector there is growing acknowledgement of the importance of 
worker dedication and the encouragement of what are popularly termed worker 
participation and self-managed worker teams, multi-skilling of workers and multitask 
jobs, and flexibly organised or 'specialised' production (Piore and Sabel, 1984). 
Almost all of these innovations include greater worker discretion and autonomy, 
greater co-operation between labour and management, and greater trust between 
workers and their customers, as well as between workers and managers (Sabel, 
1992)24. 
The work of Tendler and Evans, amongst others, has fed into the Post Washington 
Consensus perceptions of the role of bureaucracy, and the shift in focus of NPM, 
perhaps towards what Desai and Imrie have termed a post-managerial phase (1998). It 
is with such accounts of the potentially positive nature of the bureaucracy that 
Esman's third categorisation of the 'entrepreneurial' bureaucrat resonates. Essentially, 
this bureaucratic type incorporates these private sector perceptions of work culture 
into the public sector. Tendlers' research in North-East Brazil would appear to 
support such an analysis of the potential offered by the bureaucracy. She argues that 
Ceara State was transformed from having one of the poorest records in relation to 
human development criteria, under the direction of two young reformist governors, to 
one of considerable achievement. For Tendler, this change is based on a changed 
relationship between all parties involved in development. There was greater 
consultation, more co-operation, flexibility and informality in their interaction and 
24 Many of these practices follow research on Japanese 'Lean' production. For information on lean 
production see Nishiguchi, (1989), Helper, (1990), and Dore, (1987). 
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supervision. She argued that this involved a transformation, although not universally 
or without resistance, in the performance of government employees. In many ways 
their patterns of work were seen to resemble the entrepreneurial bureaucrat, associated 
with the most successful private sector enterprises: they were flexible, involved team 
work and a client-centred problem solving approach (rather than a delivery of 
centrally determined 'products'). I will return to aspects of these changes in chapter 
five. 
Esman argues that the entrpreneurial bureaucrat is best suited to carry out reforms in 
line with Os borne and Gaeblers 'reinventing government'. However, he argues 
against the pitfalls associated with excessive 'bureaucratic discretion' which aim to 
secure innovation and responsiveness, but which in practice may clash with both 
politicians and public m interpreting public preferences, and could lead to 
undermining efficiency m government. Pandanddiker and Kshirsagar have also 
argued that managerial styles can also be directive and manipulative rather than 
participative ( 1990). 
2.5: Conclusions 
Within this chapter I have sought to highlight some key features of the bureaucracy in 
India, including its development, r<?le and contemporary cultures. Using Esman's 
three bureaucratic 'images', I outlined the characteristics of the traditional Weberian 
rational-legal model, the vested-interest model and the entrepreneurial model, 
suggesting that elements of all three are likely to exist at any one time and in different 
ways at different levels. The introduction of any policy or discourse within a 
bureaucracy is likely to undergo a process of negotiation and change. It is my aim, 
through this research, to assess the ways in which government officials at different 
levels are adopting and adapting change associated with NPM. 
Evans ( 1995: 67) laments about the prohibitive environment for bureaucratic change 
India. He argues that the primary problem is 'the recalcitrant challenges of India's 
social structure' and problems 'exacerbated by the way the bureaucracy has defined 
its relation to society'. For him, the ethnic, religious and regional divisions in India 
add to the 'administrative nightmare'. He argues that the bureaucracy suffers, 'less 
internal capacity, more difficult environments, and less carefully defined agendas of 
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involvement'. For Evans, these features combine to, 'put embedded autonomy of the 
sort that characterises the development state out of reach' (pp. 69-70). 
Nowhere in India are the problems associated with social, political, historical (and 
other institutional factors) more acute than in Uttar Pradesh. It is necessary to 
understand this environment so that assessment of change can be made in light of the 
low social and administrative staring point of the State (Steinmetz, 1999). In the next 
chapter, therefore, I discuss governance, administration and development (both 
economic and social) in the case-study State and District, before going on to discuss 
the nature and aims of IMY. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE 'STATE' OF UTTAR PRADESH: GOVERNANCE, 
ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
3.1: Introduction 
Chapters I and 2 set out the background to the field of research. Shifts in development 
debate and policy from a Washington, to a Post-Washington Consensus were 
identified, and the parallel changes affecting public administration, namely moves 
towards new public management described. I concentrated specifically on the shifting 
focus, in India, to a more open and liberalised economic policy, the countries 
association with the World Bank, and moves to restructure the institutions of state 
through civil service reform from 1996 onwards. The central question tackled in this 
thesis, as previously stated, is 'How have bureaucrats involved in IMY in Uttar 
Pradesh engaged with the process of change associated with new public 
management?' 
The second chapter outlined the structure, role and working cultures of the Indian 
bureaucracy. It argued that the ways in which policy is adopted and adapted in situ, 
are clearly context specific for a place at any one period in time. This section, 
therefore, offers a contextualisation of the areas in which this research took place. The 
chapter begins with a detailed analysis of the social, political and environmental 
characteristics of the northern State of Uttar Pradesh (see Map 1 ). Uttar Pradesh is at 
the heart of an area (made up of UP and its bordering States of Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Rajastan) that has been characterised as bimaru (sick), particularly in 
economic terms in relation to the rest of India (Ashish Bose, 1991 ( The State also 
has a poor record in social development, gender equality, bureaucratic and political 
corruption and poverty alleviation. It is on these factors that I specifically concentrate. 
In the second, section I narrow the focus to the Rae Bareli District of Uttar Pradesh in 
which a specific government programme, Indira Mahila Y ojana, was investigated. In 
terms of geographical area, caste groupings and population, the District is broadly 
average for the State, but it is particularly interesting politically, as the home of the 
Gandhi family strongholds, the Amethi and Rae Bareli constituencies. The Indira 
1 For comparative studies see Sopher (1980a); also Karve (1965), Rudolph and Rudolph (1972), Dyson 
and Moore (1983), Caldwell and Caldwell ( 1987), Satia and Jejeebhoy (1991 ), among others. 
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development advancement (Lieten and Srivastava, 1999i. Uttar Pradesh is primarily 
a low lying, agricultural State (See Map 2), with a high proportion, of its population, 
over 80%, living in rural areas, and mainly engaged in the agrarian economy (Census, 
Go I, 200 I). Although urbanisation and non-agricultural employment increased in the 
post independence period, forms of agricultural production and the distribution of 
assets, notably cultivable land, still predominantly determine the material condition of 
the population. 
Two developments in the region's agranan history are particularly significant. The 
first involves the abolition of the zamindari system of land revenue and property 
rights at independence. Land reforms have resulted in some change including 
widening the base of ownership, limiting some of the power of large feudal landlords, 
and giving ownership rights to a vast majority of tenant farmers who previously did 
not own land6. The reforms did not, however, eradicate either landlessness or massive 
inequalities of land ownership in the State. The amounts of land given to farmers were 
small and, in the main, were taken from common land. Therefore instead of altering 
the dominance of proprietary classes (largely Brahmins, Thakurs, Jats and Ashraf 
Muslims) the abolition of zamindari led to large-scale eviction of tenants. This means 
the land ownership structure has changed little in the years since the abolition of the 
zamindarP. 
The second development was the spread, in the 1960s and 1970s, of modern green 
revolution agricultural practices in western Uttar Pradesh, and their subsequent, 
although highly differentiated, diffusion to other parts of the State. This has led to 
some dynamism in rural economy and the creation of new economic classes, 
contributing to political turbulence as well as positive change. Whilst technological 
development has led to the expansion of private agricultural incomes, the lack of 
public distribution for this technology has led to a slow decline in conventional 
5 In his recent work on work-force and socio-economic development in the State, Shafiqullah argues 
that socio-economic development in the State is highest in the North-Western part, it declines towards 
central and eastern parts (Shafiqullah, 200 I). 
6 Prior to the zamindari abolition, legal ownership of land in Uttar Pradesh was vested in between 3 and 
8% of rural households (see Hasan, 1989, and Stokes, 1975, for various estimates). 
7 Ranked by their ownership of land, the bottom 40% of households in Uttar Pradesh owned 2.5% of 
the total area in 1953-4, while the top I 0% owned 46% of the area. The percentage breakdown 
remained largely unchanged in 1982 (H.R. Sharma, 1994). 
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indicators of poverty. Moreover, the low quality of public services, for example 
education (Dreze and Gadzar, 1996) has led to only minimal reductions in poverty 
levels. 
3.2.2: Politics 
The State of Uttar Pradesh has held considerable sway in the wider politics of India. 
As the largest State, it provides 80 MPs to the 540 member Indian Parliament. This, 
together with the relative vicinity of the State to Delhi has meant the influence of 
State politicians at the national level has been consistently high. The 403 member 
State Assembly, based at the State capital Lucknow, also holds considerable national 
political influence, with many senior politicians fighting for constituencies in the 
State. It is significant that of the twelve Indian Prime Ministers to date, eight have 
come from Uttar Pradesh. 
The late 1970s defined the importance of Uttar Pradesh in national politics, indeed 
Gould (1971) argued that the politics of India from Independence were played out in 
Uttar Pradesh. Paul Brass (1985, 163), with reference to the Emergency period8 
(1975-77) and political changes of the late 1970s, writes that, 
'In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the conflicts for control of the 
government of India ... have been almost entirely a playing-out on the national 
stage of social and political conflicts that have their origins in the north Indian 
states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar'. 
In reaction to the Emergency and the imprisonment of opposition leaders, the Janata 
coaliton rose in Uttar Pradesh and won all 85 Lok Sabha seats in March 1977 when 
Indira Gandhi called elections. The State elections followed the same course, with the 
Janata winning 352 seats in the UP assembly. The Janata victory was short lived 
however, collapsing under the pressure of coalition politics. Sanjay Gandhi took 
advantage of the turmoil in UP and helped his mother Indira become Prime Minister 
for the second time in 1980. 
By the late 1980s, the socialist rhetoric of the Congress Party had lost much of its 
traditional support base of the upper castes. Dual political and economic pressures led 
x In a general State of Emergency (such as that declared by Indira Gandhi in 1975), the State legislative 
assemblies are dissolved and total power is assumed by the Centre. 
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many to defect to the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata party (BJP), which by the 
late 1980s became the second largest party in Uttar Pradesh. Liberalisation and the 
removal of many of the protective institutions of the state (Nair, 1996), led to 
economic pressures not only for the poor, but also the middle classes in both the cities 
and the countryside. Political change was influenced by the emancipatory cravings of 
the lower castes, promised to them by Congress9. The balancing act between classes 
and castes attempted by Congress began to alienate supporters on both sides. Under 
the short lived Janata Dal government of V.P.Singh (1989-1990), the multi-class 
appeal of Congress became increasingly difficult to sustain when the Mandal 
Commission recommendations, which had been produced over a decade previously, 
were brought into legislation in 1992. Its adoption meant a change in the relationship 
between Upper and Other Backward Classes, as the latter have been granted reserved 
places in elected and government postings (Balagopal, 1991; Galanter, 1991; Heuze, 
1991; Beteille, 1992, 1996; Srinivas, 1996). Reaction to the national legislation was 
played out in the State and resulted in weeks of violence throughout the cities of UP. 
The then leader of the BJP, L.K. Advani, reacted in October by leading a Hindu 
procession through the States, ending in Ayodhya, and resulting in the destruction of 
the town's mosque by extreme Hindu nationalists. 
Lower-caste groupings had begun vying for power at the centre of State politics in the 
1960s (Hasan, 1989), and the swearing in of the first Dalit Chief Minister, Mayawati, 
in April 1995 symbolised the realisation of the previous decade's pressures (Lerche, 
1999). But the farcical nature of UP politics was exemplified at this time with 
Mayawati's lower-caste based 10 Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) precariously allied with 
the Bharatiya Janata Party. The coalition was predictably short-lived (though has 
recently been resumed for the third time), and the failure of any party to gain a 
majority during the 1996 elections led to UP being placed under Presidential Rule. 
In March 1997, the BSP and BJP again joined forces agreeing to six months in office 
for each of the two leaders, Mayawati and Kalyan Singh (Brass, 1997). However, 
their radically differing ideologies led to persistent conflict. During her rule, 
9 This prompted a range of demand groups to mobilise in the 1980s - most notably rural coalitions, 
known as the 'new farmers movements', with their political expression in the Bharatiya Kisan Union. 
10 See Jeffery and Lerche, (2000) for an alternative perspective. · 
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Mayawati dramatically restructured the administration to guarantee support, and 
promoted Dalit prominence through symbolism including building statues of 
Ambedkar (who had been a prominent equality-promoting leader at Independence). 
On gaining office Kalyan Singh took the offensive, successfully encouraging 
defections to his party, and gaining overall control. To encourage the support of new 
allies and to appease old ones, he increased the number of ministries to provide all 
key supporters with high level posts, leading to dramatic increases in expenditure and 
bureaucratic mayhem. Multiple resignations followed including that of the Family 
Welfare Minister, Devendra Singh Bhole in April, 1999 accusing the Chief Minister 
of 'corruption, prejudice and being under the influence of bureaucrats' (Frontline, May 
6 1999). Kalyan Singh was finally removed from the party later that year. 
For the State as a whole, with Congress fading out, the upper castes, particularly the 
13% Brahmin population and the 12% Thakur population, continued to gravitate 
towards the BJP. In addition to the high-caste vote, the BJP has attracted a 
considerable lower-caste vote, with the former Chief Minister, Mr. Kalyan Singh, 
being drawn from the lower castes. However, with Singh now ousted from the party 
(from the beginning of 1999) the caste base began to weaken. Despite the party's 
waning popularity, it managed to hold onto power at the centre in 1999, albeit with a 
reduced majority. 
In the recent State assembly elections (February, 2002), Mr. Vajpayee's BJP and its 
allies lost elections in four States, the worst affected being UP with 99 million voters. 
The party had campaigned on anti-terrorism, anti-Pakistan and security issues in UP, 
despite the fact that the State is home to India's largest Muslim population. The BJP 
fielded only one Muslim candidate and the Prime Minister churned up a political 
storm when he told a rally that the party could win without the Muslim votes. This 
undoubtedly contributed to the massive losses incurred by the party, dropping from 
158 to only 88 seats. At the same time the contentious issue of the temple in Ayodhya, 
which had helped propel the party into national office on a wave of Hindu nationalist 
sentiment, is now proving difficult for the BJP to manage. In January 2002, around 
4,000 protesters belonging to a militant Hindu organisation marched on New Delhi, 
demanding the construction of a temple to the god Ram in the town. These same 
nationalists have criticised Vajpayee for not giving them full support. Although he is 
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said to favour the temple construction, he is constrained by secular parties m his 
national coalition (The Guardian, 2002). 
The socialist OBC Samjwadi party (SP) and its two small allies won 149 of UP's 403 
assembly seats, with a voter turnout of about 53%. The samajwadi leader Mulayam 
Singh Yadav, has considerable support from the (8.55%) Yadav and the (16.5%) 
Muslim populations. The parties' candidate emphasised the state's failures in relation 
to infrastructure, the lack of development, and the corruption of officials who 
siphoned money away from its true causes. Success in this election has been in no 
small part due to two key factors. First, sentiment over the brutal killing of the 
Samajwadi party MP, Phoolan Devi, in the summer of 2001 is still running high. 
Members of the party have called it a political conspiracy against the lower caste 
leader (Hindu, 2ih July 2001). The second weapon of the SP is India's biggest film 
star, Amitabh Bachchan - and presenter of 'Kaun Benaga Krorepati'. Mr Bachchan 
campaigned in the State, entertaining tens of thousands of supporters with a mixture 
of poetry, songs, and political points alongside the party's leader Mulayam Singh 
Yadav 11 • 
The Bahujan Samaj party, which controls most of the (23%) Dalit vote nearly doubled 
its representation, winning 98 seats. Adding to the cacophony of participators in the 
election has been the canditature of about twenty eunuchs. Whilst new to the political 
scene, they argue that not having families will make them less corrupt than the current 
batch of politicians! This sentiment no doubt refers to the number of candidates with 
criminal records. On the 28th of January the Asian Age reported at least five incidents 
of pre-poll violence in the State concluding that these elections could end up "as one 
of the most violent ever" (2002). They were right, allegations of vote rigging and 
violence at polling stations led to two districts being struck from the elections, 
meaning that votes were calculated for 401 of the (403) seats (India Today, October, 
2001). 
11 The BJP retaliated in similar fashion, with the support of Hollywood actress Hema Malini, popularly 
known as the 'Dream Girl'. 
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As no single party took power in the elections it was necessary for the parties 
concerned to organise a coalition government, the debates around which took over 
two months. In May the leader of BSP, Mayawati, was sworn in as the chief minister 
of UP for the third time in coalition government with the BJP (BBC, website 2002). 
BSP members took thirteen portfolios while the BJP got nine, and the two remaining 
posts went to the Indian National Lok Dal. 
This situation in UP exemplifies what Rudolph and Rudolph ( 1987) have termed the 
shift from 'command' to 'demand' politics. They refer to the fact that both State and 
Central governments have moved from a dominant position, directing policy through 
consensus and coercion, to a position where they are increasingly pressured by 
powerful social and political actors. Atul Kholi, in his study of the 'crisis of 
governmentabilty', suggests that uncontrolled politicisation of both state and civil 
society has resulted in the incapacity of the state to, 'simultaneously promote 
development and to accommodate diverse interests' (Kolhi, 1990: 14). Nowhere is 
this more true than in the current UP environment. The sharing of authority between 
the BSP and BJP has led to the transfer of senior officers, who have sometimes only 
occupied the portfolio for several hours, causing normal business to come to an abrupt 
halt. The World Bank has threatened to stop lending to the State, specifically because 
of the negative impact they have calculated political transfers to have had on 
development. The Bank contends that up to $377 million, of their $1.8 billion loan to 
the State is not being used effectively due to the transfer of officers. 
3.2.3: Development: 
Whilst caste polarisation is so complete and vicious in the State that it dominates the 
political agenda (Pai, 1997), successive State government regimes in UP, as in Bihar, 
have, until very recently, done relatively little to promote socially inclusive 
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development or reduce casteism (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000, eh. 9). Within this 
generalisation, Lerche ( 1995) asserts that the persistence of caste and class oppression 
in western UP is greater than that in the east of the State due to greater political power 
and organisation of dominant castes in the west. According to Dreze and Sen ( 1997), 
the political inequalities in UP have severely distorted the priorities of state 
intervention and implementation in development schemes. The low participation rates 
of disadvantaged groups in the political process reflect inequalities on the basis of 
class, caste and gender. This they argue has fed into low levels of social advancement 
in the State. Whilst India ranks 138 out of the 175 countries for which the HDI is 
computed, marked differences are evident both between and within States (Shiv 
Kumar, 1996). The southern State of Kerela ranks highest in India with an HDI value 
of 0.603, which is comparable to that of China. At the bottom of the scale is Uttar 
Pradesh (HDI of 0.348), similar in ranking to countries like Madagascar, Rwanda and 
Senegal, which have some of the lowest levels of human development in the world 
(UNDP, 1997). Within this section, I consider specific elements of human 
development in the State with particular focus on women as this is particularly 
0 + h" d 12 Important .or t IS case stu y. 
The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) for Indian States reveals not only the 
extent of gender inequalities within India, but also the country's poor performance in 
relation to other countries (Agnihotri, 1994) 13 . Topping the list of advanced Indian 
States is Kerela, with a GDI value of 0.565. Uttar Pradesh lurks at the bottom with a 
GDI value of 0.293, ranked next to Benin, reflecting the sharp disparities within India. 
Female literacy was recorded as 43% in the 2001 census in UP, showing a higher than 
average increase. This, however, remains less than half that achieved in Kerela, 
suggesting that the percentage increase may, in fact, reflect the relatively low starting 
point of UP. 
12 The role and status of women, clearly have important implications for the effectiveness of 
development work in India (see Basu, 1992; Asian Development Bank, 1994). However the focus of 
this project on changing culture of the bureaucracy, does not and cannot cover this subject in detail. 
13 The Department of Women & Child Development (DOWC), GOI, has sponsored studies to evolve a 
mechanism of gender audit at the District level, using indicators more appropriate to the socio-cultural 
context in India. UNDP supported a study on data availability in eight districts in four States, which 
found that gender disaggregated data is not available as yet to compute a meaningful GDI at the district 
level. The interagency Working Group on Gender and Development is supporting initiatives to gender-
sensitise data systems and provide the database for gender audits. 
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Despite the increase in literacy, the State remains 31st of the 35 States for female 
literacy levels. There are, in fact only thirteen countries in the world with lower GDis 
than those of Bihar (0.306) and Uttar Pradesh (0.293) 14• Another worrying trend in 
UP is the low Female to Male Ratio. Dreze and Gazdar, 1997 contend that, 
'Uttar Pradesh is not just a setter of world records when it comes to the female 
deficit in the population, it is virtually in a league of its own' (p.45). 
They argue that the main cause of the low female to male ratio represents the far 
lower survival rates of women from birth until mid thirties. For the 0-4 age group, 
female death rates in UP are 16% higher than male death rates, in contrast to the 
female advantage in that age group in South India. 
The average births per woman is twice as high in Uttar Pradesh as in South India, and 
the risk of maternal mortality during child birth is three times higher. It should be 
noted, that not only is the female to male ratio in Uttar Pradesh low, but it has been 
declining since the beginning of the century from 0.94 in 1901 to 0.88 in 1991, though 
this has slightly improved in the latest census 15 . For Murthi, Guio and Dreze ( 1996) 
the decline of the female to male ratio, despite improved medical facilities and 
reduced total poverty levels, must in part relate to the persistence and even 
accentuation of unequal gender relations. At the State level there has been little 
change in the rate of population growth in Uttar Pradesh 16 compared with signs of 
quite considerable reductions in growth rates for many other States (Dyson, 200 I). 
Whilst the provisional census results suggest that there has been a decline in India's 
population male bias (compared to 1991 ), Dyson argues that evidence is largely 
spurious because women were less fully enumerated in 1991. Dyson's argument is 
supported by the fact that the FMR in the 0-6 years age groups is actually falling 17, 
which implies the perpetuation of traditional female disadvantage. 
HDI levels within the State are both spatially and socially differentiated. The levels of 
development in urban areas, where 26% of the population live, are better than their 
rural counterparts in many respects. Life expectancy for a person born in urban India 
14 Twice as many people live in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (combined population of222 million in 1991) 
as in the total of the thirteen countries that have lower GDI values. 
15 According to the preliminary figures for the 2001 census the FMR is now 0.9. 
16 26% growth for the decade 1991-2001. 
17 This figure stood at 0.976 in 1961, 0.945 in 1991 and has fallen to 0.927 in 200 I. 
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is sixty-five years, compared with fifty-eight years in rural India. Similarly infant 
mortality and illiteracy are far higher in rural areas. A quarter of India's population 
belongs to communities classified as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs 
and STs). The level of human development amongst these communities have 
remained lower than the rest of the population, a feature intensified in the UP context 
(Chakrabarty, 2001). In 1992-3 the infant mortality rates were 107 and 91 per 1000 
live births among Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes, respectively, (22% and 
45% over the national average). Similarly, according to the 1991 census, only 24% of 
women in Scheduled Castes and 18% of Scheduled Tribes were literate. 
Uttar Pradesh, like many other Indian States, has been hit by the financial crunch of 
the late 1980s and 1990s. Expanded government borrowing at market rates, 
particularly from the late 1980s, has increased the cost of debt service management 
throughout India. Although central government allocations to the social sector have 
been slightly increased, combined Central and State government expenditure has 
reduced, as transfer funds from the Centre to the States have decreased (Goi, 1995). 
Social sector spending began to slow down in the mid-1980s. There was a decline in 
real per capita expenditure on health and education, especially in the poorer States 
(UNDP, 1997). However, since 1990-1 this problem has intensified. Total expenditure 
of central and State governments on social services and rural development fell from 
9.1% of GDP in 1989-90 to 8.7% in 1994-5 (Ghate, 1998). This factor was 
highlighted in interview with a senior bureaucrat B. L. Bajaj, Chair of the State 
Electricity board. He argued that, whilst caste and religion are often cited as causing 
communal violence in the State, the real cause is financial, 
'The major problem in U.P. is that new development expenditure has gone 
down very sharply. It's had an impact on employment and development 
projects, the effects can be seen in tension in the villages. These problems 
erupt under the name of caste and religion but essentially the problem is about 
money ... Per Capita Income from 1992 -1997 has risen only 1.8% whereas in 
most States this is around 3%. There are also very sharp inequalities in income 
in the State and the poorest haven't had much benefit lately. We have 
witnessed the withdrawal of the state in many areas. The government is 
pressed with fiscal and financial problems and so can't employ new people. 
The programmes that do actually occur are restricted by the Central 
Government or by the World Bank (Interview, 51h May 18)'. 
IR Unless otherwise stated all interviews were conducted in 2000. 
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It could be suggested that low levels of social development in the State relate to the 
high incidence of economic poverty (poverty is of course widely understood to be 
multidimensional) (Kanbur, 2001 ). The extent of poverty in Uttar Pradesh is 
undeniable, demonstrated by the fact that in 1987-1988 almost half of the population 
was estimated to live below the 'poverty line' (Jain et al. 1993; Minhas et al. 1991). 
However, the incidence of poverty is high in India as a whole, in fact poverty 
indicators in UP have been similar to those in other States, whilst HDI improvements 
show great disparity (EPW Research Foundation, 1993). Whilst the problems of 
poverty in UP are vast, Dreze and Gazdar ( 1997) argue that other factors must 
contribute to the low levels of advancement in social sectors. They contend that one 
important factor relates to the nature of public service in the State. First, expenditure 
in relation to health care provision, educational facilities and the PDS provision in UP 
is extremely low (Goi, 1992, 1993; Tyagi, 1993; Visaria et al. 1993; International 
Institute for Population Sciences, 1994 a and b; Parihk, 1994 ). Second, and 
particularly relevant for this work, Dreze and Gadzar argue that it is not simply the 
quantity, but fundamentally the quality, of public services which have restricted 
advancement in the State, 
'The restricted scope and quality of public services in Uttar Pradesh, in 
comparison with South India, seems to have less to do with the levels of 
government expenditure than with distorted patterns of social spending as well 
as with the defective functioning of the services in question' (p. 54 emphasis 
in the original). 
They continue, 
'It is important to note that the neglect of public service in Uttar Pradesh is not 
confined to specific programmes ... Rather, it is a case of comprehensive 
failure of social provisions in a wide range of fields including basic education, 
land reform, child immunisation, public distribution, maternal health, social 
security, public works, environmental protection, anti-poverty programmes, 
among others. There are few exceptions to this pattern. Nor is it easy to cite 
any examples of a successful or innovative public programme relating to the 
promotion of human well-being on a widespread basis' (p. 55-56). 
According to Tolia the general acceptance of bureaucratic failure coupled with 
financial crisis led the Government of Uttar Pradesh to approach the World Bank for 
assistance. India has a relatively long relationship with the Bank, which began in 
1944. Today India is the Bank's largest single borrower with cumulative lending of 
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more than $47 billion in market based loans by June 2000 19 (World Bank, 2001). In 
recent years, the Bank has shifted its focus from national loans to those focused on 
States that 'chose' to embark on a programme of economic reforms. State level 
operations are not new for the Bank. Previously, however, these were largely on 
project and sector specific grounds, rather than as a broad based approach to reform as 
detailed in chapter one (World Bank, 2001 ). Uttar Pradesh is particularly interesting, 
as it became the first State in India to take a sub-national adjustment loan, consisting 
of $125 million credit and $126.3 million loans (in 1998). The government of UP and 
the Bank are currently working on reforms in the areas of public expenditure, tax 
policy and administration, civil service, anti-corruption, deregulation, 
decentralisation, privatisation, financial management and accountability. The scope of 
reforms is too vast for this research, which focuses specifically on reform of the civil 
service. 
3.2.4: Administration 
Lewis ( 1995) has acknowledged the problems of change in 'giant systems' of which 
the Indian civil service is clearly one. Today there are approximately one million civil 
servants directly employed by the UP government, and a further seven million 
employed in public enterprises in the State of Uttar Pradesh (Tolia, 1997). As a result 
of the numerous critiques of the bureaucracy in UP (e.g. Dhar, 1999, Rai, 1999, Toila, 
2000), and the World Bank loan criteria, the government is currently initiating a 
programme of reform relating to the structure and nature of the administration (see 
chapter I). 
As already detailed in chapter 2, problems of the bureaucracy such as politicisation, 
corruption and nepotism have been highlighted in the UP context. However, Dr. R. S. 
Tolia, Director of the UP Administrative Training Institute (ATI) at Nainital, has 
suggested that real changes are taking place. Tolia claims that there has been an 
attitudinal change, a reduction in the 'fear psychosis' in the government officials in 
UP, to enable shifts to working practices synonymous with NPM (which involves the 
reduction of bureaucratic power) to take place, 
19 Money has come from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and 
development credits from the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank affiliate 
that provides interest free loans to economies with low per capital incomes. 
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'We're doing client surveys and looking at customer satisfaction which is a 
complete change. There is a change in opinion, that now as a bureaucrat, 'I am 
going to be judged by the people', this is good. We have shifted from a status 
quo-ist administration to a proactive one. There is a feeling that it is necessary 
to stick your neck out to get things done, instead of doing nothing. We're 
teaching that they won't be judged for making mistakes ... There is a move to 
re-skilling and re-deploying, looking at the problems sector wise and seeing 
what changes should be made. There is also a move to capacity building and 
IT. It is a new message that people should be working as a team not as an 
individual. That they succeed or fail as a team, this is essential to cut down 
hierarchical thinking. We're starting to encourage working in a circular 
manner so that anyone can be free to give ideas (Interview, 9th June)'. 
However at the same time as acknowledging the need for attitudinal change, Tolia 
also points to a right wing focus to reforms, including terms made popular by the 
World Bank, such as 'right-sizing'. 
'We are initiating a 2% per annum reduction in the civil service ... The role of 
the bureaucracy is changing to a facilitator. They are moving from 'rowing' to 
'steering' in development policy .... There is a dual change going on at the 
moment which is a precedent in history - the attempts at the up-linking with 
the global and, at the same time down-sizing and delegation to the local. .. The 
state has to be key in this change. For this simultaneous change to be possible, 
there has to be empowerment at the local level. Without this change isn't 
possible. We have shifted from no agenda to a double agenda (Interview, 9th 
June, 1999). 
One important area of change highlighted by Tolia is the greater devolution of power 
to locally elected village councils. The aim here is not to study the Panchayati Raj 
Institutions (PRI), but rather to consider the ways in which the change in power 
relations has impacted, and is impacted, by changing bureaucratic values associated 
with new public management. According to Morris-Jones (1971, p.156), the 
government administration was working in an authoritarian manner in the 1960s so 
that the marriage between local self-government and the centralised bureaucracy in 
India was 'somewhat inconclusive'. For him, the reality was that bureaucracy has held 
onto power, and the devolution of finances and responsibility remained constricted 
within a centralised framework. Jain ( 1985) in his book, 'Grass Without Roots', 
argued that attempts to revitalise local democracy have shown few promising results, 
in part because of the nature of public administration in India. Following the 73rd 
constitutional amendment legislative changes in 1994, the PRis are now officially 
recognised as the lowest rung of self-government and have been given greater 
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financial resources and responsibilities. These changes supported a three-tier structure 
with the Gram PanchayaP0 at the base, giving wider representation to women and 
scheduled castes, both as members of village councils and as council heads. In 
keeping with the constitutional amendments, the Uttar Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act 
was initiated in 1994 (Panchayat Raj Act, 1994). Although the adoption of this 
legislation is a significant shift, the efficacy of the model, according to Lieten, is 
based on the assumption that the highly unequal access to resources in rural areas will 
be modified. In their survey of 250 Panchayat members from twenty-five Panchayats 
in 1995, Lieten and Srivastava report that many candidates to the panchayats before 
1995 were elected unopposed. This signifies dominant relations and that many village 
councils only existed in name but were otherwise non-functional. They argue that 
OBCs and SCs have de jure gained representation as many village-level elected 
leaders, or Pradhans, are agricultural labourers with low literacy levels. They claim, 
however that, in reality these individuals are manipulated by (or working in 
association with) local elites, in many cases with the collusion of Block and District 
level government officials. They describe what they see as Pradhans by proxy, 
accentuated in the case of women members and women Pradhans. Legislation of 
reservation for women and SCs has not been viewed favourably by the richer classes 
(Lieten and Srivatava, 1999). Lieten and Srivastava saw intense factionalism in 
villages creating problems for even the smallest development projects. They argue, 
therefore, that of the panchayats in UP most do not function properly and others don't 
function at all. 
Lieten and Srivastava ( 1999) also evaluated the Panchayat' s role in village 
development programmes. They argue that the selection of beneficiaries for the 
Integrated Rural development Programme (IRDP) programme by the village Pradhan 
often resulted in the selection of ineligible beneficiaries as well as other forms of 
corruption. Despite the findings of the study, Lieten and Srivastava found that the 
majority of people interviewed supported the greater devolution of funds to the village 
level, with the caveat that there be better supervision over the management of funds 
by an accountable administration. Across the social spectrum, the universal demand 
was for a more responsive administration. This assertion made by Lieten and 
20 Village level council. 
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The government-engineered process of liberalisation has contributed to a marginal 
shift towards industrial trade and services. In less than a decade, the 'no-industry' area 
of Amethi acquired the distinction of having the highest industrial investment in UP. 
Despite this, in 1991, 87.5% of the population still worked in agriculture. 
Furthermore, the many industrial ventures which have come up, and for which many 
peasants were dispossessed of their land, has not resulted in employment generation 
for the majority of the poor (Lieten and Srivastava, 1999). 
After Independence, the population growth in RB was amongst the lowest in the 
State. The reason for this was not lower levels of female fertility, but high levels of 
male emigration from the area. This, rather than social factors, is the most likely 
explanation for the higher than average female-male ratio in the District. The FMR for 
Rae Bareli in 2001 is 94921 , compared to 898 for UP as a whole. As elsewhere in the 
State the identity boundaries between different groups remain important. The rules on 
caste segregation have been somewhat relaxed, but inter-caste commensality 
continues to be rare. The proportion of Muslims in the Tahsil of Rae Bareli itself is 
12%, however, in some towns such as Salon the number can be as high fifty percent. 
Rae Bareli is well known for forming part of two distinguished political 
constituencies, those of Amethi and Rae Bareli. For the past two decades, these have 
been bastions of the Nehru-Gandhi Dynasty that has presided over the Congress party 
for over 40 years since Independence. The long-standing interest of the Gandhi family 
in Rae Bareli and Amethi constituencies has resulted in the allocation of ample 
development resources to the area, particularly after 1980. After the death of Indira 
Gandhi, Rae Bareli constituency went to her cousin Arun Nehru and after his 
defection, to the BJP, to her cousin Sheila Kaul. Today the dominance of Congress in 
the constituency is far more tenuous. In 1996, the INC had a 44% margin over 
opposition party the BJP. However, in the last elections, with only a 4% advantage 
over the SP, the traditional power of Congress was severely challenged22 • 
21 This shows a considerable achievement from 931 in 1991. However the result may reflect 
inaccuracies in the 1991 calculation (Dyson, 200 I). 
22 Veron et al. (2002) suggest that the politics of an area has important implications for the way in 
which development policy is implemented. However, within this research the areas considered do not 
tit into set constituencies. Therefore, in this instance, such analysis was not possible. 
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In Amethi, the adjoining constituency in which Salon is located, Sanjay Gandhi's first 
attempt to enter Parliament was stopped by the Janata wave of 1977. It was not long, 
however, until the Gandhi dynasty became dominant in the politics of the area. Sanjay 
Gandhi, and after his death, his brother (Rajiv Gandhi) conquered the constituency 
with relative ease. In 1984 and 1989, for example Rajiv secured respectively 83.7% 
and 67.4% of the valid votes (Buttler et al. 1991 ). The battle for the State assembly 
seats was more of a contest. The Left of centre parties (the Socialist Party in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the BKD in the 1970s, the Janata Dal in the 1980s and the Socialist 
Party/BSP in the 1990s) have continued to be strong contenders. That contention is 
now with the BJP, which has replaced the Indian National Congress (INC). After its 
unsuccessful attempt in the 1950s, as the Hindu Mahasabha and the Jan Sangh, the 
Hindu party had withdrawn from the area. In 1991, it reappeared and gained one 
quarter of the votes, and more than one third in 1993. Concurrently the fortunes of the 
INC dwindled. As in the national and State arenas, once the Gandhi patronage was 
dislodged, many upper caste voters transferred allegiance to the BJP. This shift has 
been of quite remarkable proportions. Whilst in 1996 the BJP had a 4% advantage in 
the constituency (over the INC), this increased to almost 41% in 1999. A significant 
feature of the area, considering its political background, is the lack of participation in 
the electoral procedure. In 1993, 50% of the population chose not to vote, although 
this remains higher than in many western countries, a rise from only one third in the 
early 1980s (Election Commission, Lucknow). 
The head of administration within a District is the District Officer (D0)23 based at the 
District Headquarters, Vikas Bhawan, in Rae Bareli. A Chief Development Officer 
has responsibility over all the development work within the District. Other District 
Officers are also posted at the District Headquarters (see Annexe of major officers at 
District level). The unit of development in India is the Block. There are twenty-one 
Blocks within the district of Rae Bareli (see Annex of Blocks). At each Block, a 
Block Development Officer (BDO) is posted to oversee the co-ordination of 
development work at this level. The IMY project is being implemented in six 
developmental Blocks in Rae Bareli, namely Bhadurpur, Maharagang, Salon, 
Singhpur, Tiloi and Unchahar. 
23 The DO is also known as the Deputy Commissioner for revenue and the District Magistrate (DM) for 
judicial matters 
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At the State level in Lucknow, the scheme functions through the government's 
Institute of Child Development Services (ICDS). The role of the DWCD at this level, 
is co-ordination with other departments and the organisation of training for the 
programme workers. Training for the scheme in UP is primarily offered through the 
National Institute of Public Co-operation and Child Development (NPCCD), 
Lucknow. In addition to ICDS, other organisations (both inside and outside of state 
provision) play a part in IMY through the State Level Steering Committee (SLSC). 
The Committee aims to identify various schemes, for example in basic education, 
which may be important to the women involved in IMY, and avoid any duplication of 
effort. NGOs also have a key role to play in IMY. In Rae Bareli CARE works directly 
with the programme in its Breast Feeding Campaign, as do UNICEF and the local 
NGO Sabla. 
At the District Level in Rae Bareli, primary responsibility for the scheme rests with 
the project officer (PO). In each District, there is a District Level Co-ordinating 
Committee (DLCC), involving all sectors from government and various external 
agencies involved in the programme24. Working with the programme officer is one 
CDPO (Chief District Programme Officer) and a number of supervisors in each 
development Block. Supervisors are recruited at the District level, rather than through 
the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) at the national or State level. In 
addition, the recruitment criteria are also more flexible in terms of age and education. 
Supervisors interviewed in Rae Bareli were of different ages (25 to 58) and came 
from different vocational backgrounds, whilst others had either returned to work after 
having children, or come straight from higher education. 
The work of Peter Evans has been important in informing development policy and 
debate in recent years, particularly in regard to the possibilities offered by a more 
effective state for development. He cites the work of Moo re ( 1994) who suggests that 
local level officers can have positive implications for the quality of their work, and 
responsiveness to the public, 
'Irrigation associations are overwhelmingly staffed by people who were born 
in the locality, have lived there all their lives, and in many cases also from 
there ... (so that) .. .IA staff are so much part of the local society that they can 
24 The specific roles of each of the parties involved in the project are outlined in Appendix I. 
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neither escape uncomfortable censure if they are seen to be conspicuously 
performing poorly, nor ignore representations made to them by members' 
(cited in Evans 1996a: 1121 ). 
A similar policy to recruit at the local level is adopted in the case of IMY. 
Training within the IMY is intensive, and offers a broader range of exposure than that 
given before to those at State level and below. At the State level, key actors in the 
programme are offered training both overseas and domestically, and in a shift from 
convention, so are Programme Officers at the District level. Lower level supervisors 
are given four-week residential training courses in Lucknow, which are followed up 
every six to twelve months with refresher courses. Anganwadi workers are trained at 
the District level and by the trainers and government supervisors involved in the 
scheme. 
The funding for the scheme at the district level is through Intermediate Micro-finance 
Organisations (IMOs), who work directly with RMK. The IMO for Rae Bareli district 
is an NGO called A vadh Lok Seva Ashram. The IMO works with IMY programme 
but also with other micro credit schemes working in the District. As the IMO works as 
a business, if it does not meet set targets it can be replaced by RMK. 
The scheme operates at the lowest possible level in the village with the assistance of 
the anganwadi worker (village level worker), who lives and works in the village with 
the women. The IMY handbook (1995: 12) suggests that, 'the anaganwadi will play 
the most important role in IMY'. Within the IMY group focus is placed on social 
education, including literacy and health care and thrift savings in the first instance. 
Once they have developed sufficiently as a group, they are encouraged to network 
with other groups thus forming a village level society called Indira Mahila Kendra 
(IMK). Once a sufficient number of IMK groups are formed, a Block level society 
known as Indira Mahila Block Society (IMBS) will develop as an apex body. It is 
anticipated that the development of networks of trust will promote intergroup learning 
and empowerment so that the women in the SHG's may gain both social and 
economic independence. 
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Fig: 3.4 Aims of the IMY Scheme: 
The vision ,for IMY according to the DepartiJ1ent of \V,Pm~n .and Ch,ild Development 
is to empoWer women who will then: 
. ·~· 
• • D~l;iiand their rights from family; community <thl:lcgD:v~f,tBnent 
• · H~v~ increased actess to and colitrol 6vi!t''tftat€Hal, social and political 
·re'soilrtes · . .· · ·. ·.·; ~ ~ ·. · 
• "il~~{eJ1hanced awareiie~s and improved skills; ang 
~ ~e aoie to raise issues of common concer11 thro4gh mobilisation and 
netw()rking (Department of Women and Child Development, Government of 
India; 1998). 
IMY is premised on recognition that empowerment is a multifaceted process (Gol, 
1998; Rowlands, 1997). Unlike previous projects such as Integrated Rural 
Development Programme (IRDP) and Jawahar Rojgar Yogana (JRY), social 
empowerment is seen as a precursor to economic development. It aims to generate 
awareness among women by disseminating information and knowledge, so as to bring 
about an attitudinal change. Subsequently, there is an attempt to help women achieve 
economic strength through micro-level income generating activities; and also to 
establish convergence of various services including literacy, health, non-formal 
education, rural development and water supply. 
This would seem to contrast with previous schemes. Attwood and Baviskar, (2002) 
argue that although the Indian government has invested huge amounts of money in 
formal, state run credit 'co-operatives', empowerment was rarely achieved for the 
poor. In these schemes, they suggest, the assets were never formed through members' 
savings, in reality, they consisted of loans that went primarily to landowners (mainly 
men), many loans never being repaid. Thus, for them formal 'co-operative' credit is 
neither self-supporting nor beneficial to the poorest villagers, including women. It is 
suggested even the goal of economic empowerment was rarely achieved. Other 
schemes that have encouraged economic empowerment have been more successful, 
and include the 'Women's Thrift Co-operatives' (WTCs) in Andhra Pradesh State, 
launched in 1990 under the auspices of an indigenous NGO. WTCs raise funds solely 
through small, regular contributions from their members, earning modest interest. A 
village WTC consists of around two to five hundred women divided into groups of 
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between ten and fifty. Biwas and Mahajan (1997) have asserted that group discipline 
ensures excellent rates of loan recovery. By the end of 1998 the village WTC's 
combined savings totalled Rs.26 million, without external grants or loans. They 
suggest whilst NGOs provide advice and support in establishing the WTCs, the 
groups soon become self-sufficient and self-managing, and provide a source of 
empowerment for their members. However, the primary focus on economic 
empowerment has now been questioned. 
That IMY aims to 'facilitate' SHGs to gain empowerment is an interesting concept in 
itself. Srilatha Batliwala (1994) has criticised the way in which the term 
'empowerment' is used as a 'catch-all' phrase, virtually replacing terms such as 
poverty alleviation, welfare and community participation. She called for a more 
precise understanding of power and empowerment, one that sees power, 'as control 
over material assets, intellectual resources, and ideology' ( 1994: 129). For Batliwala, 
empowerment, rather than the financial freedom seen in the Andhra Pradesh case, is 
'the process of challenging existing power relations, and of gaining greater control 
over the sources of power' (1994: 130). For her, it requires a political element, 
including a collective assault on cultural as well as national and community power 
structures that oppress women and some men. Like Batliwala, Naila Kabeer (1994) 
emphasises collective, grassroots and participatory action - the power to work with 
others 'to control resources, determine agendas and make decisions' (1994:29). Jo 
Rowlands describes empowerment as more than the ability to contribute to decisions, 
it is the feeling that your contribution is worthy. She suggests, 
'there is a core to the empowerment process ... which consists of increases in 
self-confidence and self-esteem, a sense of agency and of 'self in a wider 
context, and a sense of dignidad (being worthy of respect from others)' ( 1997: 
129-30). 
It is on this holistic concept of empowerment, through self-help, facilitated by 
government officials, that IMY focuses. The IMY handbook outlines the core group 
activities as, 'information sharing, awareness and confidence building, planning for 
child care and nutrition, health and literacy, creation of opinion groups and opinion 
lobbies, monitoring government schemes and finally raising resources for various 
activities' (p. 7). 
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In July 2001 the Human Resource Development (HRD) Ministry announced the 
amalgamation of the IMY scheme with the Mahila Samridhi Yojana scheme, creating 
the 'Swayam Siddha' programme, based on the precepts of IMY to empower women. 
Two developments are important in relation to this work. First, is the increase of 
funding for RMK. During my research, I was told that in order for more women to 
benefit from the scheme, the size and scope of RMK would have to be increased 
(Interview with Durgesh Hukku, 30th August, 1999). Originally, a total credit of Rs. 
77.36 crore was sanctioned to benefit 350,000 women. This figure is being increased 
to Rs. 250 crore by 2006. This implies increased prioritisation of this area, something 
to which I return in chapter 6. The second change relates to the expansion of facilities 
for women. In addition to the social provision it is envisaged through the new scheme 
that training and facilities be provided so women can pursue activities following 
vocational training. This is a specific element that the State level head of IMY, 
Durgesh Hukku, said that she wanted in the future (Interview, 15th May, 2000). 
Within this chapter I have offered an outline of the geographical area and socio-
political environment in which the research was undertaken. I have also detailed the 
aims, nature and organisation of the IMY scheme. In an attempt to understand how 
the theory of bureaucratic change has been translated in the UP context, I conducted 
my fieldwork in several stages, in different geographical areas and with a wide variety 
of individuals. In the next chapter, I discuss the logistical and methodological 
considerations that impacted my work. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1: Introduction 
Within this chapter, the methodological challenges and choices in deciding how best 
to analyse change within the bureaucracy 'at grass roots level' are discussed. The task 
of analysing means of change (or resistance to it) is complex, so various methods 
including interviews, focus groups and other participatory approaches were used. The 
use of a multiple method approach permitted cross checking of information and also 
improved reliability, depth and richness of explanation. 
The first step within the research process involved critical analysis of literature 
relevant to the research area (Layder, 1994; Silverman, 1993). Three distinct yet 
interrelated literatures, were covered within this project, namely development studies, 
public administration, and the literature pertaining to India's political economy. 
Academic books, journal articles, documentary sources, policy documents, other 
official resources and newspapers were all used. Whilst there are limits to the 
reliability of politically produced material (Scott, 1990), secondary sources including 
materials from the Government of India, the World Bank and the Indian Journal of 
Public Administration, helped situate my theoretical understanding within the Indian 
context. 
Figure 4.1: CREME course outline 
From Literature from the Durham University Business School: 
The participants on the Credit and Micro Enterprise Development Training Course (or 
CREME for short), are employed by a variety of government Departments and Non-
Government Organisations and all work in the area of women and child development. 
They have been selected to undergo training at The Foundation for Small and Medium 
Enterprise Development at the University of Durham by the British Council, on behalf of 
the Department for International Development (DfiD), in partnership with the 
Department of Women and Child Development (DWCD) in India. The CREME course is 
designed to enhance participants' skills in the support of the women in the IMY groups. 
The focus is on training of trainers. The course material aims to help officials 'facilitate' 
the development of SHGs in their area. It also stresses that whilst it is important to be 
aware of the results of interventions and review performance, it is necessary to examine 
approaches to 'monitoring and evaluation' in order to assess their usefulness. 
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Initial access to research participants was through the University of Durham Business 
School (DUBS). DUBS, runs a three-month course, annually, for Indian government 
and non-government officials. The course, called CREME, is sponsored by DflD and 
teaches individuals working in the areas of credit and rural enterprise for development 
new ideas and ways of working. By November 1999, when I first met the course 
participants, I had already decided on the broad research area on which to concentrate, 
centring on changes to the bureaucracy in the post-liberalisation period. I conducted 
pilot interviews with the DUBS course participants in order to check my areas of 
questioning were appropriate and flexible enough to include all areas of interest. 
These government and non-government workers then provided initial contacts in 
India. Other contacts were accessed through Dr. Mawdsley and other members of the 
Department of Geography. 
The fieldwork took the form of three visits over a period of eighteen months (March 
1999-September 2000). During my first visit to India in March and April 1999, I met 
contacts in Delhi who facilitated introductions with other potential participants 
through a 'snowballing' technique. My objective was to gain a broad spectrum of 
opinions from both state and non-state employees. Informants included policy makers, 
bureaucrats, officials, NGO workers, activists, academics and community members. 
After speaking to individuals involved at the national level with IMY, the programme 
was selected to form the analytical heart of my research 1• Advice and information 
gained, as well as geographical proximity, led to the choice of Uttar Pradesh for my 
case study. Later the same year (October, 1999) I returned to India for a period of four 
months. During this time I was based in Mussoorie, in northern Uttar Pradesh where I 
attended the Landour Language School to learn Hindi. The choice of Mussoorie was 
an obvious one, as it is also home to the Lal Bhadur Shastri Academy of 
Administration, the centre for training government (primarily IAS) recruits for the 
whole of India. This institute not only trains new entrants and retrains more 
experienced bureaucrats, but also houses a wealth of academic expertise pertaining to 
the bureaucracy in its literature and staff. During my time in Mussoorie I was able to 
make several visits, use the library and interview key personnel. 
1 Justification for the programme and research area selection are detailed later. 
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The final and most substantial research period (from April 2000 to September 2000) 
consisted of a six-month intensive field study. During this period I began in Delhi 
following the IMY project from its formulation at the national level in Delhi, through 
the State level in Lucknow to its implementation, at the lowest administrative level 
within six allocated Blocks within the District of Rae Bareli. From the base of 
Lucknow, I also visited and interviewed individuals at Uttar Pradesh Administrative 
Training Institue (UPATI) in Nainital, during a week of meetings and negotiation 
relating to civil service reform with World Bank representatives. 
4.2: Research Strategy 
The aim of this research, set out in chapter 1, is to explore the ways in which the 
bureaucrats involved with IMY have engaged with the process of change associated 
with new public management. The research question is deliberately broad and open. 
Strauss and Corbin argue that this is necessary so that all possible answers are able to 
surface. They argue there is a need for, 
'a research question or questions that will give us the flexibility and freedom 
to explore a phenomenon in depth. Also underlying this approach to 
qualitative research is the assumption that all of the concepts pertaining to a 
given phenomenon have not yet been identified, at least not in this population 
or place ... This reasoning creates the need for asking the type of question that 
will enable us to find answers to issues that seem important but remain 
unanswered' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 37). 
Kabeer ( 1999) notes that any organisation should be scrutinised through analysis of its 
official rules and unofficial norms. She notes an analysis of 'rules', in particular 
official ones, (here involving moves towards agendas promoted through the NPM 
discourse) offer only a partial picture as far as understanding the true outcomes. 
Analysis of the processes by which written rules and unwritten norms and beliefs 
come into play, and result in the translation of organisational goals into practice. For 
Kabeer, the 'outcomes' of organisational practice - who gets what, who does what, 
who decides, who gains and who loses - cannot be understood through a 'snap shot' 
analysis of its rules, resources and practices. 
The theoretical framework for this project, therefore, draws on actor-orientated 
approaches (Long, 1992). Actor-oriented approaches suggest that, although certain 
important structural changes may result from the impact of outside forces (due to the 
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encroachment of the market or the state), it is incorrect to see end results as purely the 
result of external determination, 
'All forms of external intervention necessarily enter the existing life-worlds of 
the individuals and social groups affected, and in this way are mediated and 
transformed by these same actors and structures. Also to the extent that large-
scale and 'remote' social forces do alter the life-chances and behaviours of 
individuals, they can only do so through shaping, directly or indirectly, the 
everyday life experiences and perceptions of the individuals concerned' 
(Long, 1992: 20). 
This approach, therefore, tries to offer descriptions of diverse actions within set social 
structures. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) introduced the term 'grounded theory' as an approach to 
inductive research, where theory is developed from close observation of the empirical 
world. In my research, I explore local interpretations of the changes within the 
bureaucracy that may challenge traditional ideas about the role and nature of the 
Indian bureaucracy and its role in development. This method is particularly suitable 
for my work as the variety of perceptions elucidated could not have been predicted 
before the research began. 
The exploratory and inductive approach to the study of the bureaucracy necessitates a 
case-study approach (Casey and Lury, 1987). This research does not aim to provide a 
general picture of what is happening to the bureaucracy in India, but rather gives an 
in-depth and rich account of what is happening in a specific programme in Uttar 
Pradesh at a particular point in time. McDowell ( 1992) makes the distinction between 
intensive and extensive research, with intensive methods involving in-depth 
investigations being: 
'essential to reveal the underlying causal mechanisms and structures that lie 
behind observed behaviour. Whereas extensive research - of the type 
commonly based on the identification of descriptive patterns through large 
scale data analysis - has its place in the initial identification of empirical 
irregularities, it rarely meets the criteria of real explanatory power' ( 1992: 
213). 
The aim of the research is to explore local perceptions of bureaucratic change, both 
from within, and outside, the bureaucracy. An approach was taken to attempt to 
ensure that the hypotheses, frameworks and theories that were developed were based 
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on the opinions of those involved in the IMY scheme, from inside and out, rather than 
primarily on stereotypical 'vested interest' perceptions of the bureaucracy currently 
dominating academic and policy literature. Traditional categories and theoretical 
positions were challenged through the 'elucidation of actors' interpretations and 
strategies' and the 'understanding of everyday life situations' by those actually 
involved in the programme (Long, 1992a: 5-6). 
Research on the bureaucracy has produced a range of findings. There has been 
considerable difference in opinion between theoretical and practical scholars (Hanson, 
1969; Riggs, 1967). Differences have also been highlighted between the views of 
scholars on the one hand and the views of practising bureaucrats on the other 
(Adedeji, 1974). Pelto and Pelto (1978) make the distinction between 'emic' and 
'etic' approaches. The emic approach, which is taken in this study, is seen as being 
based on 'their' concepts and categories of meaning, with local definitions and 
understandings discovered through inductive research. The etic stance takes a more 
externalised viewpoint whereby the researcher, 
'stands "far enough away" to see it as a separate event, primarily in relation to 
their similarities and their differences, as compared to other cultures, rather 
than in reference to the sequences of classes of events within that one 
particular culture' (Pike, 1954: 10, quoted in Pelto and Pelto, 1978). 
4.3: The dynamics of the research process and role of the researcher 
The role of the researcher is central at all times in the research process. How 
knowledge is produced affects both the data collected (England, 1994) and how it is 
analysed and how the findings are written about (Clifford and Marcus, 1986). England 
(1994) supports the need for reflexivity and the acceptance of subjectivity, 
'Reflexivity is critical to the conduct of fieldwork; it induces self-discovery 
and can lead to insights and new hypotheses about the research questions. A 
more reflexive and flexible approach to fieldwork allows the researcher to be 
more open to challenges to their theoretical position that fieldwork almost 
inevitably raises' ( 1994: 82). 
Much social science research has tried to take a detached scientific approach. In order 
to legitimise their research social scientists have tried to express their findings as 
'objective'. However, this 'scientific approach' Ignores the central role of the 
researcher in the 'production' of the research. Gidden (1984) refers to the concept of 
'double hermeneutics', where actors interpret the social world around them, and this 
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can include the researcher and the research process. Drinkwater (1992) criticises 
researchers that study human agency but ignore the role of reflexivity of the 
researcher, 
'If one lauds the ability of the participant to make a difference to his or her 
own world, then it is inconsistent not to acknowledge the equally active nature 
of the researcher in shaping the field work encounter and hence the role the 
researcher plays in the selection and interpretation of field material' ( 1992: 
367). 
Strauss and Corbin ( 1990) claim that, 
'the illustrative material (quotations from interview notes) are meant to give a 
sense of what the real world is really like; while the researcher's interpretation 
are meant to represent more detached conceptualisation of that reality' ( 1990: 
22). 
When doing social research, it is necessary to be aware of whose opinions are 
prioritised (Scoones and Thompson, 1992, 1994). In taking notes in interviews, it is 
important to be aware of which information is taken down, and which overlooked 
(Seur, 1992: 142; England, 1994: 86), and whether that which doesn't fit into the 
theoretical framework is overlooked (de Vries, 1992). As Chambers puts it, 
'The question is 'Whose Reality Counts?', 'ours' or 'theirs'. As part of this we 
have to ask: Whose knowledge counts? Whose needs? Whose 
priorities/criteria? Whose appraisal? analysis? planning? Whose baseline? 
Whose indicators? Whose monitoring? Whose evaluation? Is it ours, or 
theirs?' ( 1996:7). 
Every researcher is affected by their prior assumptions, cultural backgrounds and 
conceptual frameworks (Seur, 1992). Habermas writes that it must be recognised that, 
'The social scientist has to draw on a competence and knowledge, that he (sic) 
has intuitively at his disposal as a layman. So long, however, as he does not 
identify and thoroughly analyse this pre-theoretical knowledge, he cannot 
control the extent to which, and the consequences with which, he also 
influences as a participant - and thereby alters - the process of communication 
into which he has entered only to understand' ( 1984: 111-112). 
Drawing on feminist research methodologies, England ( 1984: 86) calls for greater 
recognition of the inherently hierarchical nature of the research relationship. Madge 
(1993: 295) argues for greater consideration of the role of the 'self, showing how the 
researcher's positionality may influence the 'data' collected and thus the information 
that finally becomes 'knowledge'. Herod (1993) cites a range of research reports that 
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show the impact of gender on the data collected and even the ability to get an 
interview in the first place. Whilst I experienced various power relations with 
interviewees, I found in the majority of cases being a young female actually improved 
access for interviews. MacDowell ( 1992) suggests this may be due to the limited 
threat a woman can often be seen to represent to the interviewee. 
Perceptions of the researcher are constantly changing in the mind of those 
interviewed. Sidaway (1992: 403) discusses how class, cultural, racial, and gender 
contexts are increasingly altered and shifted as researchers from the 'first world move 
into the hierarchies of the "third world'". However, for Lancaster (1996), reflexivity 
and attention to positionality in the research process can be taken to extremes when 
the writing becomes centred on the researcher. Whilst it is important to realise the 
impact we, as researchers, are having on the project (Scheper-Hughes, 1992), the 
acceptance that we do have an impact does not negate the value of the work. The 
outsider is always an outsider, but this does not invalidate the issues of the research. 
Within this work, issues are presented as I have seen and recorded them, from those 
interviewed. The reader in turn should take into account my positionality when 
reading the interpretations offered. 
4.4: The research experience 
The way in which I was perceived by interviewees relates to the impression I gave 
about my intentions, and also by people I was seen to be aligned to. These issues were 
constantly shifting throughout the research process. In each interview I was 
demanding time and (often) confidential information. Co-operation from bureaucrats 
and other informants, and outcomes from interviews were based on the degree trust in 
me, and the power relations between us. 
It is very difficult to know how anyone perceives an outsider although, in my case 
several issues about my identity were referred to at various times. Firstly my identity 
as white and British in an ex-colonial country and as relatively rich and as an 
individual from a nation with many job opportunities was frequently highlighted. My 
gender identity; as a female who was both single and alone in an environment in 
which both were against the norm, and as a young woman working, at times (at the 
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national level), in an almost exclusively older male environment, both affected how I 
was perceived. 
As an outsider, my understanding of the cultural context, and the expenences of 
everyday life were restricted. However, this factor also acted as a benefit in certain 
circumstances. This was particularly apparent with the bureaucrats, as I was not 
considered to be a threat to their position. I was therefore able to tackle issues, such as 
corruption and inertia, which Indian researchers' may have found difficult to broach. I 
was able to gain access to many senior bureaucrats, who were flattered that someone 
had come from the UK to speak to them. At the same time women within the IMY 
groups were very eager to speak to me, as they had not met a western woman, and 
often news of my coming had reached a village before I did! There were, however, 
several cases of opposition to me talking to women, as some men within the villages 
saw my presence as a threat. One male in particular noted, 'Didn't you (the British) 
do enough damage last time you were here! (Interview, 141h May 1999). He was 
referring to the colonial history of the British in India and me personally as an 
outsider. 
Gender relations shaped how research relationships were built up with people who 
were visited regularly. With women, I could draw on common gendered roles and 
customs, while with the men, I could distance myself from Indian women because of 
my ethnicity. An example of this was my acceptance in the (almost) exclusively male 
members-only Ram Bagh Club, in Lucknow2• This difference also served as a limiting 
factor in a tiny minority of cases. A couple of bureaucrats (one fairly senior) made 
reference to what western girls 'are like', an impression gained I was told, from the 
roles of many women in western films on Indian satellite channels. This made me feel 
uncomfortable enough in one case to end the particular line of research. Fortunately, 
the individual in question did not work directly with IMY, so the decision to stop 
contact with him, in my case, was an easy one. 
The beginning of many interviews consisted of relaxed and informal conversation, 
and often centred on questions about myself. To higher bureaucrats this was generally 
2 Members consisted of bureaucrats, business people and politicians. 
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about my education and background, to people in the Districts this was almost 
exclusively about my marital status. My race and ethnicity were constantly referred to 
and played a major role in how I was perceived. I found that it opened many 
opportunities, but frequently for reasons I found difficult to accept. From the majority 
of people I interviewed, there was uncritical respect for white people, and disrespect 
for people with dark skin. This influence is a form of ascribed power, and was 
something I witnessed on many occasions, an exception being among some (although 
not all) of those with higher education. The issue of race has become particularly 
important within the bureaucracy since the adoption of Reservation policies. One 
senior Backward Caste government official, for example, was sarcastically referred to 
as the 'rickshaw wallah' by several other high-caste officers. Race and power 
relations is an issue that will be returned to in later chapters. 
How I was perceived was also influenced by how I explained my role. I took some 
time at the beginning of each interview to explain to the interviewee that I was 
interested in seeing how they are changing the way they work. To the women's 
groups in the villages I said that I was interested to see what they thought of the 
provision they got from the bureaucracy, and that the work was unlikely to bring any 
direct benefits to them. I promised all interviewees confidentiality, but frequently 
interviewees said they wanted others to know their views. Despite my constant 
repetition of the reasons for the work, a number of rumours spread about my role, I 
was working for an aid agency that may help them, for the World Bank doing a 
survey or for the British government doing research about training. This became less 
of a problem when I was carrying out repeat visits, or when I was working at the State 
or national level. Research also became easier as my confidence increased and my 
relationship with my two research assistants developed. 
Access to villages was primarily gained through female IMY Block supervisors, who 
had already developed a relationship with the various groups of women. Whilst this 
affected the way I was viewed, as aligned to the government employees, other means 
of introduction without a 'gatekeeper' would have been impossible. Other IMY 
groups were accessed through NGO workers (in particular CARE) who worked with 
them. Non-IMY groups interviewed were those formed by Avadh Lok Seva Ashram 
(ALSA) the NGO working with RMK in the Rae Bareli District. As the research 
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process continued, I became more accepted. I had to 'enrole' people into my research 
project, by trying to change the way in which I was perceived, in order to build up co-
operation (Latour, 1986). To avoid the ethical considerations of paying interviewees 
(Robson, 1997), people who helped me were never paid, although I gave some key 
informants gifts and photographs. 
My position was complicated further by working closely with research assistants and 
'interpreters', partially at the District, and entirely at the Block level. On the one hand, 
these individuals are seen in their own context and this affects how the research is 
perceived. Therefore the issue of gender, race, class and caste of the research assistant 
can shape the research outcome. When I arrived in Rae Bareli I was told that a 
District level bureaucrat would be accompanying me to help with interpretation. 
However, after one visit it was clear that the officer could not put aside the 'lecturing' 
role of so many government officials, and I declined the offer of any further 
assistance. My research assistants were both Indian, although still 'outsiders' to a 
different degree (Twyman, 1997). The position and background of the research 
assistants was given as much importance (Berreman, 1993), if not more, than my 
background, with most interviewees asking them where they were from and their 
ethnic origin. My first research assistant, Aparna Chaudry was a postgraduate 
university student from Delhi. I was eager to work with a female interpreter, but was 
unable to find a local woman who had good enough English, interviewing skills and 
could live away from home. Though Aparna was able to associate herself with the 
women in the self-help groups, her knowledge of local cultures, politics and customs 
was that of a complete outsider. My second research assistant Amit Bajpai, was a 
public administration graduate from Rae Bareli. Amit found it easy to talk to the 
groups and the majority of women responded to him well. In the cases where women 
were insecure talking to a man either Toolika Khan (a worker with CARE) or one of 
the supervisors was able to ask the questions so the women felt more at ease. 
The role of research assistants as 'interpreters' is also problematic as the translation of 
a conversation allows room for reinterpretation and the selection of what facts they 
think the researcher wants to know. My proficiency in Hindi was adequate for 
introductions and small talk before and after an interview, important in building up 
rapport. I was not able to conduct in-depth interviews, although I was able to 
110 
Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
understand much of the questioning and replies to check that the questions were 
understood and details of the replies had not been left out. 
I paid attention to the role of my research assistants as moderators (Cook and Crang, 
1995: 57) as this affected the behaviour of participants and the information I was 
given (Herod, 1993: 308; Mosse, 1994 and 1995). It was a constant battle at the end 
of a day of interviews to make sure a question did not change, for example, from, 
'have you noticed change in the way the people (bureaucrats) who come here 
treat you?', to 
'you like the people (bureaucrats) who come here, isn't it?'. 
4.5: Selection of research sites and respondents 
4.5.1: Selection of Uttar Pradesh and Rae Bareli 
Following Kabeer and Subrahmanian ( 1999), I needed to talk to a wide variety of 
people with knowledge of the bureaucracy from both outside and within. When I 
visited Delhi for the first time (March 1999) both Mrs. Sarojini Thakur, Director of 
the Department of Woman and Child Development (DOWC), and Mr. Mark 
Robinson, of the Ford Foundation, suggested that it might be interesting to consider a 
social sector scheme so that the reality of change as understood by beneficiaries could 
be investigated. The IMY scheme was relevant to my research interests as it was 
created in the post-liberalisation era and contains many of the ideas espoused in the 
new public management literature. These ideas included the use of private sector 
ethos in the scheme's financing (through RMK), working through NGOs and civil 
society bodies, facilitation through the bureaucracy and attempting to provide a 
holistic, rather than sector specific, approach to development. The fact that it is a 
centrally formulated, rather than State, scheme was also important. This meant that I 
could follow the scheme from the Central level, to the State and finally see its 
implementation in the District. This was important, as I thought that changes seen in 
the bureaucracy were likely to be different at the various spatial scales. IMY is 
obviously not a particularly typical central government scheme, in fact, in many ways, 
it is atypical. This very difference in fact allowed me to explore the different ways in 
which change is being attempted in this scenario. 
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Uttar Pradesh was chosen for several reasons. As one of the bimaru States, I was told 
by many that 'nothing positive' was happening there, but this was not the impression I 
got, regarding IMY, from those who co-ordinate the scheme at the State level. I was 
interested to see why this was apparently possible, in the face of so many 
development failures in the State. Uttar Pradesh is also home to the National Training 
centre for IAS recruits, the Lal Bhadur Shashtri National Academy of Administration 
(LBSNAA). UP's relationship with the World Bank is well publicised and offers an 
interesting additional dimension to the national attempts at bureaucratic reform. The 
Administrative Training Institute (ATI) under the direction of Mr. Toilia, has been 
central to these changes. The proximity of UP to Delhi made research of the three 
major tiers of administration possible within this project. 
Mrs. Durgesh Hukku (State level co-ordinator for the IMY programme), oversees the 
project in the Four Districts in Uttar Pradesh in which the project has been introduced, 
namely, Bijnor, Jalaun, Rae Bareli and Sonbhadra. Mrs. Hukku suggested Rae Bareli 
to me for a number of reasons. The District is only 80 kilometres from Lucknow 
which meant that access was fairly easy (although access between Blocks in the 
District was rather difficult). Second, the District level co-ordinator of the programme 
in RB, Lilly Singh had been involved in much of the new training (although she had 
not attended CREME in the UK) and so was keen to help me with my research. Third, 
the political history of Rae Bareli, within the constituencies of Rae Bareli and Amethi, 
makes the area a particularly interesting case study. 
4.5.2: Selection of key informants 
Research was carried out with key informants who were selected for their particular 
knowledge or position. The development of trust and rapport was built up through the 
number of times I visited the individuals, and repeat visits allowed me to establish 
relationships with the individuals involved. Several key informants became friends, 
with whom I would spend social time with in the evenings, or go out with in the day. 
Key informants were also 'gatekeepers' to new areas of research and made 
introductions, creating a 'snow balling' method of sampling. However, in some 
circumstances this restricted my access to others, as I was aligned to particular 
individuals. I attempted to ensure that I met a range of key informants that were 
representative of different opinions on change within the bureaucracy. In order to do 
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this, I interviewed individuals who were practicing as well as retired, those who were 
working in IMY, and those outside (these tended to be connected to IMY through the 
State and District Level Co-ordination Committees). The decision of 
'representativeness' was mine, based on categories emerging from earlier research 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990) and experience of living among the people I was selecting. 
Great care was taken to avoid the different forms of bias (Chambers, 1983: 13), 
especially according to gender, age, ethnicity and wealth. However, as the primary 
informants were the bureaucrats working on, or with, IMY the extent to which this 
was possible was limited. I ensured that different groups were included in the study, 
so that I could understand the various actors' personal values and ideologies (Kabeer 
and Subrahmanian, 1999). Three sets of indicators are highlighted. First, 'agency 
indicators', to uncover how individuals within the agency perceive and measure its 
objectives. Second, 'outsider indicators', from individuals who have gained wide 
acceptance in a particular field of development, arising from a substantial body of 
research. Finally, 'beneficiary indicators', which express how those who are expected 
to benefit from a particular intervention would themselves assess their own well being 
and experiences as a result of the intervention. For total numbers involved and 
breakdown see Appendix 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Interview Breakdown 
Bureaucrats Non 
Bureaucrats 
National 14 Jl 
State 31 13 
District 12 7 
Block 17 55 
4.5.3: Sampling for the semi structured interviews and focus groups 
A list of all bureaucratic posts involved in IMY was accessed and bureaucrats (at 
Central State and District levels) involved directly, or indirectly, with the programme 
were interviewed. Academics, NGO officials and RMK workers were also 
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interviewed. At the District level, six Blocks are participating in the IMY scheme. I 
interviewed between four and seven of the groups in each Block. I went to each Block 
with the Block supervisor who had a schedule of groups to visit each day. The groups 
interviewed, therefore, reflected those that the supervisor was to visit on that 
particular day, rather than those groups that the supervisor felt reflected best on them, 
as an individual. In addition to these visits with supervisors, I visited several groups 
with CARE and Sabla employees who were working with the IMY groups but who 
visited independently of government employees. As well as IMY groups, I 
interviewed non-IMY micro-credit groups organised through ALSA. 
Interviews were carried out on different bases and at different times depending on 
who the interviewee was. Interview length ranged between twenty minutes and two 
hours. At the National and State level, these were often during 'office hours' at the 
various government offices. As I spent much of my time at the State level, I 
developed a close friendship with many of the participants, so interviews were often 
more informal, over dinner or during a visit to someone's house. The IMY groups in 
the villages were always interviewed in the early mornings, or late in the afternoon, 
when it was more likely that members would be in the villages, rather than working in 
the fields or at home. Village level workers (anganwadi) were often interviewed on 
their own, whilst IMY groups always took a focus group format. In the majority of 
cases, this was in their meeting place for the group, away from other villagers. 
However, on a few occasions, men demanded to be present and dominated the 
interview. 
4.6: Methods used 
4.6.1: Semi Structured Interviews 
The main research tool was the 'semi-structured' interview, which follows a checklist 
of open-ended questions allowing conversation to shift to areas of interest, both for 
myself, and for the interviewee. The checklists of questions varied considerably 
according to whom I was interviewing. Elite government officials were, for example, 
asked questions specifically relating to NPM, whilst self-help group interviews were 
more concerned with their perceptions of change in bureaucratic culture. Questions 
were constantly adapted as new areas of research were identified (examples of 
interviews are given in Appendix 3). When working with key informants, repeat or 
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serial interviews (Cook and Crang, 1995) helped build relationships and allowed 
certain areas to be further explored. Some of the most interesting interviews happened 
when interviewees were most relaxed. This happened at various times, whether after I 
had put away my notepad at the end of interview, or when we were socialising 
together. 
Group interviews and discussions were used to explore certain issues. The advantages 
of group work are not only the over-lapping range of knowledge, and 'observable 
mutual cross checking' (Chambers, 1997, 148), but also 'a means to set up a 
negotiation of meaning through intra and inter-personal debates' (Cook and Crang, 
1995, 56) that may 
'bring forth material that would not come out in either the participant's own 
casual conversation or in response to the researcher's preconceived questions' 
(Morgan, 1989: 21 ). 
Morgan (1998: 11) found the use of focus groups was useful for, 
'orienting oneself to a new field, generating hypotheses based on informants' 
insights, evaluating research sites, developing interview schedules and 
questionnaires and obtaining participants' interpretations of results from 
earlier studies'. 
In this way, Morgan sees focus groups as a compromise between the strengths and 
weaknesses of participant observation and individual interviews (1998: 22, see also 
Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999). Focus groups were conducted, with between six and 
ten self-help groups in each administrative Block involved in the IMY programme. To 
enable some comparison between perceptions of bureaucratic culture of those 
working in IMY, and individuals outside, I conducted two focus groups with SHGs 
working with each of the NGOs - CARE, LSA, Sabhla and UNICEF. The women in 
the SHGs were accessed through two sets of gate-keepers. The first was through 
government supervisors. Here, I arranged to work-shadow the supervisors to the 
villages, to visit the groups in each of the six Blocks associated with IMY. The 
supervisors prearranged meetings with the anganwadi workers up to a month in 
advance, so through work-shadowing, I was able to visit the groups on a random basis 
depending on which ones the supervisors had arranged to see on any given day. 
It was during the supervisor's meeting with the anganwadi worker that I was able to 
speak to the groups. During interview, the supervisors were occasionally present, 
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primarily in the case of those supervisors who were less comfortable with my 
questions, but more usually were not. In Blocks where supervisors were on training 
programmes, I was accompanied by another (ICDS) official who was known to the 
anganwadi worker in the village. Having met the SHGs, I arranged where possible, to 
return to discuss my work with them again at a later date. The second set of gate-
keepers was provided through the NGOs, Sabhla and CARE. A woman NGO worker, 
with whom I developed a close relationship, was particularly useful in this regard, and 
gave me an extensive non-state view of the scheme. Accessing IMY groups with 
NGO workers provided the opportunity to verify findings of research conducted 
where access was gained through the government officials. The focus groups with 
NGO SHG's further gave me a sense of comparison between IMY and non-IMY 
schemes. Focus groups took place in the late afternoon and in the early morning, 
around work and anganwadi centre times. Informal group interviews and discussions 
were not planned, but took place when there were a number of people together who 
were willing to discuss a certain issue. This may have been in people's houses, when I 
called to see individuals in their offices, who also had guests, or in public places like 
the anganwadi centres in villages. 
Group interviews were not, however, always productive. In some cases, particularly 
in the case of ALSA created groups, discussed in detail in chapter 6, the group itself 
was not strong enough to avoid pressure from outside. Women were marginalised and 
were not well organised (Burkey, 1993) in giving an accurate account of their 
experiences within the meeting, without the interference of men within the village. 
Power relations within the groups were problematic at times within the groups. As 
Mosse ( 1995, 29) found, this affects who is invited, who speaks, and who is excluded. 
This was certainly the case in one village, when one woman who had been ostracized 
from the group and was consciously excluded from the meeting. I tried to minimise 
the effect power relations had on my work, by noting the social relations within the 
groups (particularly the influence of domineering individuals; Mascarenhas et al, 
1991; Norman et al, 1989; Mosse, 1995; 28) and consciously trying to involve those 
who were less vocal in the discussion process. I found that other women could simply 
not spare the time to help to assist with the research, particularly in a format which 
required many of them to be available at the same time (Farrington and Bebbington, 
1993). 
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Data from interviews and group work were recorded in notebooks, except for a small 
number of tape-recorded interviews. Note-taking was found to be preferable as it was 
more informal, people interviewed were more comfortable and less suspicious, and it 
would not have been possible to conduct the large number of interviews if all were 
transcribed (and/or translated). Notes and recordings were transcribed in the evenings 
following the interviews. This allowed me to identify areas for further discussion or 
cross checking, and was a vital part of the ongoing analysis. 
Analysis of qualitative data took place continually with comparative analysis 
(Silverman, 1993) where the researcher seeks negative examples in order to 
constantly rework hypotheses. The reworking of hypotheses was done during the 
interviews, in discussions between myself and my research assistant after the 
interview, during transcription and whilst talking to key informants. Much of the 
preliminary analysis was in the form of writing notes on the side of transcripts, or 
noting ideas and memos whenever they came to me (Burgess 1984, 174). Once 
transcribed, data was formally coded for further analysis with the search for 
relationships and tensions in the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Janesick, 1994). The 
analysis process continued to progress after the field research period was over. 
4.6.2: Participatory methods - Observation: 
Observation played an important role throughout the fieldwork. This took place 
continually while living in India, at every scale from the Central level to the villages, 
and especially during and whilst waiting for interviews. I cannot refer to this as 
participant observation, as I was not able to participate in what it is to be a bureaucrat. 
I was, however, able to work-shadow bureaucrats at various levels which gave me an 
insight into their working lives (Evans, 1998). The friendships I built with many key 
informants during my fieldwork meant I also gained a detailed understanding of the 
lives of bureaucrats outside the work environment. Whilst living in the Government 
hostel at Rae Bareli, as well as at other times, I followed the approach of Hollier 
( 1986) who in relation to market transactions, adopted a method of 'lurking' which he 
identified as 'patient, unobtrusive observation'. This enabled me to collect 
information by observing the ways that bureaucrats act towards each other and toward 
other people, which I discussed with parties involved at another time. 
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Throughout the research process, including preliminary interviews in Durham, 
experiences at the LBSNAA and during the six month extensive field visit, I kept a 
field diary covering my experiences of living with government officials, interviews, 
social events and grass roots field work. This not only provided me with richer 
material than interviews alone, it also proved a useful aide-memoire to remember 
certain events which may not have seemed important at the time, but later added to 
my understanding, or interpretations, of bureaucratic culture. 
4. 7: Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the methodological tools used to study the ways in which 
the bureaucrats in UP have engaged with the process of change associated with new 
public management. The methodology was adapted to collect and analyse data that 
can give a rich explanation of what is actually happening in the bureaucracy in Uttar 
Pradesh. I have attempted to develop a mixed methodology that relied, almost 
exclusively, on qualitative data. The exploratory nature of the work required an 
inductive approach that created the opportunity for me to explore new ideas and 
linkages, as they became apparent. 
I have tried to present my role through the research experience, in order for the reader 
to understand the context of the data and analysis presented. I am aware of the role 
my position has played in the collection, analysis and presentation of data. However, I 
feel there is validity in the information presented, and that the perceptions expressed 
in the following chapters are those of individuals involved in the IMY scheme, rather 
than my own. 
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CHAPTER 5: INSIDER PERCEPTIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC CHANGE 
5.1: Introduction 
In chapter 1, I discussed the recent shifts in 'mainstream' development thinking 
towards forms of governance influenced by the new public management (NPM) 
discourse. As the state's main institution of governance, the civil service directly 
affects, and is affected by, these shifting debates and practices. In this, the first of two 
substantive analytical chapters, I consider how those working within the bureaucracy 
have understood and interpreted change along NPM lines. The opinions expressed 
within this chapter are those of practising government officials associated with the 
IMY scheme at various levels of the hierarchy: at the Centre (Delhi), the State capital 
(Lucknow), the District (Rae Bareli) and in the six administrative Blocks in which the 
IMY scheme is being conducted 1• 
Within chapter 3 I considered how efforts at promoting effective development 
through the public bureaucracy in Uttar Pradesh have largely been seen by a sceptical 
public as camouflage, a public show aimed solely at getting votes. I outlined the 
chronic underdevelopment of the State, and a political and administrative 
environment legendary for its clientelistic and corrupt ways of governing. Many 
academics and government officials, to whom I spoke in Delhi, were quick to surmise 
that any analysis of the workings of the bureaucracy (particularly in relation to 
development projects) in the State would be futile. An academic working for a 
bilateral agency in Delhi lamented, 'Nothing is happening in UP' (Interview, 27th 
April, 2000), and a senior administrator commented that in fact, 'there's been very 
little progress in the State in the last twenty years!' (Interview, 20th May 1999l It is 
specifically this kind of resignation, as well as well-documented cases of bureaucratic 
failure in the State, that makes the case of IMY so interesting. 
Whilst there was some resistance to bureaucratic change, the majority of local 
government officials working at all levels on the IMY programme felt substantial and 
1 As described in chapter 3, other schemes were also briefly considered in other Blocks, to get a sense of 
comparison. These included schemes by UNICEF and Sabla (two NGOs), as well as schemes run by LSA (the 
NGO responsible for RMK loans). 
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positive changes were actually occurring. According to interviewees, these changes 
related to the role of training at all levels, the structure of the scheme, and the nature 
of accountability and monitoring within the programme. The three areas are detailed 
in turn in the following section, after which the views was critically appraised. 
The arguments made in this chapter broadly relate to two phenomena, the 
development of a 'culture' of commitment within the scheme, and the flexible forms 
the programme takes. Reasons for the high, and perhaps unexpected, levels of 
commitment recorded relate to a variety of key issues. First, the role of particular 
(women) officials at District, State and National levels was fundamental in both 
creating personal relationships with individuals who held access to power and 
resources, and in developing an environment of trust between various bureaucratic 
levels (and those 'outsiders' involved in the scheme). These women were able to 
encourage, through a combination of consent and coercion, a work environment at 
odds with the traditional 'vested-interest' perception of the bureaucracy. Furthermore 
in the process of 'de-bureaucratisation', circumvention tactics were deployed to avoid 
dealing with individuals, both inside and outside the bureaucracy who were felt to be 
'corrupting influences' on the work of officials. 
The scheme's implementation through supervisors and village level workers has also 
enabled greater reach and scope in the villages. The fact that these women had not 
been recruited through State or national level examinations meant they were less 
authoritarian and 'closer' to beneficiaries. The predominantly female staff appear to 
have a 'sense of calling' (Tendler and Freedheim, 1994) not prevalent in many other 
sectors and departments. This I understood to relate to intensive training at all levels, 
and the high degree of autonomy given to lower levels of the hierarchy, promoting 
both improved status and satisfaction. Social sector positions were seen by some in 
the department as 'punishment postings', due to their lack of power and prestige. 
Whilst this is clearly a negative phenomenon, the corollary leads those who are not 
committed to push for immediate transfer, leaving a concentration of individuals that 
have a genuine concern in the sector. Furthermore, this sector controls little finance 
2 This interview took place with, A.M. Tiwari, Joint Director DOWC. Other national level interviews offering 
similar perceptions include Vivek Srivaster, (National Council for Applied Economic Research); and Mark 
Robinson, (Ford Foundation). 
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and wields only minimal power, so temptations to divert funds, develop patronage ties 
and gain speed money, though not absent, are less prevalent. The low status of the 
department means the traditional bureaucratic problem of politically motivated 
transfers is much reduced in the case of IMY. This increases the amount of time 
individuals spend on the programme promoting worker knowledge and experience, 
and through this the quality of their contribution iss enhanced. 
The scale of adaptation within IMY reflects the high degree of flexibility afforded 
within the scheme. In contrast to many other central government schemes, individuals 
at lower levels felt their contribution was both valued and valuable, with individuals 
trusted, and indeed expected, to adapt the scheme at the local level. Key elements of 
NPM are incorporated into the scheme including 'circular working' (which aims to 
develop interaction, debate and feedback between the various levels of the hierarchy), 
flexible job roles, and support for innovation and experimentation, points to which I 
return later in the chapter. Having no fixed quotas for group formation or 
development reduces the 'fear psychosis', described by Tolia (see chapter 3, page 87) 
as one of the key restrictions to effective working of the administration. The current 
development fascination with 'audit' and 'report culture' (Irnrie, 1999) was notably 
absent in the scheme. Accountability is, theoretically at least, provided from below. 
However, low levels of official accountability in several cases did leave the work of 
less scrupulous government officials free from detection, castigation and correction. 
Moreover, despite senior officials professing the importance of quality over quantity 
of groups, some Block level officials still felt the necessity to fulfil certain numerical 
criteria for group formation, and the establishment of authoritarianism in the 
preceding decade was perpetuated in certain instances. 
I do not claim that the scheme is either an uncontested success, as there were those 
who resisted change for a variety of reasons. Ideological resistance to change relates 
to India's long (quasi-) socialist tradition. Some interviewees saw the introduction of 
NPM as exemplifying the hegemonic domination of western ideas in India, as 
promoted and imposed by the World Bank. Other officials interpreted the shift 
towards 'facilitation' as symbolising a move away from government provision, and 
hence the welfare state. This was described as inappropriate and undesirable in the 
Indian context, and is a point to which I return later in this chapter. Pragmatic reasons 
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for re~i,tancc indmlcu fear of pri,ati~ation and 10'>:-. of juh-.. hut 111ore common!~ 
related to apathy and inertia. T) picall} thi.., occurred ''hen the demand-. placeJ on 
officer" ''ere not perce1' cd a" legitimate. re le' ant or necc-..-..ar) . Thi.., \\ J-. enhanced 
\\hen m cent i' c.., avai lable for co-operation were m:ucheJ or out" cigheJ h) benefit" 
of non co-operation. 
The majorit) of go\'ernmcnt ufliciab ~upponeJ the adaptation of clement-. of the 
NPM agenda (though in many cases the) did not deline change a-. relating to a 
~pecilic di-..cour~c). My ana ly~is o f the adoption of element-. of NPM identified in the 
ca ... e of IMY cc.Hl<.:ur.., with the work of Mawdsle) et al (:?002: 8). who '>ugge-.t that. 
' Knowledge and idea~ arc always political. The) cannot he di' orced from ~:onte\h of 
power'. They highlight the di:.tinction bet\\een 'little' and 'big' idea-.. In the ~:a"e of 
IMY. local Je,el adaptation or NPM repre:-.enh the de,clopmcnt or 'little' idea-.. 
'' hibt change i:-. dominated b) the ''e-.tern concei,ed di..,cour'e - the 'big Idea· - "nh 
liule ..,pace afforded 10 alternati'e'. Thi!) i'> panicularl) the c.:a..,c in l 'P. ''here the 
Bank. ha" bcen acti,el) imohed in the proces~ of admmi,trati\e relorm. 
The factor' promoting and re:-.tricting bureaucratic change are comple\ anti 'hifting. 
Here a 'f()rce-liclcl ' analy~i~ ha~ been used to broadl} determine the i,..,ue ..... relerreJ to 
in th i~ chapter a:-. the main in ... titutional factor~ aftecting the culture of the bureaucrac~ 
in the ca"c of IMY in UP. 
Figure 5. I The composite force-field analysis of bureaucrat ic cultures through 
IMY in Uthu Pradesh 
Disabling Factors 
• lnadtlquatc funding 
• Lack of StatT 
• Corrupt NGOs 
• Lack of t."<>-operation from {some officen. 
within JCDS and) other departll'lt!nts 
• Political Pressure 
• Bureaucratic hierarchy 
• Cullural norms role of women 
• lnadequalc transportation 
• Unable to meet demands of groups 
• Promotion of neo-lihcral NPM 
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Enabling Factors 
• Support from OOWC. ICDS 
• Pool of trainoo commilled womt!n 
• Anganwadi and NGO panner~ 
• Femi-sociability and support 
• Power in numhen; at local level 
• Circumvenlion and devolulion of power 
• l..caders changing cultural norms 
• Anganwadi workers in 'ill ages 
• Promotion of SHG 
• Adaptation of elements uf NPM and 
avoidance of other,. 
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5.2: Training 
The new public management 'revolution' (referred to in chapter 1) reflects the global 
dimensions of power wielded by those promoting the discourse. This thesis broadly 
considers the ways and extent to which government officials involved in the IMY 
programme have adopted and adapted aspects of NPM, and the resultant change in 
bureaucratic cultures. The impact of changes in training was immediately apparent 
within the IMY programme and offers a useful means to analyse this issue. 
Proponents of NPM suggest that training is important in changing the 'the mind sets' 
of administrators (Clarke and Newman, 1993; 1997) and creating new bureaucratic 
'cultures' (Dunleavy, 1991, 1997; Dowding, 1995). 
Extensive training for senior government officials is not a new phenomenon. Kees 
van der Pijl (1998) has written of the development of a 'transnational class', 
especially at senior levels, whereby individuals in different countries in different 
institutions think about, and 'do', development in similar ways as a result of 
international experience and learning through consultancy, training and visits. He 
suggests that they start to share more common mindsets and languages with each 
other than with subordinate workers, or 'beneficiaries', in their own countries. In 
contrast to this, particularly interesting in the IMY case, is the extent of training 
offered to District and Block level government officials and even village level 
anganwadi workers. For this reason the issues relating to training are divided into two 
sections. The first outlines the change in training for higher officials, namely IAS and 
PCS officers, and considers whether in fact this reflects the direct transfer of global 
ideas on NPM to the UP context. The second considers the training and its 
implications of lower level functionaries (LLF), namely (Assistant) Child 
Development Programme Officers ((A)CDPOs), supervisors and anganwadi 
workers.3 
Commitment to Training in Uttar Pradesh 
In UP, the scale and type of training, and its implications for the traditional 
hierarchical bureaucratic structure are all important. R. S. Tolia (Head of the 
3 Issues relating to anganwadi workers are, in the main, are dealt with in the next chapter. They are not 
government employees, as they have no legal rights in relation to the state, and are not paid a salary. Instead, they 
are given a stipend of up toRs. 500 a month. 
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Administrative Training Institute in Uttar Pradesh4) suggests the scale of commitment 
to NPM in the State is borne out by the State's training strategi, focusing on more 
training hours per person at every level in the hierarchy. For him, the new training 
policy in Uttar Pradesh is particularly innovative as it 'expands and improves on 
national policy', incorporating global ideas and learning much from the experiences 
of South-East Asia. In UP the NPM discourse has primarily been promoted by the 
World Bank in its administrative reform package. As described in chapter 2, the ways 
in which reform has been legitimised in UP supports specific changes. Clarke and 
Newman have argued that, 
'Increasingly, particular changes have come to be legitimated in and through 
narratives which place them in globalising contexts of change' ( 1997: 40). 
In relation to training, Tolia stressed that 'delearning' is as important as 'learning' -
perhaps more so. He argued the traditional command and control environment of the 
bureaucracy has to change, but stressed that creating 'enablers' was a difficult task, 
particularly in the older generations of officials. This was something that was 
observed to be a key factor in the IMY programme. Second, he emphasised the role of 
'capacity building', which includes 'mutual appreciation and learning' between state 
and non-state actors. Third, he said that training can help remove the 'fear psychosis' 
of government officials who have felt in the past that it has better to do nothing for 
fear of punishment or transfer. Once the fear has gone, he suggested, government 
officials can 'stick their necks out', knowing that it is better to try to be innovative 
and fail, than to perpetuate the status quo. Finally, Tolia considered the importance of 
training in enabling individuals to stand back and look at what the department should 
not be doing, as well as what it should. As a result, the Uttar Pradesh Civil Service 
Reform Policy document6 (2000) places emphasis on training that consolidates and 
expands on the experience of others. 
'Training institutions are to play a major role in the entire implementation 
process and their suitable exposure to best practices within country and 
overseas are also planned' (2000: 4). 
Another change relating to training reflects moves away from the traditional hierarchy 
of the Indian administration. The CSR document exemplifies this point noting, 
4 Tolia has also written extensively on bureaucratic reform, including 'Reforms in Governance in the State of Uttar 
Pradesh' 1999. 
5 This interview (dated ninth June 2000) is discussed in more detail in the Uttar Pradesh context in chapter 3. 
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'If the subject of restructuring of the civil service is to be treated in its proper 
perspective, then the subject 'civil service' must include not only the superior 
civil services but also the subordinate civil services. The cutting edge or the 
contact level between the government and others is the subordinate civil 
services, especially in the States' (1999: 12). 
The document points to the traditional prominence of, and adherence to, hierarchy 
within training. This has, in turn, structured superior/subordinate relationships in 
highly rigid and deferential terms, reducing innovation and causing resentment 
amongst lower level officers who feel their room for personal intervention is limited 
(Subrahmanian, 1999). 
Problems of early training strategy in /MY 
When the IMY scheme began in 1995, both quantity and quality of training 
programmes was lacking (Interview, 26th May Durgesh Hukku; Goi, 1998). The style 
and functioning of IMY, focusing on empowerment and participation in development, 
were elements not seen as central to earlier schemes promoted by the same 
government officials (including IRDP and DWCRA). Durgesh Hukku, Assistant 
Director of ICDS, in charge of IMY for Uttar Pradesh, argued that in the beginning 
the scheme was sanctioned without due preparation, leading to problems of 
understanding by officials and thus difficulties with policy implementation.7 
'On our part at first the implementation was slow. There was a lack of training 
and so even we at higher levels were unable to guide those working in the 
field. [For example ... ] We were asking the field level workers to draw up an 
'action plan'. Time went by and the plan was not formed. When we spoke 
about it, it was clear that the PO (Programme Officer) was unable to make a 
plan as she didn't know what it was, or what it was supposed to contain' 
(Interview, 26th May). 
In fact, so bad was the information relating to the programme in the beginning, that it 
came to an abrupt halt in the Rae Bareli District. 8 On a field visit to Bhadurpur Block, 
one of the supervisors there, Shiromani Soukar, explained what happened, 
'The project started in 1995 but it stopped for some time. This was partly 
because of the lack of training the supervisors had received so they were 
unclear about their role, and partly because there had been bad rumours about 
the project, so encouraging people's participation was difficult (Interview, lst 
August)'. 
6 Outlined in chapter I. 
7 These problems were furthered by the fact that IMY followed the withdrawn Mahila Yojana scheme discussed in 
section 5.4. 
s There are a few cases of IMY groups which continued during this, however these are rare. 
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Since 1995, the National Institute of Public Co-operation and Child Development 
(NPCCD) has been the primary institution providing training for IMY in UP. 
However, Mr. Mishra, one of twenty trainers at the institute in Lucknow claimed that, 
in the beginning, training was generic and offered nothing substantially different to 
that which had gone before. He explained that at this time, despite official rhetoric of 
innovation, working environments remained rather static, and the transformative 
potential of the scheme went unrealised. Because supervisors had not been trained to 
understand and promote the long-term aspirations of the scheme (and use alternative 
means of achieving these ends), they often felt uncomfortable and insecure. Mr. 
Mishra offered- the example of supervisors paying the joining fee themselves, thus 
creating 'paper-groups', or exaggerating the (financial) benefits of the programme to 
encourage women to join in order to create a positive external impression of the 
scheme. The inaccuracies of such 'paper truths' have been highlighted by Emma 
Tarlo's (1995) work on sterilization and slum clearance during the emergency (1975-
1977) in Delhi. Tiwari said that in the case of IMY, these cover-up attempts could not 
be sustained, suggesting that the women in the groups. 
'quickly became impatient as they had been promised a lot and began to 
criticise the scheme and spread rumours about it (17th August)'. 
Many District and Block level officials I interviewed expressed similar concerns 
about problems of the previous training strategy, or lack of it, within IMY. Several 
supervisors said they were nervous about the scheme as they did not feel competent or 
confident in the role they had been assigned. A typical response was offered by a 
supervisor in Bhadurpur Block, 
'IMY was just another scheme that we implemented. I wasn't so enthusiastic 
about it initially. I had to encourage the same women (that had lost money in a 
previous scheme) and I couldn't convince them of the benefits because I 
couldn't see what they were myself (Interview, 20th May). 
Criticisms of the Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) 
programme have highlighted exactly this issue. Based on her examination of available 
reports and evaluations, as well as interviews conducted with officials in the Ministry 
of Rural Development, Ramachandran ( 1995) found that very little effort had been 
made to communicate its innovative rationale, concepts and strategies to the officials 
who were responsible for implementation. In fact, once DWCRA had been approved 
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at the national level, the conceptual documents explaining the philosophy of the 
programme were put to one side and only the financial and administrative guidelines 
were circulated to the implementing agencies lower down the bureaucratic hierarchy. 
The lack of appropriate training was clearly a limiting factor that, not surprisingly, led 
'to a major gap in the objectives of the programme and implementation on the 
ground' (Ramachandran, 1995: 8). 
Training the elite 
Senior Indian government officials are given extensive training from the time of 
recruitment. This involves one year's intensive training at the Lal Bahadur Shashtri 
National Academy of Administration in Mussoorie, overseas visits, and even the 
opportunity to study for higher degrees in overseas universities. Two of the officials 
taking part in this research had been sponsored, by the government, through their 
Masters degrees in development studies at the Universities of London and Sussex. 
The overwhelming majority of those officials working on IMY felt the exclusivity of 
such experiences to the senior administrative echelons was not productive to the 
development agenda. Durgesh Hukku commented why she did not think this was a 
good idea and how the process has changed, 
'In the past it was possible only for the IAS and then the PCS to go for this 
training ... This was not effective as these people may only stay one or two 
years in a department, so as soon as they were trained they were shifted. They 
had no need or interest in what they had learnt after moving so the process of 
bettering the way in which we provided our service did not happen. Even if 
these people were able to advise better what people lower down should be 
doing, and writing it into policy, because the people who were implementing 
the policy did not have these innovative ideas, the way in which they worked 
remained the same ... Also in the past the IAS officers because they were 
offered training abroad they became choosy about which training they took. 
Because who went on the training was strictly based on a pay structure it 
meant that if the officer did not want to go, no one went. .. Programme officers 
and supervisors are even receiving this kind of training now. Government feels 
that people working at the field level, who are in direct contact with the people 
need wider exposure to other ways of working so they can do their own work 
better. They can function better because they have a much broader realisation 
of alternative ways of working' (Interview, 261h May, 2000). 
She described the current system as more flexible, allowing those lower in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy to attend overseas training. This change of approach is a key 
element of the IMY programme. Several of the more senior (PCS and IAS) officials 
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(as well as NGO workers) interviewed for this research had attended the CREME9 
training course for credit and enterprise development in Durham. It was anticipated 
that, because I am a student at Durham University, they would speak highly of their 
time at the University, and that they would also want to imply that they were effective 
in their work. However, the extent of enthusiasm based on experiences through the 
CREME course was far in excess of that which I had expected. Course participants 
argued that it had significantly contributed to their change in attitude, and changes in 
their work environment10• 
One example is the case of Arvind Mohan, a trainer at BIRD (Banking Institute of 
Rural Technology) in Lucknow, who attended the DUBS CREME course in 1997. 
BIRD offers training to both government and non-government officials involved in 
IMY, particularly in relation to small enterprise development. He said that through his 
experiences in Durham he had fundamentally changed his perceptions of how to 
measure success in development programmes. Elements of change, he argued, 
included greater tolerance for other ideas, being more creative and innovative in the 
way he works, and acknowledging that constant experimentation and adaptation is 
necessary within development work. Mr. Mohan said he felt that at present this 
described only a minority of officials in Uttar Pradesh, which in general are 'not the 
facilitating type'. He estimated that less than I 0% of officials felt that things had 
changed, 
'if you look for the right parameters there has been a definite change in 
schemes and what is achieved. Those who have been part of forums and 
training are definitely acting differently. Those who have not, usually have not 
been changed' (Interview 5th May, 2000). 
Durgesh Hukku also attended the CREME course in 1997. She said that it too had 
changed her perceptions of what could be achieved. She noted that her, 'ambitions 
and expectations for the schemes has been greatly improved through the Durham 
training' (15th May). Two UK projects that she visited as part of the course were 
pertinent to Mrs. Hukku. The first was a micro-enterprise scheme for women in 
Scotland. Here all the facilities were provided under one roof with communal 
9 For further information on the nature and content of the CREME scheme see figure 4.1. 
10 Course feedback information (accessed through Durham University) suggest that support for the scheme was 
consistently high during the five years it took place. Despite appeals for the scheme's extension, DtlD has decided 
to withdraw overseas training for Indian government officials and the last course was run in 2001. 
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reception facilities, fax and phone system. Without these facilities, she said, the 
women would not have been able to engage in the various enterprises undertaken. The 
second scheme involved training and business support for disabled people to promote 
their entry into employment. She said it was her ambition to be able to promote some 
similar schemes in India. Hukku noted that the work environment within these 
schemes in the UK differed substantially from that she had seen before. These 
aspirations, she noted, together with the training through CREME, has played a large 
part in the help, practical training and encouragement she is able to give to officials 
working beneath her in IMY. It is interesting that since the change of the scheme in 
200 I, the idea of training and provision of facilities for beneficiaries to pursue such 
ventures has been incorporated into the scheme. This is not to suggest that Mrs. 
Hukku has necessarily had a direct impact on policy-making, but rather that the 
circular way of working, and upwards transfer of ideas, is likely to have occurred in 
the case of IMY. 
A three year collaborative training programme with the British Council, evolved for 
CDPOs, Programme Officers (POs) and NGOs, has been implemented under the IMY 
programme. This included training C\)urses held at BIRD and NPCCD in Uttar 
Pradesh and two exposure visits were arranged to Bangladesh, (where individuals 
visited some of the Grameen Bank's self-help groups) and Indonesia. Lilly Singh, PO 
for Rae Bareli District, has spent several months in various schemes, both in India and 
overseas, training for the programme. She felt her experience in Bangladesh had given 
her encouragement as to what could be achieved in her own District. 
'In Bangladesh I saw in a poor slum one group, where the lady was the wife of 
a rickshaw-puller. He had been ill so they had borrowed money from the 
moneylender. When she joined the group she borrowed the money from the 
group to clear her debts with the moneylender. She was managing to repay the 
money to the group as well as contribute to her savings, (as she didn't have the 
huge interest rates of the moneylender). They had got group dynamics. This 
area in Bangladesh is very poor so there is no reason if it is working there why 
it can't work here' (Interview, 141h August). 
Training Lower Level Functionaries 
The direct implementation work of the IMY scheme is primarily conducted by lower 
level functionaries (LLF), namely supervisors and anganwadi workers. Kaviraj 
( 1991) suggests that a profound gap has developed between the bureaucratic elite, at 
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home with the 'modernist discourse', and personnel at lower levels whose 'everyday 
vernacular discourses' are very different. This, he argues, means that when policies 
are implemented 'very low down in the bureaucracy, they are reinterpreted beyond 
recognition' (Kaviraj, 1991: 91 ). It is only reasonable that these women be trained to 
the highest possible standard to promote the successful realisation of the goals of the 
scheme. However, before IMY (and even within IMY in its early conception) this was 
not the case. 
Supervisors working in the Districts said that in the past they resented the fact they 
were 'doing all the work' (Interview, 15th June), but did not get the benefits of going 
to conferences. They also saw the transfer culture in India (Banik, 2001; Chambers, 
1983; de Zwart, 1994), which appears to have worsened in recent years, as a 
justification for training lower officials who would be less likely to be transferred and 
so could make better use of their skills. Furthermore, according to current IMY 
supervisors, in the past and in other schemes, the higher up the bureaucratic chain an 
individual, the less frequently they visited the field. This meant that while senior 
individuals frequently had an abstract understanding of the problems for development, 
they would have little bearing on grass roots reality. However, it was noted that things 
had changed somewhat in recent years. 
'Those from the Centre are actually visiting the States. They are seeing what is 
happening on the ground. They are realising the very different ways in which 
the States work. And again training at the State level, this was not done before. 
This means we know what is expected of us. Everyone is clear on the policy 
and what is to be achieved' (Interview, Durgesh Hukku, 26th May). 
The shift in policy to encourage the training of LLFs fits with Subrahmanian's 
observation that, 
'Middle-level officials and field-level officials in particular can often feel 
paralysed by the hierarchy that characterises bureaucratic organisations, and 
often cannot see a role for themselves in initiating change. The training 
environment can positively reinforce the capacity of bureaucrats to act as 
agents of change' ( 1999: 405). 
Several key aspects of change were highlighted by those attending the various training 
initiatives including, broader exposure to other ways of working, the feeling of being 
appreciated through the status implied by being trained, and more effective working 
once they knew precisely what was expected of them. 
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I attended several days at a four-week residential training course for CDPOs and 
ACDPOs at NPCCD in Lucknow. Here, I had the opportunity to see details of the 
training programme, how it was carried out, and discuss with tutors and participants 
on the programme how they felt it impacted their work. The course had 41 
participants, (39 women, and 2 men), 26 from Uttar Pradesh and 15 from Madhya 
Pradesh. Though all participants were ICDS employees, they were not all involved in 
IMY 11 • Most of these individuals had not been trained outside the District before, and 
certainly not for the same length of time. The structure of the programme was very 
informal, involving watching videos covering various issues including anti-dowry 
promotion, literacy campaigns and the importance of using clean water. This was 
followed by discussion sessions and focus groups. After each stage of training the 
groups were asked how they could put such information into practice, and to discuss 
their own experiences of the issues. The video I saw was part of a UNICEF sponsored 
campaign that aims to unite government and non-government officials in the 
promotion of certain welfare issues. The course also included field visits to case study 
development projects. Participants to whom I spoke, said the change of environment 
for training was a positive one, for several reasons. First, they were able to meet 
people in similar positions from different areas, exchange ideas and share mutual 
experiences. They also commented on the advantages of leaving the classroom and 
seeing how projects were working in different areas (Session attended 181h August). 
Training in the State centre meant individuals could focus exclusively on training in 
an environment designed specifically for that purpose. Pankaj Jain's (1994) study of 
eleven successful development organisations in five Asian countries found that these 
agencies tended to centralise the training of field workers. In order to train the new 
entrants, he explains, the organisations 'deployed some of their best people and made 
heavy investments which, in itself, required centralised training' (1994: 1371 ). It is 
not clear from his work, however, whether he feels centralised training causes an 
improvement in training quality, or rather, that to encourage the involvement of the 
best trainers, a centralised location is desirable. In the case ofiMY, it was felt that the 
centralised nature of training provided a more conducive atmosphere for learning. 
One of the ACDPOs at the NPCCD training course commented that there weren't any 
11 As explained in chapter 3, !MY is only working in four districts in Uttar Pradesh. 
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factions in the training in~titute and the) all felt open to di.,cu.,., an) maller., there 
without any inhibition.,, 
·we are all the ~ame in the instilUte. There aren't an) (peer) group .... and \\Call 
wor~ together. We've all made contact~ and friend., from different Blod . .., and 
Di~trict., "ho we ·n stay in touch with ... We can di-,clh'> our problem" in a 
more open \\ay here and ~uggest idea~ without any pre.,~ure on u..,· (I men ie\\. 
181h Augu-;t). 
Plate 5.1 :Cour~e Photograph- Training at NPCCD 
The change in training offered at NPCCD \\US argued b) another CREME participant. 
Mr. Mi~hra, to relate to the process of ·de-learning· a phenomenon highlighted l'l) 
Tolia in relation to NPM: 
'There arc a lot of project~ and they are gi\ ing a lot of information but it '" 
u~eles~ if the people are not using it. What we need to do i'> to 11') to change 
people's altitudes. DUBS (Durham University Buo;incss School) helped me sec 
the need to change my atLitude and they wa) in which I loo~ at things. You 
have to respect the basics and use your knowledge in a different \\tl). There j.., 
a need for 'de-learning· and a change in approach and attitude or project., \\'ill 
continue to go the same way as those before them' (Interview. 171h Augu-.,t). 
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HowC\er. whibt the de-learning a~~ociated with NPM e\pOU\e\ the adoption or 
private \ector \\Orking practice~. for Mr. Mi ... hra it imohed the the or more 
participatory form~ of de' elopment, e\emplit) ing the dh erg em imerpretat ion and 
adoption of NPM idea~. Thi~ i.., reflected in the e\amplc of participator) learning and 
action (PLA ) relating to women·~ age~ given by Mr. Mi ... hra. He argucu that. in the 
pa~t. official.., would get incorrect data, <b they ..,imply a ... !--ed .t que'>tion anu were 
given an an ... wer. Now Mr. Mi::.hra recommend~ that '>Uney~ arc collected through 
group di~cu:-.sion in which people relate their experience' 10 ( for example) local 
calendars rather than national ones. and women's perceptions and idea:-. uscJ to 
generate information rather than tho:-e of the bureaucrat. This i., not to ~uggest that 
PLA is an end in itself. Rather, the example given by Mr. Mi~hra ... uggc~h an 
awarene~~ that authoritarian approaches 10 development are n01 cffectin:-. and that 
there is a need to be more flexible and open to ne\\ approache'>. PLA being ju ... t one. 
/ 
I 
Change~ experienced by officer ... in IMY are more re ... ounding \\hen compared \\ ith 
ofticer., in other department~ '"ho have not experienced ... uch training. \tan) 
go,ernmcnt oftiriab interviewed from other departmcnh :-.till had the idea that the) 
·ruled'. particularly in the District. One Dist rict ofticer. not invol\ed Jircctl) in I MY. 
expressed how entering the civil service was a ·national hobby' and the a'>piration of 
every parent for their child. He felt that government oflicials represented the ·~upreme 
Chapter 5:/nsiders' Perceptions of Bureaucratic Change. 
sector of society' (Interview, August 4th). The following comment, made by a District 
Provincial Civil Service (PCS) officer, is just one of many expressions of this type: 
'In 'the Hindi belt' the bureaucracy is very powerful. In backward areas 'the 
bureaucrat' rules. In agricultural areas the power is shared between the 
Pradhan and the bureaucrat. Their liking and disliking and what they think 
should be done is what happens. It isn't in the interests of many bureaucrats to 
change the way it is. If we get more literacy and development then the power 
of the bureaucracy may be questioned. The very reason we go into this field is 
for the power and authority' (Interview, 3rct August). 
Mrs. Hukku (like many others) did not underestimate the problems faced in working 
in the bureaucracy, which are intensified in the case of Uttar Pradesh. However she 
maintained that advances were being made (Interview, 15th May). Training for her 
meant that officials knew what could and should be achieved. 
Not only was the interaction between officials different in the case of IMY but the 
way in which information was imparted to the public also varied considerably in 
relation to other schemes. The first week in August is national breastfeeding week in 
India. The programme in Rae Bareli is jointly funded by the government and by the 
NGO CARE focusing on a three-step programme for mothers; namely immediate 
breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding and weaning of the child. I attended a training 
programme for supervisors in Rae Bareli and a publicity drive for breastfeeding the 
following day (I st and 2nd August). The promotional visit I attended was not in an 
IMY Block but in Bhaon, a village in Rahi Block (in Rae Bareli). 
From the outset the nature of this meeting was far different from anything I had seen 
with IMY. The 'presentation' began with lengthy introductions by the panel before 
going into laborious detail about breast-feeding. Whilst I am sure the content was 
pertinent, the temperature was incredibly high and although we were supplied with 
water and tea the people watching were not. Children soon became tired and mothers 
were more concerned with pacifying them than watching the middle aged men from 
out of town talking about the benefits of breast-feeding. Once registers of attendance 
were taken several women left, although most stayed. Whilst the potential benefits of 
such meetings are undeniable the structure was low on visual stimuli (except for the 
cooking session at the end) and I found it very difficult to keep my concentration 
while man after man thanked the doctor, officials and 'our friend from England' for 
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attending. The meeting coincided with the distribution of 'pushtahar' (food supplies) 
in the village and this together with the weigh the baby competition (complete with 
prizes) were presumably the reason for the high attendance figures. 
S.A. Khan, Director of NPCCD, said that in many cases the superficiality of schemes 
is a major problem, which would seem to be the case from my limited experience of 
the breast-feeding campaign, 
'They think if they visit a village once or twice the group can form, and will 
work. I give them (the supervisors) the example. If someone comes to you to 
sell something and talks to you for half an hour are you going to buy it? They 
need to sell it to you, to convince you to buy it, and this takes time. The same 
is true of programmes. They involve the women making a choice with their 
time and often money, and it has to be sold to them, they are the customers of 
the project. At the same time they should be accurately informed and not led 
to believe that something will come that won't. If this is the case they lose 
faith very quickly and it is much harder to get them to buy a product from the 
same sales group (government) again' (Interview, 1 ih August). 
This aspect of 'embeddedness' in the community, developing relationships to 
convince beneficiaries to 'buy into' a scheme, does not only relate to training. 
Because IMY works through supervisors and anganwadi workers, it has created or 
developed networks that are close to the people. In addition, due to vast numbers of 
women working on the project, it has access to resources (of people and time), which 
are unavailable to many other departments. This point will be elaborated upon later in 
the chapter. Mr Khan noted the problems were largely based on autocratic perceptions 
of government officials. 
'Last week I was trammg some supervisors at Bakshi Ka Talab12 • I asked 
them, "What is your job?" People said, "to inspect groups". I ask them when 
they were made part of the police rather than the social sector. I say they are 
there to help the anganwadi, to see what shortcomings she is faced with and 
then find how these problems can be remedied' (Interview, 17m August). 
The fact that the IMY handbook (Goi, 1998) states that nodal officers in the District 
should have had several years in their position, implies the importance of tenure in the 
programme. Not only does the development of trust for effective working take a long 
time, but also learning how to work in a new department or District is a lengthy 
process. The intensive training offered in IMY also takes resources of time, effort and 
12 Bakshi Ka Talab is an area outside Lucknow that houses the Rural Training Institute. 
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money. Based on these grounds, it is unsurprising, therefore, that transfers were seen 
to be a major problem particularly by the key officers at the District and State levels. 
In the case of IMY, however, 'politically motivated' transfers were not seen to be the 
major issue (and rarely featured below the State level). Rather some, mainly male, 
officers who were transferred into the department saw it as a 'punishment posting', 
and other Block level officers who wished to move out of rural areas to the District or 
State capitals were constantly using any influence they had to push for transfer. Mrs. 
Hukku explained how she feels about the transfer situation. 
'It is a loss to the department when people shift. They request the transfers, but 
if they leave it is a waste of money. NIPCCD have trained them, we have 
invested time and money in them and then they move. They shouldn't be able 
to move for 3 years, especially if they have had training abroad. One of the 
CDPOs in Jalaun 13 was trained and ready to train her subordinates then got a 
transfer. How is the project supposed to make progress like that?' (Interview, 
241h May). 
I would suggest that whilst elements of the NPM discourse are being promoted 
through training including devolution, downwards accountability and flexible 
working conditions, in reality, these exist in hybrid forms developed in conjunction 
with other influences. The harder 'public choice' influences of NPM are notable for 
their absence. Whilst at the State level, 'down-sizing' and 'right-sizing', and even the 
idea of 'vision crafting' are buzzwords, but in reality these are not translated into 
training at the grass-roots level. 
5.3: Structure 
The structure of IMY was highlighted by both 'insiders' and 'outsiders', as being 
fundamental in changing the work culture of government officials. Elements 
discussed in this section reflect the adoption of some (and avoidance of other) 
elements promoted within the NPM discourse. First, the flexibility of the scheme has, 
according to officers at the District level and below, given them greater autonomy. 
This is typical of the NPM promotion of 'localisation' through the 'devolution' and 
'deconcentration' of power. The second feature relates to the nature of hierarchy in 
IMY. Within the scheme, not only is there a narrow chain of command above the 
District level providing direct points of contact, but the nature of relationships within 
13 Jalaun, like Rae Bareli is on of the other Districts in Uttar Pradesh which has been selected for the !MY 
programme 
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the hierarchy were discernible for their congenial nature. Here I focus on the role of 
key individuals in the activity of managing the process of 'de-bureaucratisation'. The 
final area discussed in this section relates to selective use of 'externalisation' and 
'contracting out' methodologies, through interaction with quasi-and non-
governmental organisations within the programme. 
5.3.1: Localisation 
Through the devolution of power and responsibility to the lowest practical level the 
IMY programme attempts to shift away from the conventional centralised command 
and control of Indian state sponsored schemes. In the IMY Handbook (Goi, 1998), an 
entire chapter is dedicated to the subject of flexibility in the scheme. It states, 
'the State level nodal agencies... have been vested with the flexibility to 
modify any other feature, instructions, guidelines ... The changes can be 
brought out to suit the needs and requirements of the field situations. There is 
no need to seek prior approval of Government of India for effecting such 
changes' (p.l57). 
Durgesh Hukku (Assistant Director ICDS, Lucknow) explains what this change of 
approach means for the project, 
'In the implementation of IMY the approach is flexible, it's according to the 
geography of each specific locality. Not just the physical resources, and access 
to market and raw materials but looking specifically at the culture of the area 
and the conditions with which the project is faced' (Interview, May 261h). 
District and Block level supervisors suggested they were more able to take their own 
initiative with the groups. This supervisor from Singhpur said that, though groups 
sometimes fail, at least within IMY they have tried their utmost to support them in 
every way possible, 
'Some groups are doing incredibly well, obviously this relates to their starting 
point. Some groups take a long time to form and the process is often a long 
and difficult one. I can and do spend time with these groups. It is upsetting 
when they don't work out but at least I know I have done all I can' (Interview, 
July ih). 
This devolution of power within the bureaucracy has several implications for the 
culture of those implementing the policy. The first relates to minimising the culture of 
fear that leads to inaction to which Fine man and Gabriel ( 1996) have referred. They 
argue that in many cases, 
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'Organisational hierarchies become highways along which blame travels; 
superiors blame subordinates for designing forms and levers wrongly or giving 
the wrong instructions. Apportioning blame can become an unpredictable 
business. Under these circumstances, people may learn the simple, but 
demoralising lesson, that the best thing to do is simply to protect themselves' 
(p.tl9). 
The second aspect relating to the structure of the scheme concerns the ability of lower 
level functionaries (LLF) working at the grass roots level to have some input into the 
way in which the policy is interpreted and implemented. Vaughan and Wait (1984), 
amongst others (Wait, t 988, Wait et a!, 1990, WHO, t 989), have highlighted the fact 
that restricting involvement of those who implement policy in the planning of 
programmes and discretion in work has led to project failure. It is interesting that 
research over the past two decades relating to private sector environments has focused 
on the need to 'empower' employees to facilitate innovative and dedicated work 
cultures (Kanter, 1982). In Tendler's research in Ceara, she suggests that recognition 
or appreciation for individual's work (to which I turn later), and their ability to have 
some control over the direction of the programme are important factors in successful 
implementation (1997: 36). 
A third element relates to the culture of bureaucratic authoritarianism that appears to 
have been minimised in the case of IMY, partly through the devolution of power to 
the localities. The implementation of IMY is carried out through large numbers of 
supervisors (government employees) in each Block, who assist anganwadi workers in 
the villages. The role of anganwadi workers is seen as crucial to the programme's 
success as they are the points of direct contact for the beneficiaries. Mrs Hukku notes 
the importance of interaction with the groups, 
'As a department, it has the best network to the people. Because we work 
through the anganwadi workers there is a close link to the field. The POs have 
to go into the field also so the women in the groups know who to contact and 
have a personal relationship with the administration (Interview, July 201h)'. 
Neither supervisors nor anganwadi workers are recruited through the traditional 
examination, as for the PCS or IAS, but are recruited at the District level. This has the 
implication that they have not been trained in the 'authoritarian culture' from which 
they felt many other officials suffer. Further, as the anganwadi workers live in the 
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villages where they work, they feel they have a better understanding of the problems 
of local women, and better access to them. 
This evidence contrasts with the research of Pankaj Jain ( 1994, 1996) which has been 
mentioned above. He suggests that the most successful working practices were found 
where work was highly standardised. This is in opposition to much work on the 
benefits of NGOs based around their 'local knowledge' and ability to adapt projects to 
suit local needs (Ciarke, 1995). The departure from traditional top down, standardised 
ways of working was highlighted as a key factor in IMY' s success. Other factors 
highlighted by Jain do coincide with experiences in IMY. These include what he 
describes as a 'sense of calling' and 'brotherhood' among employees, promoting 
dedication and motivation. 
Jain's case studies do differ from the case of IMY, and many NGO studies, in several 
respects. The organisations studied were non-government or semi-government, and 
had an employee total of more than one hundred. Whilst large in terms of firm sizes, 
compared with the size and scale of IMY these represent relatively small numbers of 
people. Another key difference between Jain's work and my own relates to the type of 
work conducted by the organisations he studied. Those NGOs he highlighted as most 
effective were working in areas suited to standardisation of procedures, namely 
irrigation, milk processing and bank credit - rather than the multiple and 
differentiated tasks involved in social and economic development through IMY. 
Much of the latest work on developmental service bureaucracies (Wade, 1988; Moore 
1989; Lam 1996; Ostrom 1996, 1998 and Evans 1996a, 1996b) has tried to come to 
terms with the issues of flexibility and standardisation in bureaucracies. Judith 
Tendler suggests that performance and job satisfaction can be increased where a strict 
structure enables power to be taken away from local elites. At the same time power 
and autonomy is devolved to programme workers at lower levels. In her case study of 
Caera she contends that, 'the state's actions represented a felicitous combination of 
centralised control and local "embeddedness'"(1994: 1176), whereby power was both 
devolved to the lowest possible level at the same time controlled by officials higher in 
the hierarchy. In a similar fashion through IMY, power is devolved within the scheme 
to lower levels of the hierarchy to the District level. At the same time power is 
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maintained within ICDS by restricting the involvement of other departments and local 
elites in the form of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRis). 
5.4.2: De-bureaucratisation - The role of key individuals 
The structure of IMY encourages limited hierarchy. The numbers of bureaucrats 
involved at higher levels is reduced, with the focus being placed on those individuals 
who implement policy. At the District level therefore there is one main point of 
contact, (the Programme Officer), one at the State level (the Assistant Director, 
ICDS), and one main Central contact (the Joint Director of DOWC in Delhi). Whilst 
there are, of course, other individuals at each level who contribute advice to the 
scheme, the chain of authority in reality is very narrow. Of particular interest, in the 
case of IMY in UP, is not just the reduced numbers of officials involved at higher 
levels, but the ways in which these key individuals use various strategies to induce or 
restrict involvement of various other institutions, individuals and groups in the 
programme. 
In Jenkins' work on the promotion of liberalisation in India, he highlights three main 
strategies used by key individuals to manage change associated with the shifting 
economic environment. These are political skill, political institutions and political 
incentives. In IMY, key individual have also been fundamental in promoting certain 
aspects of NPM, whilst avoiding others. The methods described by Jenkins in the 
economic sphere can be usefully adapted to describe the measures used to promote 
the reduction of 'bureaucracy' in the administrative sphere. The following section 
discusses the main methods used by key individuals in the case of IMY, namely 
administrative skill, administrative incentives and administrative institutions. 
Administrative Skill: 
The devolution of power and authority to lower levels of the administrative chain, 
through IMY, implies a reduction in power of those higher up and their accountability 
at the grass-roots. It is unlikely that bureaucrats easily relinquish their authority, or 
that those at lower levels would feel compelled to encourage the SHGs to act as 
monitors of their work. The way in which this has happened can be understood 
through the pursuit of three (overlapping) methods of consent, coercion and 
circumvention. 
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opm1on 'an insult to her profession' (Interview, 251h May). This kind of commitment 
and strength of character, particularly in situations that were difficult, gave those at 
lower levels faith in her support for their work. 
The relationship between supenors and subordinates in IMY was particularly 
interesting. For example, whilst the supervisors used the term 'Madam' for Lilly 
Singh, showing their respect and regard, the reality of the relationships was far from 
the obsession with protocol seen in other departments. There were, for example, no 
cases of deferential feet touching, or walking out of offices backward by subordinates 
towards Lilly Singh, so common in other departments. Whilst Lilly was obviously 
unable to form the same relationships with the women's groups as the supervisors 
had, several anganwadi workers singled her out specifically for praise. The same type 
of camaraderie was witnessed in the case of Mrs. Hukku. She visited the Districts on a 
regular basis to praise the work of individuals, to support the work of groups and to 
try to assist when particular problems had developed. It was this type of 
understanding, and 'can do' attitude promoted by key individuals, that appears to have 
promoted consent for the changes encouraged through the scheme. 
Coercion: 
The process of encouraging participation, and even acceptance of a project to devolve 
power from State and District level, obviously met with some resistance. The use of 
coercion was a key skill to promote acceptance of the scheme at the same time as 
minimising the laborious red tape for which the administration has often been 
criticised. Here, personal networks played an essential role. The key individuals I met 
were particularly assertive women. At the National, State and District levels, Sarojini 
Thakur, Durgesh Hukku and Lilly Singh, respectively, would actively coerce and 
pester those individuals whom they felt could offer something to the scheme. An 
example in Rae Bareli is useful to illustrate the point. Every week all the higher 
ranking District government officials are obliged to attend an audience with the 
District Magistrate (Raj Veer Singh) to discuss their work. The parochial nature of the 
District bureaucracy means that all officials attend. It was at these meetings Lilly 
gained access to particular government officials without an appointment. She said she 
had their captive attention as they had nowhere to 'escape', and she noted the amount 
of co-operation gained was further enhanced if the conversation was in earshot of the 
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The most visible resistance tactics were deployed by (mainly male) officers, who 
considered work in the social sector degraded, and viewed the posting as a form of 
'punishment'. Mr. Khan, previously Director DOWC Uttar Pradesh, now at the 
Department of Finance, said he felt that the morale of those working within the 
department was low - although he claimed this is not the way he personally felt. 
'They feel their job is a waste of time. It depends on what job you are in but 
people in DOWC often feel that things have been dumped on them. Because 
of the nature of the work some feel they are being punished' (4th August). 
Others felt that the political priority of the social sector and resources available to it 
are so low that it could not achieve anything, so to even try would be futile. The 
attitude of a senior DOWC official epitomised this resolve, 
'This job is very diffuse, very frustrating. Jobs in the industrial sector are very 
satisfying, very sought after. You can show your children a building and say I 
made that but in this job I can't own anything. What can I say, "that women's 
group is because of me?" When I was in the industrial department you heard 
that this department couldn't do anything. There is no job satisfaction .... I can 
say they were trained because of me' (20th April). 
People who felt this way about the Department were, in the main, actively seeking 
transfer. As noted earlier Mrs Hukku acknowledged that this was a problem for the 
programme. However, at the same time she said if they weren't committed, their 
leaving the scheme was in the long run, no loss, 'They don't do anything positive for 
the scheme, it's no loss in the end, if they leave!' (Interview, 16th June). 
Agarwal ( 1994) cites this type of reluctance and often downright refusal of state 
officials to. carry out government policy in relation to land rights in India which allow 
women to inherit. They argue that it would jeopardise the stability of the family 
through challenging male authority. She argues that such attitudes often start from the 
top and notes the response of the Indian Minister of Agriculture to her advocacy of 
land rights for women at a seminar for the Indian Planning Commission in 1989: 'Are 
you suggesting that women should be given rights to land? What do women want? To 
break up the family?' (Agarwal, 1994: 12). 
At the District level the committee has never met, the majority of its members did not 
even know they were part of the group until I informed them. Whilst it may be 
perceived as a failure of the IMY officials not having encouraged co-ordination with 
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the other departments, this is not how Lilly Singh saw the situation. She argued that, 
because of the nature of administration in the District, having meetings would not 
only be difficult to organise and low on productivity, but may even have a negative 
impact on the scheme by introducing adverse attitudes into the scenario. Instead, she 
said she had close relationships with officers in certain departments, including Basic 
Education and Social Welfare (as well as certain NGOs), with whom she worked on a 
regular basis, whilst consciously avoiding others. 
At the State level, the committee had only met once since the programme had begun 
in 1995. Mrs Hukku argued that the senior bureaucrats who form the Steering 
Committee are moved so frequently that the processes of negotiation and co-
ordination are brought to a halt when officers are transferred. Furthermore, due the 
vast number of commitments each senior bureaucrat has, she said, to arrange a 
meeting would require more effort than simply finding a solution to the problem, for 
which the meeting was being organised. Again, whilst Mrs. Hukku worked closely 
with officials whom she felt could further the project, she claimed the constant 
transfer of others was a constant hindrance to the work of officials in the scheme. A 
typical example of the negative impact of transfers was that of Uma-Shanker. He is a 
proactive IAS officer previously Secretary of the Rural Development Department 
transferred five times during my twelve-month fieldwork period (as well as spending 
several months without a post!). 
Just as factions have been highlighted within UP society more generally (chapter 3), 
they also exist within the bureaucracy. One example can be seen in the perceptions of 
Reservation policy. Some senior officials stated how Reservation was lowering the 
calibre of the service. One new IAS recruit interviewed in Mussoorie even 
commented, 'How can these people enter into the civil service when they are so 
backward they cannot even eat with a knife and fork!' (Interview, l01h December 
2001 ). More implicit prejudice was frequently observed with caste and regional 
groupings within the bureaucracy forming alliances. One senior bureaucrat recruited 
from within the BC category was even referred to by high-caste government officials 
as the 'rickshaw wallah'. IMY officials, through direct contact with key officials 
have, in the main, managed to side-step the political and religious factions within the 
UP bureaucracy, particularly at the State level. 
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The autonomy of key individuals clearly has the potential to be either extremely 
dangerous or productive depending on the objectives of the bureaucrats who wield 
power. If the key government officials' wanted to behave in a clientistic manner they 
could no doubt do so. There is little or nothing structural that enforces change, it has 
to come from the individual. The focus on support, training and empowerment of the 
individual is therefore central to changes in bureaucratic culture within IMY. 
Public choice theorists suggest that 'managers' in the public sector will adopt a 
vested-interest culture if unregulated and autonomous. However, when the same 
conditions are afforded to the private sector an 'entrepreneurial culture' is presumed 
to develop. Whilst clientistic practices, both explicit and implicit, were observed 
during my research, this was rarely the case in either DOWC or ICDS. My experience 
of IMY would suggest, in agreement with Tendler's work on 'good government', that 
there is no reason why this should be the case. Indeed, key officials working on IMY 
are IAS and PCS officers publicly renowned for being the intellectual cream of Indian 
society. It is reasonable to presume, therefore, that if their motives were based on 
financial, prestige or clientistic bases, they would have entered the more lucrative 
private sector or, at the very least, the more prestigious economic departments within 
the bureaucracy. 
In the case of IMY the circumvention of other departments was not the result of 
individuals trying to hold on to their power bases. Rather, within IMY, officers were 
doing something different and quite actively so. Veron et al. (2002) suggest officers at 
the District level reshape development policy, due to a lack of trust in the capacity of 
national level officials to fulfil their promises, and in grass roots level officials to 
perform their tasks without corruption. This parallels the case of IMY, the difference 
here, however, is that officers, at every level within the scheme, have an inherent 
distrust for those outside. However, whilst the involvement of 'corrupting influences' 
within the bureaucracy were indeed restricted, other less traditional involvement was 
actively encouraged in the forms of quasi-governmental, NGOs and the private 
sectors (discussed in the externalisation/ contracting out sector). Whilst the narrow 
chain of command was seen to avoid many of the problems of working in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy, it is not to suggest that it did not in any way, or at any time, 
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of mouth. and networking between SHG>:>. At the Di..,trict level. Lilt) Singh ll'>ed e\er) 
opportunit) po..,..,ible to promote po>:>iti\e perception' of IMY. In one in...,tancc. "he 
im ited a local reporter to one group I ''a-; all ending to intel'\ ie" me. and in '>O doing 
also gained puhlicit) for the scheme. The championing of po .... iti'e attitude.., tO\\arJ.., 
the ..,chemc c.:lcarl) contributed to government official<., feeling obliged to meet the 
high standard' they felt \vere expected of them. Thi'> i .... an C\ample or dO\\ 11\\ arJ..., 
accountability. meaning that official monitoring. which has the potential to increa'e 
the amount of bureaucracy in the project is reduced. 
Plate 5.5: A group member· in Pali village, Maharajgang Block. 
has opened her own shop. Such achievemenrs give super\'i'>or' a 
sense or pride and act as an incentive to pertorm. 
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Further incentives for officials to perform to the best of their ability result from the 
relationships developed with the IMY groups themselves. ICDS is the only 
department that works through village level anganwadi workers in project 
implementation. There is a closer bond between those who implement the scheme and 
the IMY groups, than simply exist between officials and beneficiaries. There was a 
feeling expressed by both anganwadi workers and supervisors that if they didn't help 
the groups they were letting down their own communities. The anganwadi workers' 
have the further incentive of awards from the District Magistrate for their 
performance and the opportunity of promotion to post of supervisor. The supervisors 
too, are almost exclusively from the Blocks in which they work, and so were 
(geographically and emotionally) closer to the groups with whom they worked. Whilst 
this structure hasn't changed from previous ICDS schemes, the opportunity to adapt 
the scheme at the local level and increased focus on training of lower levels of 
administration has helped implementers realise their aspirations for the groups. 
Administrative Institutions: 
In defining institutions the analogy between institutions and the 'rules of the game' in 
a competitive sport (represented by the organisation) is a useful starting point (North, 
1990). The institutions affecting bureaucratic cultures include class, caste, gender and 
cultural rules and norms. There is currently little work on how the women within 
given organisations affect, and are affected by, such institutions. Noting this in her 
work on getting institutions right for women, Goetz writes, 
'To explore the question of whether women approach public organisations 
membership differently from men, more still needs to be known about women 
bureaucrats and agents in development organisations ... as long as women 
remain a minority in these contexts, it is very difficult for them to develop any 
potential for performing as advocates in women's interests given the pressure 
to respond to dominant organisational incentives. This underlies the 
importance of strategies for networks to build up internal power and support 
blocks, and to connect to external sources of support' ( 1995: 9, emphasis 
added). 
In the case of IMY, most jobs, and all key posts in UP, are occupied by women. The 
networks to which Goetz refers clearly depend on the development of trust, shared 
values and on personal relationships, key factors in the scheme. The relationships that 
have developed in the organisation make an interesting parallel with the work of 
Kanter ( 1977) who suggests that the development of 'homosociability', in the form of 
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old boy's networks has the capacity to restrict the advancement of women. I would 
argue that IMY provides an example of 'femi-sociability' that provides the 'internal 
power and support blocks' of which Goetz writes. The sheer number of anganwadis 
and supervisors has allowed them to act as a considerable force against local 
politicians and other powerful people (most notably Pradhans) who they felt had, in 
the past, diverted policy and funds to their own ends. The strength at the local level 
has been enhanced by the availability of 'protection' from those women higher up the 
hierarchy, whether that is at the District, State or Central government level. However, 
whether, as in the case of homosociability, this type of institutional development 
actively restricts the advancement of the opposite gender within the department, is a 
moot point. In my experience, the majority of men in the department found the job 
degrading and had no real desire to gain advancement from within. Whether this is 
because of the networks developed within the sector or in spite of them, it difficult to 
assess. 
A key difference between the 'culture' developed by those working in IMY and 
Kanter's observations is that those inside IMY are fighting against the norm. As 
Goetz suggests, women remain very much the minority in the bureaucracy. In 
working with those outside the sheltered and supportive environment of ICDS or 
DOWC, women frequently have to sacrifice their different needs and interests and 
become as Kanter ( 1977) describes, 'sociological males'. At the national level, one 
IAS trainee commented that entering the service demanded greater commitment from 
women than men. She said her choice of profession had narrowed her options for 
marriage. She argued that marriage outside the service was unlikely, as potential 
husbands would feel uneasy about her status, work commitment and the potential of 
being posted away from home (Interview, Iih November 1999). Due to this 
phenomenon, Kaw, (1993), in her book 'bureau-crazy: IAS unmasked,' highlights the 
fact that the majority of female officers marry within the service, known in common 
parlance as 'CBM', cadre based marriage. 
When dealing with other departments Mrs. Hukku frequently changed her language 
and approach, presumably responding to the institutional norms outside her own 
department. This could be described as the abandonment of her different needs and 
interests as a woman, or alternatively it could be argued to represent her skill as a 
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manager to be able to network and interact with a range of actors on their own terms 
(Armour Metcalf, 2000). 
De-bureaucratisation infers cutting 'administration' out of the system, but also an 
attitudinal change of those working within the bureaucratic hierarchy. Attempts to 
reduce the 'bureaucracy' in IMY include narrowing the chain of command (above the 
District level), the circumvention of other departments and the ability of those lower 
down the hierarchy to adapt the programme without higher approval. An attitudinal 
change has also occurred according to those within the scheme, which I interpret as 
having been promoted by incentives such as prestige, and a genuine commitment 
promoted by key individuals within IMY. Furthermore, the development of close 
bonds between the various levels of the hierarchy, described here as 'femi-
sociability', has allowed individuals the confidence to enact change. Women are a 
minority within the Indian bureaucracy and the changes made have been automatic 
nor uncontested, and have involved, at times, considerable sacrifice. Ironically, due to 
the low social and political status of the department, coupled with its minimal access 
to finance, change has been enacted with relatively little political interference. 
5.4.3: Externalisation 
During our discussion, Dr. Tolia spoke of the need for government to act as 'enablers 
and facilitators' in development rather than 'providers' (Interview, 91h June). This is 
characteristic of the promotion of 'contracting out' within the new public 
management discourse in the pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness (although these 
terms are often contradictory, see chapter 1 ). In the IMY handbook (Go I, 1998, p. 6), 
it is suggested that the government officials should act as catalysts for development, 
creating access to credit, and as instruments of awareness generation and 
empowerment. If this occurs in reality, it would support Veron's (1999) argument that 
the government in India has shifted from the broad role of 'provider' to one of 
'supplementary provider' or 'facilitator' in the 1990s. 
'it (the Government) enables, or 'empowers', self-help groups and voluntary 
organisations to strengthen people's opportunities for development' (1999:5). 
He continues, 
'The state defines its role increasingly as supplementary provider of services 
that are not offered by the private sector, voluntary organisations and the 
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community. In line with current World Bank thinking, India's government is 
concentrating its efforts, besides promoting economic growth, on the provision 
of basic education and primary health care because in these areas, private 
initiatives and the market are unlikely to play a significant role ... 
Development responsibility is shared with, and delegated to, other institutions 
such as community groups and the private sector. This also signifies the state's 
changing relationship to these institutions' (Ibid: I 0-12). 
The extensive range of bodies involved in IMY, enable a narrow administrative 
hierarchy in the scheme. External actors include NGOs, anganwadi workers and the 
private sector in the form of Rashtrya Mahila Kosh (RMK). The interaction with 
individuals outside the bureaucracy (as with those within) is, in reality, highly 
selective. RMK is a quasi-governmental body that acts as a business, working through 
a selected NGO in each District (Lok Sebha Ashram in Rae Bareili) to loan money at 
non-subsidised rates to the IMY groups 14. Removing credit facilitation duties from 
government officials is intended to remove opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour 
and allow implementers of IMY to dedicate their time to the core function of 
supporting the SHG groups (Interview, 30th August, head of RMK). 
The relationship with, and attitudes towards, NGOs by government officials are 
diverse and case specific. Although government officials felt some NGOs were 
working well with IMY, the overwhelming opinion was that they were more 
bureaucratic, less innovative and even less accountable than the state institutions. The 
recruitment of NGOs into IMY is a selective and subjective process largely 
determined at the State level, 
'We work closely with CARE, UNICEF, Sabla and a few others, which are 
doing great work. But when I see NGOs that are not primarily socially 
committed I don't want to recommend that they have association with our 
work (Mrs. Hukku, 26th May)'. 
Many government officials thought that whilst potential was offered in some spheres 
by NGOs, the attitude of government officials towards these bodies remains one of 
suspicion. One senior central government official noted, 
'My generation has internalised this idea (mistrust). Now we talk of enterprise 
and the NGOs as animators. But it is not a partnership, it's seen as our 
generosity to let them in' (Interview, 29th August). 
14 For more detail about RMK and its role see chapter 3. 
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Several high profile cases of corruption involving NGOs in Rae Bareli, most notably 
that of B.K. Shukkla, has done nothing for the confidence many government officials 
have in the sector. In the case of Mr. Shukkla, who is currently serving a prison 
sentence for his crime, crores of rupees were embezzled from government funds for 
'development projects', not only causing frustration, but also deep embarrassment for 
the officers who had allowed such large-scale fraud. One supervisor noted that at first, 
an NGO wants to 'earn its bread and butter', but eventually 'need' a Contessa Classic 
(a four-wheel drive prestigious car) (Interview, 17th May). So bad is the reputation of 
NGOs in UP, that the Director of ICDS felt that they actually damaged the reputation 
of the bureaucracy, which, as already discussed, is incredibly low. 
'We are just starting to co-ordinate with the NGOs. Thinking has changed and 
we are trying to involve them. But this is not with an open heart - it is with a 
heavy heart - many officers' view NGOs with suspicion. To be frank, NGOs 
spoil our image. They have not performed well and they are commercialised. 
This has led to their image being dirtied and people have lost faith in them' 
(Interview, 13th June). 
Recurring criticisms of NGOs related to their 'vested interest' nature, their lack of 
accountability. Even where they were not seen to be corrupt, the idea of 'professional 
NGOism' (Interview, 14th August) was seen to be a problem. One of the trainers at 
NPCCD argued that whilst the way in which government works is changing, NGOs 
performance remains static. One reason for this, he said, is that government 
departments now attempt to emulate private sector firms. NPCCD therefore charges 
NGOs attending its training schemes. As a result, the number of NGOs attending has 
fallen to one fifth of what it was at its peak. The corollary, surmised Mr. Mishra, was 
that the majority of NGO workers are now in a similar position to government 
officials who had not been educated in new ways of working (Interview, 18th August). 
Even where NGOs do gain training and have the potential to become innovative, the 
nature of their work in reality relates to their dependency on government for funding. 
Dr. Singh, (Director of Mahila Kalyan Nigam, one of the State level government 
organisations which works with ICDS in IMY) suggested at the local level this can 
mean NGOs are less flexible in their functions than the administration which they 
seek to replace, 
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'Whilst some NGOs are free, most are dependent on government funding. 
This means that the functions they perform and the routes they take are not 
entirely of their own choice, but they are dictated to from above (5th May)'. 
Mr. Mishra at NPCCD argued that, particularly in relation to IMY, the idea of 
contracting out to NGOs is unproductive. He said that, 
'I think sometimes NGOs' are threatened by the true concept of SHGs. If the 
SHGs succeed then it no longer depends on them and the local NGOs rely on 
dependency for their incomes. So in the main they are not supporting them 
properly and so they don't work' (Interview, 18th August) . 
. The primary use of contracted labour in IMY is in the form of anganwadi workers. 
These women are not government officials, but are paid a stipend for their work (as 
such their perceptions of the changing cultures of bureaucracy are considered in 
chapter 6, which looks at 'outsiders'). The UP government is financially constrained 
so the use of this cheap labour source could be perceived as the 'rolling back' of the 
state. However, in IMY these women work in addition to the government officials 
rather than replacing them. It is perhaps this reason that accounts for the lack of 
animosity between the state and non-state employees. Lilly Singh described the role 
of anganwadi workers, 
'They are very important, they provide the point of contact between the state 
and the women and they provide awareness for the rural women - without 
imposing officials coming into their villages. The anganwadi arranges all the 
co-ordination at the local level, they seek opportunities for productive 
ventures. They arrange group meetings at the local level. The scheme really 
couldn't work without them' (Interview, 14th August). 
Whilst decentralisation of power within the realms of the state is one key element in 
IMY, it does not devolve power to local government or Panchayati Raj institutions 
(PRis) (headed by an elected leader or Pradhan). Durgesh Hukku felt that this was 
beneficial as, in her opinion, in UP the PRis represent the perpetuation of unequal 
power relations, dominated by men. Many government officials, including the PRI 
Director at the District level, criticised the ways in which PRis had been introduced in 
Uttar Pradesh. The District Magistrate, Raj Veer Singh, commented, 
'They seem to have taken the case of West Bengal where this system is 
apparently working well and decided to transplant it here. Over the years we 
have learnt that a policy that works in one area won't necessarily work in 
another, but yet this is exactly what they have done in this case ... the better 
answer is SHGs. Whatever the people want should come from the people' 
(Interview, gth August). 
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The newest IAS officer in the District Mr. Shahu, said he could see the potential 
benefit offered by decentralisation, but felt that this potential was not realised in Uttar 
Pradesh. 
'Local forms of governance are not well developed in UP. Whilst it is fine to 
say that all the people need to decide what they need and who needs it this is 
not the reality at the grass roots level. The idea of a Panchayat is they make 
collective decisions and these decisions reflect the aspirations of the villagers. 
But in reality this is not happening. The Pradhan once he is given authority 
has started behaving in an autocratic manner and does not consult the Gram 
Panchayat (GP) members in the decision making process. In reality, after 
reaching the Pradhan, true decentralisation is finished. Each person is not 
given their rights. The Pradhan offers his personal opinion, often for his 
personal benefit. Perhaps the situation would be better if there was an 
awareness among the people, then only can this process be more effective. But 
with the ignorance that prevails, the Pradhan is getting the whole deal' 
(Interview, 4th August). 
Whilst there has been some contracting out in IMY, particularly to key NGOs, the 
shift has not met with popular approval. In Rae Bareli, resistance to moves away from 
state provision towards facilitation, were seen to relate to two main factors. First, 
Uttar Pradesh is at the centre of what has been termed the 'Hindi-Belt', synonymous 
with low levels of literacy and human development. Interviewees, at the District level 
in particular, highlighted the persistence of what has been termed 'Ma Bap Sarkar15 
culture'. Literally translated this means 'government is mother and father', and 
perpetuates the idea of state as unconditional provider to the people 16. Tolia noted 
that, 'there are now certain things that government can not and should not do and 
giving hand-outs is one of them' (Interview, gth June). Supervisors, particularly in the 
more remote areas of Blocks, noted that whilst the idea of facilitation to help people 
help themselves and participate in development projects stands in theory, in many 
parts of UP it is not a feasible approach, particularly in areas of high illiteracy. One 
supervisor in Salon Block explained what happened when she asked a group how they 
would like to help themselves, 
'When the groups are illiterate and want to focus first on economic activity it 
doesn't work. I go to them and say what do you want to do. I say, 'it's up to 
you - you could buy a goat', they say 'OK, we want to buy a goat'. That's 
what we'll do!' (Interview, lOth Aug). 
15 This is also frequently spelt Sarkar Mai Baap 
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Whilst the Ma Bap Sarkar is largely criticised by a financially constrained state, those 
working within IMY saw the scheme as a half-way house between total provision and 
facilitation. Instead of focusing on economic development, IMY aims to help women 
gain access to welfare resources and help them demand their rights of the state and 
their communities. In this sense, externalisation through IMY acts as a support, rather 
than an alternative, to state assistance. 
The second factor District (and State) level officials believed restricted their role as 
facilitators was political interference. This factor, common in UP, is particularly the 
case in Amethi and Rae Bareli as they are such politically significant constituencies. 
A case that illustrated this, was that of Sonia Gandhi and her daughter Priyanka, who 
visited the District and handed out sari material to women during the run up to the 
State elections in 1999. This frustrated several government officials, who said such 
actions were promoting a 'dependency culture' among the people and conflicted with 
the idea of self-help promoted through IMY. 
'Politics interferes with interaction. I wouldn't say it was corruption as such, 
but the influential people and local politicians want to give money away to an 
area in which they are fighting their election. This causes disparities and 
makes people expect handouts. The politicians are the worst - like Sonia 
Gandhi turning up and giving sari material to the crowds. It creates a 'begging 
culture' and isn't what our aim is. If they would stay out of it everything 
would be much better' (Interview, May, 261h). 
Jenkins, in his analysis of moves towards liberalisation in India, argues that politicians 
actively sought liberalisation, they did not simply respond to the shock of financial 
crisis by initiating change. However, Corbridge and Harriss (2002) argue that there is 
a more 'Marxian' interpretation of reforms than Jenkins allows. This, they contest, 
has led to liberalisation being unstable, partial and even violent. The case of NPM in 
UP (as the administrative equivalent to economic liberalisation) would appear to 
parallel the arguments made by Corbridge and Harriss. 
In the case of IMY, whilst there is general support for some elements of NPM, other 
aspects of the discourse have been resisted. Government officials are encouraging 
greater interaction with other organisations for development provision, and the 
reduction of bureau-pathologies, including excessive hierarchy and delays. At the 
16 This issue is discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
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same time, government administrators on the scheme do not support the unequivocal 
shift to contracting out and privatisation. This idea does not emanate from individuals 
desire to protect their own position, although this is inevitably a factor, but rather 
those within the scheme feel a commitment, as state employees, to some form of 
welfare provision. The extent to which government officials have been able to adopt 
and adapt NPM in the case of IMY, would suggest that the hegemony of the western 
discourse is far from complete. This is an area of debate to which I return in chapter 7. 
5.4: Targets, Accountability and Monitoring: 
Targets clearly put pressure on government officials to fulfil quantitative criteria, 
removing their ability to focus on qualitative aspects of change. Ramanchandran 
found, in her discussion with DWCRA officials, that this led to hasty formation of 
groups with the main focus on economic, rather than social components of the 
programme. Furthermore, a review of the programme in Rajasthan noted that, 'The 
implementation of the programme is restricted to accomplishment of targets without 
concern for actual results' (PRADAN, p. 22). Not only is the structure of the IMY 
programme flexible, with high degrees of autonomy given to lower layers, but the 
obsession with 'audit' and 'report' culture to which Mawdsley et al. (2002) have 
referred in relation to NGOs is notable for its absence in the scheme. Those 
government officials involved in IMY noted that the lack of fixed targets and limited 
bureaucratic monitoring has lead to both positive and negative outcomes. Within this 
section, therefore, I discuss the ways in which IMY is measured, monitored and made 
accountable and the implications of each. 
5.5.1: Targets 
In my experience, IMY was the only government programme based around self-help 
groups in Rae Bareli, which didn't have enforced quotas for group formation. In other 
departments, where quotas exist, the long-term quality of groups and projects was 
questioned, 
'LDC (Land Development Corporation) groups are working without adequate 
groundwork. In this situation, what they are creating is non-functional infant 
groups. They are given a quota to form groups and if they demand by a certain 
date there should be I 00 groups then there will be, on paper at least. But after 
a month or two these will collapse' (S. A. Khan, NPCCD, I ih August). 
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The pressure placed on other departments to form groups was seen however to impact 
on IMY making the job of supervisors more difficult. Muni Singh Chauhan 
(originally from, and now supervisor in, Maharajgang Block) is the head of the 
Supervisors Association and was previously a policewoman. She said that although 
she has a good rapport with the people in her Block, the job is still a difficult one. 
'Self-help groups are the flavour of the month and there's been a 'scramble for 
groups'. It confuses the women as to which group to join. It costs both time 
and effort to take part in IMY so they were enticed by short-term handout 
schemes. There is a mixed message being sent to the people in villages. No 
wonder it takes a long time (Interview, 11th of August)'. 
In the initial formulation of the IMY scheme, the areas in which it was to take place 
were decided at the national level based on social and economic criteria. However, 
within the Districts in which it operates, there are no determinants of who can join an 
IMY group, based on class, caste or income categorisations. There are no set targets 
for numbers of groups to be formed, or the timing for stages of development. 
Supervisors said they could afford to take the time to encourage groups which 
required more 'ground-work' and encouragement, rather than have to search for the 
'easy targets' to fill quotas (Interview, l41h May). 
Supervisors in the Tiloi District found that task particularly difficult, as the area is 
remote and people predominantly illiterate. In these cases, supervisors said family 
members were not supportive and group formation tended to take a great deal of 
effort, 
'When I first approached the group they were very annoyed and they wouldn't 
even talk to me. It has taken a lot of hard work to get them this far and they are 
still in the early stages but it has been great to see the changes already. It took 
a long time for them to come to this stage. First they gave me 15 minutes time, 
then half an hour and so on until I could convince them that they would 
benefit from the scheme if they gave it a chance' (Interview, 1 01h May). 
Supervisors felt it was the embedded nature of their relationship with the groups, 
facilitated through lack of targets, that made IMY a success. In Salon, one supervisor 
explained; 
'In this area the women all work in the fields. They earn Rs.30 a day. They 
have so little they find it hard to save, and they are scared to put their money 
in a scheme- they feel safer to hold (wear) it.. .. I try to tell them, 'if you save 
Rs.1 a day you can save Rs.l 0 in 10 days and it will benefit you'. They said to 
me, 'why should we believe you, you are rich', sometimes they are abusive to 
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me. I speak to them in their own words (colloquial language), 'I am from the 
village too' I try to motivate them with their own understanding, sometimes it 
is successful, always it is a long process (Interview, 101h May). 
As the majority of supervisors and all the anganwadi workers live in the Block in 
which they work, the relationships built up were not in the main ones of bureaucrat/ 
beneficiary, but of friendship and support Through the gradual development of trust 
between the officials and groups, the beneficiaries' faith in the possibilities offered by 
the scheme were enhanced. Such relationships were immediately obvious through the 
way in which many supervisors walked into anganwadi's houses and, for example, 
helped women making tea or helped with their children. They talked about village 
issues, who was getting married and how their children were, rather than just 
checking the administrative issues of the groups. 
Supervisors felt that IMY worked better than self-help groups in different schemes for 
a number of crucial reasons. First, supervisors are employed to work at the Block 
level, they know from the outset that this is what their job entails. In comparison they 
felt officers in other departments who had not been recruited for the purpose of 
working in the Blocks did not want to, nor were they able to work as effectively in 
these areas. The Social Welfare department was offered by supervisors as an example 
of a department whose staff did not have sufficient time available to develop 
sustainable groups. 
As there are no targets for the rate of progress of groups once formed, IMY 
functioning varies considerably in different localities. The pressure to promote 
economic ventures is not paramount in IMY and many SHGs focus predominantly, 
often exclusively, on social development, particularly in the early stages of group 
development Supervisors also used their autonomy to take on tasks outside their 
usual realm. Examples of such new roles included the 'ne dana ne !ana' (don't take 
don't give) UNICEF sponsored anti-dowry scheme, an adult literacy programme, and 
the government sponsored 'School Chalo!' (Go to school) scheme to encourage 
children to attend school. The flexibility of the scheme meant that, in reality, 
supervisors sometimes worked in a way contrary to government policy. For example, 
whilst all of the supervisors (and the majority of women in SHGs) spoke about the 
promotion of the anti-dowry message, the grass roots reality in villages means that 
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dowry is unlikely to be eliminated in the short-run. In several cases, SHGs that had 
begun economic ventures gifted items they produced to poor or orphaned girls to act 
as dowry payments. Supervisors acknowledged that morally they were opposed to the 
practice, but that education and change in practice was not going to happen over night 
and that without dowry, these women would be destitute. 
Supervisors often acted outside their traditional roles within the scheme. During one 
visit to Unchahar, members from the 'Mother Theresa,t 7 samu (group) came to the 
supervisor's office. The house in which the Mother Theresa Group did their work 
(they did some chikkan embroidery work as part of IMY) had been burgled, and 
equipment stolen. They had come to see their supervisor, Meena, before going to the 
police so she could accompany them and fill in the police report. She said it was not 
unusual for people to come to her for such things as the women didn't feel confident 
with 'officials' and she could speak on their behalf. The women clearly didn't see her 
as part of the 'establishment' of which they were uneas/ 8. Public choice theorists, 
however, would suggest that such flexibility would merely extend the opportunities 
for patronage and reduce accountability within the system. Whilst observations made 
by government officials were in contrast with traditional perceptions of bureaucrats as 
'self-seekers', inevitably interviewees were unlikely to describe themselves in a 
negative light. However, having spent a considerable amount of time with the various 
individuals involved in the scheme I would suggest that, whilst there are obvious 
exceptions, the majority are genuinely utilising the scheme's flexibility to benefit the 
groups and furthermore, have even taken on extra tasks. Furthermore, the fact that 
relations are so close between group members and supervisors that downward 
accountability is reinforced. 
The case of IMY shifts away from what Fineman (1993: 9) terms the 'rule bound 
obsession' of many bureaucracies. He argues this has reinforced the negative, and 
unproductive view of people in organisations as 'emotionally anorexic'. Rather, IMY 
sits more comfortably with Gabriel' s ( 1998) thesis that emotions such as commitment, 
trust, caring, enthusiasm, pride and even fun are more important for organisational 
17 Each of the groups chose their own name. Groups frequently named their groups after Hindu deities, famous 
tigures or after their anganwadi worker. 
IX This argument is developed in chapter 6, which discusses 'outsiders" perceptions of the bureaucracy. 
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success than structure and hierarchy. He draws a distinction between managers who 
promote efficiency through deals and an eye for detail, and leaders who stir emotion, 
provide vision and generate commitment. 
Officials at all levels felt more able to extend help to SHGs, as they were not under 
pressure to meet targets. They argued this changed the way in which they responded 
to groups and in turn what the groups achieved. Whilst I do not intend to assess the 
effectiveness of IMY, supervisors suggested that the effects of moving from a 'box 
ticking' (Interview, 16th August), to a flexible and responsive approach, made their 
job more fulfilling. At a meeting with one of the supervisors in Unchahar Block it was 
commented, 
'It is a gradual process. They are gaining literacy, they are gaining knowledge 
and they are becoming aware of their rights - more powerful. They are coming 
out of their homes, which is a hugely empowering thing, they are going to the 
banks and they are having their say' (Interview, 9th July). 
Because there are no quantitative targets, supervisors are more able to concentrate on 
any aspect that may assist the holistic empowerment of women. Mrs. Hukku offered 
another example, 
'There was one school where the male teacher was misbehaving with young 
girls. The parents didn't know what to do so they took their daughters out of 
school. When the group heard about it they went straight to the District 
Inspector, and the teacher was suspended. How are you supposed to measure 
this?' (Interview, gth May 2000). 
It could be suggested that the lack of targets in IMY mean the wrong groups are 
favoured in order to assist kith and kin. However, this very problem has been noted in 
schemes which do have targets. Evaluations of IRDP (Integrated Rural Development 
Programme) in India note widespread errors in targeting; of exclusion (of eligible 
beneficiaries) as well as inclusion (of ineligible ones). While estimates of errors vary 
between States and sources, summaries suggest leakages of around 15 - 20% to 
ineligible beneficiaries (Rath, 1985; Bagachi 1995). According to Dreze, (1990) IRDP 
has tended to reach the relatively better off within the poor at the expense of women 
and landless. He highlights the top down identification of beneficiaries and target 
driven structures as contributing to failures in the work of the bureaucracy (Dreze, 
1990). The numerous criticisms of the IRDP have fed into it restructuring, in April 
1999, as the Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY). Several key changes in 
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Not only was this felt to waste too much valuable time, but some supervisors felt that 
they should visit a certain number of groups each day, which in many cases was 
logistically impossible, so filled in their reports saying they had done this. Thus, 
although there are no set quotas, Durba Banerjee, one supervisor from Maharjganj 
expressed exactly this problem when problem when we were late in arriving to meet 
her, 
'The whole process is fake. Like today I was worrying that you might not 
come, and today I have to visit certain villages, so if I had to sit here all day I 
would have to make fake entries that I have been there' (Interview, 11th 
August). 
The lack of transport was the cause of further frustration, particularly when 
supervisors saw government officials, based in Rae Bareli, who didn't leave the office 
but had a Jeep permanently parked outside. The situation in Unchahar Block was even 
more ludicrous in that they employed a full time driver19, but their Jeep had not been 
road-worthy in years. 
Lack of technical resources further restricted the ability to monitor the scheme. From 
the State level, Durgesh Hukku could not easily communicate with the Districts, and 
had to call them to Lucknow for meetings when required. Within Rae Bareli power 
failure was a constant problem, and the lack of telecommunications meant that it was 
not possible for Lilly to stay in regular touch with supervisors. Mrs. Hukku noted 
further, that the lack of computers not only made the compilation of information about 
the scheme long-winded and laborious, but that statistical analysis of the performance 
of the project was impossible. 
'There are certain important things that still restrict us acting as efficiently as 
we would like. The weakest point, despite changes, is still monitoring. This is 
a priority, which should be strengthened. The field level workers make 
detailed reports about what is happening in the field. These reports are 
organised by the PO and sent to me. I get them, and all the information is 
manually filed. There are reams of information, but when I want to access 
something specific to look at the way things are changing or which areas are 
doing what it is very difficult. If we had a computer it would be much easier to 
analyse these things. If everything is done by register manually is it difficult to 
manipulate the figures for the most benefit (Interview, 261h May)'. 
19 Because of restrictive employment laws the driver remained employed. 
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5.4.3: Accountability 
According to Durgesh Hukku, despite the low levels of monitoring, there was still 
pressure for accountability within the scheme, albeit from the non-governmental 
sources. 
'There are only a few people involved in the scheme in Delhi, the information 
is given to me and the only monitoring which goes on is that which we do 
ourselves. This project is not accountable through strict monitoring. However, 
as the groups develop, they act as a check on the work that we are doing and if 
there is something they feel is not being provided at the field level, they 
approach the problem through those higher up' (Interview, 26th May). 
In the past, however, the lack of accountability at the highest levels was a problem. 
This also caused problems for the IMY programme, as there was a lack of trust of the 
government from women who had been let down by a previous government 
programme. 
'The lack of accountability within schemes made it very difficult for us to start 
this programme. This was a major drawback. Several years ago a programme 
called Mahila Yojana was sanctioned to increase the savings of women in the 
rural areas, so they would have access to money for their essentials. In order to 
promote the scheme, ICDS was used. We made the contacts with the women 
and told them of the benefits of the programme and encouraged them to save, 
as they were offered favourable levels of interest... Once the scheme had been 
under way for two years and we had built up the trust of the women and they 
were saving nicely, the scheme was abruptly cut and we were not told why or 
given notice. Because the scheme was cut the women who's money had been 
deposited in the post office became stuck and it was a very difficult process 
for them to get at their own money' (Interview, 26th June). 
This scheme was not adapted or sanctioned at the State level, unlike IMY, which can 
take different forms in the different States, Districts and even villages. Mr. Saxena, 
(Director of ICDS, UP), said that if government officials feel they are responsible for 
the scheme then they are more accountable and also have more desire for it to work, 
'If we formulate policy then we are fully accountable for it, we are also 
inclined to want it to succeed. If it is from Delhi, whilst I may be officially 
accountable for the policy, what happens is that there is no association, we just 
do what we have to do, lip service if you will. There is no personal touch or 
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involvement. Association should be from the beginning therefore at all levels' 
(Interview, 191h June). 
Mr. Saxena supported the move away from constant reports and evaluations. He 
admitted that, in the past, fake data had been created at the field level and been 
processed by him (knowing it was fake) to protect his, and field level officers 
positions. 
'When projects are framed in Delhi by central government on whatever 
criteria, then they ask the people at the field level to implement it is difficult as 
policy often has no bearing on ground realities. Sometimes we get a scheme 
that cannot be implemented. Those at the field level have to protect their 
position and create fake data at the field level. We process it knowing it is fake 
and send it to the central level. This has to be done to survive. So I think those 
who formulate should be those who know what is needed and not needed and 
what is possible and not possible' (Interview, 19th June.). 
Apart from the internal reports, there is no structured monitoring of the IMY scheme. 
Though this lack of monitoring does not fit with public choice conceptions of NPM, 
recently research has suggested that with the focus on constant evaluation, rather than 
the promise of streamlined, efficient services, the reverse is occurring (Cochrane, 
1993, Stewart, 1998). Such criticisms were supported at the highest level in IMY, as 
Sarojini Thakur20 criticised what she saw as the obsession with 'report culture' 
affecting the real work of the state. 
Some individuals did, however, use the low levels of monitoring and accountability to 
their personal advantage. Though several cases were highlighted, the example of Uma 
Shukkla in Singhpur illustrates the point. We had arranged to meet Ms. Shukkla at 
Singhpur Block headquarters at ten o'clock in the morning, but she didn't arrive. 
Other officials informed me that she had gone to Rae Bareli to attend a meeting. 
However, when we arrived back in Rae Bareli that evening, she had apparently said 
she was busy in the District and couldn't attend the meeting. Although I did not get 
the opportunity to question her about this, others who knew her said that it was 
probable that she had no intention of doing either. 
Mr. Khan (NPCCD) describes some of the more serious c~ses of officers not living in 
the Districts, 
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changes in the way that they worked were occurring through the adoption of new 
working practices. The key elements in the promotion of change are, training for 
individuals at all levels, a more 'circular' and flexible approach to development 
practice, and the empowerment of lower level officers. The hierarchy of IMY, 
although officially working with other government bodies, does so, in reality, only 
selectively at the State and District levels. Through selection by key officers involved 
in the project, association and co-ordination with other departments, and non-
government organisation, was enacted on a sporadic and partial basis. 
The evidence that I have gathered on IMY contrasts with that of Schug (2000). He 
argues that the unbending hierarchical structure of forest administration (in the Joint 
Forest Management programme in India), in which there is little downward delegation 
of authority or upward flow of information remains largely unchanged. He argues that 
to deny lower rank forest officers responsibility and initiative, not to mention 
adequate pay and training, is counterproductive in a programme that requires close 
and continuous interaction between field staff and village representatives. 'Until 
senior officials learn to listen to their juniors,' noted one commentator, 'they will not 
be able to listen to villagers' (Campbell 1992:42). 
As I have argued, in the case of IMY there has been structural change but also a 
fundamental change in process affected the work of the bureaucracy. Structural 
changes have not been imposed from outside, they have been the result of negotiated 
change from within, which in turn has led to a change in working culture within the 
bureaucracy. This change has not been unequivocally accepted by all within the 
administration. As a result, whilst some have enacted change through a combination 
of consent and coercion, others, seen as 'corrupting influences', have been 
circumvented by key individuals in the scheme. Though the traditional perceptions of 
the bureaucracy in India suggest that individuals work within a vested-interest model, 
this was not seen to be the case in IMY, where officers actually took on extra tasks 
and showed a 'culture of commitment' in the implementation of the scheme. The 
flexibility of the scheme does, of course, raise certain questions about accountability, 
which, in a minority of cases, was exploited by unscrupulous individuals. However, in 
the vast majority of cases 'empowerment' of lower level functionaries, backed by 
'change agents' (in the form of key individuals) and the development of 'femi-
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sociability' appears to have significantly changed the culture of administration within 
IMY. 
Furthermore, the case of IMY shows that change along NPM lines, although partial 
and contested, can be both empowering and enabling to government officials at every 
level of the administrative hierarchy. This, I would suggest, relates to the elements of 
new public management that have been adopted. 'Externalisation', for example, has 
been encouraged, but in addition to, rather than instead of state provision. I would 
also suggest that government officials, in the majority, feel that elements of NPM, 
·namely 'localisation' and 'de-bureaucratisation', can be useful in attempting to 
combat both poverty and social exclusion in the case of IMY. 
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'CHAPTER SIX: OUTSIDER PERCEPTIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC 
CHANGE 
6.1: Introduction: 
In chapter 5, I analysed how those government officials working inside the IMY 
scheme, regarded, and had experienced change, associated with new public 
management (NPM). Interviewees argued that changes had been facilitated through 
training, the structure of the scheme, and the nature of accountability and monitoring 
within the scheme. Chapter 5 showed that there was an identifiable cultural shift 
within this section of the bureaucracy, which was generally perceived as positive, 
from an internal perspective. 
In this chapter, I seek to build on these, and other insights, through detailed analysis 
of outsider perceptions of bureaucratic change. Contributors include academics, 
anganwadi (village level) workers, NGO workers and employees of Rashtrya Mahila 
Kosht (RMK), the funding body associated with IMY. Kabeer and Subrahmanian 
( 1999) suggests that whilst 'agency indicators' are important, they are, on their own, 
insufficient to provide a realistic picture of the culture of any institution. They 
contend that 'outsider indicators', from individuals who have gained wide acceptance 
in a particular field of development, and 'beneficiary indicators', that express the 
opinions of those who are intended to gain from the work, are a fundamental part of 
research into institutions. NPM encourages the involvement of other actors in the 
processes of de-bureaucratisation, localisation and externalisation. The perceptions of 
these other actors regarding bureaucratic cultures are particularly important, therefore, 
in defining the nature of interaction between government officials and outsiders. 
Furthermore, as the overwhelming aim of the civil service in development is to 
support and benefit a country's population - in this case poor women in particular- it 
is important to understand how those individuals perceive cultural change within the 
bureaucracy. 
General attitudes towards the bureaucracy, already discussed in chapter 2, provides a 
contextual framework for the discussion of IMY in this chapter. Unfortunately, given 
constraints of space, only a small part of the evidence gained during the extensive 
exercise of interviews, focus groups and participant observation can be explored in 
this section. When questions relating to cultures of the bureaucracy were asked, 
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examples of bureaucratic corruption (for example involving the deferral of 
computerisation of land records or collusion with Prandhans in accessing 
development funding), failures m development projects, and bureaucratic 
authoritarianism and inertia more generally, were given. However, it is the 
perceptions of outsiders regarding the bureaucratic culture within IMY that takes 
precedence in the chapter. Here, I rely heavily on direct quotes from the interviews, 
focus groups and discussions undertaken. As I lived with academics and bureaucrats 
for a substantial part of my fieldwork, participant observation also provides important 
understanding for this study. All the examples have been carefully selected, and are, 
in the main, representative of my broader findings on the respective issues - I have 
indicated unusual instances presented below. 
Whilst justification for, and understanding of, change varied considerably, outsiders 
attested to a cultural change in the actions of those government officials involved in 
IMY. A dominant feature in outsiders' observations was the high visibility and 
involvement of women in the programme. Both individually, and as a community, 
women are firmly positioned within the ideological and organisational mainstream of 
the IMY project, and its ethos for change. In particular, key women were seen to play 
a vital part in the promotion of a 'can do' culture and the development of trust 
between the various individuals involved in the programme. Bureaucratic change was 
variously described as a result of facilitation, partnership or familial approaches. 
In relation to how change relates to factors promoted through NPM, a clear distinction 
was drawn, by interviewees, between what they saw as positive and negative elements 
of the discourse. Positive endorsement was offered for aspects relating to 
empowerment (of government officials and those working with them), a focus on 
missions rather than rules, as well as decentralisation and facilitation. However, the 
same support was not given for elements of NPM that have been influenced by public 
choice theory, including contracting-out, down-sizing, and what was interpreted as 
excessive externalisation. 
This chapter does not provide a representative survey of administrative cultures in 
India. In fact, those government officials working in IMY were characterised by 
outsiders as working in a way rather different to 'standard' vested-interest perceptions 
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of bureaucratic functioning. Clearly, as Fox argues, state organisations are, 'composed 
of a range of actors with different interests, who struggle to control agency, to 
determine its goals, and to decide how to pursue them' ( 1993: 10). Opinions expressed 
by outsiders clearly related to the personality of the individuals with whom they 
worked. Responses also tended to correlate to the nature of interaction between the 
individual and the IMY scheme. In short, the closer the involvement with IMY, the 
more positive the outsider tended to be about change in bureaucratic culture. 
The bureaucracy is clearly not a single unitary actor, nor entirely part of the 
'dominant proprietary classes' of which Bardhan has written (1989). Whilst high 
ranking officers, particularly at the national level are part of, and have access to, 
political and administrative power structures, this is less true at lower levels. Whilst 
NGO workers and academics at the national level considered the higher ranking 
government officials to be capable of, and willing to change, they had little faith in 
this rationale being translated to the lower levels of the hierarchy. Outsiders, 
interviewed at the sub-national level, however, did testify to considerable change 
lower down the administrative heirarchy, precisely because individuals were not part 
of what was perceived as an authoritarian elite. 
The state/society division, more prevalent at higher levels of the administration, was 
described at the grass roots level to be more blurred. This was particularly notable in 
the reactions of members of the IMY groups themselves. These women often held that 
the 'state' had failed them, but it was clear in interview that they did not consider 
those government officials with whom they worked in IMY to be part of 'the state' of 
which they complained. 
Opinions varied considerably between those outsiders working at different 
geographical scales, in different occupations, and even between individuals within the 
same organisation. However, considerable overlap in understanding and experience 
was evidenced in the views of academics and NGOs. These individuals primarily 
spoke the same language (English), had similar educational backgrounds and 
understandings of the nature and influence of western discourses on development 
policy on India. Likewise, anganwadi workers and SHG members had similar social, 
cultural and economic backgrounds, and held broadly corresponding opinions about 
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the role and nature of the bureaucracy. The dichotomy of opinions and understandings 
that exists between these groups exemplifies the elite and vernacular discourses 
emphasised by Kaviraj ( 1991 ), amongst others. This chapter is divided into two major 
sections, on the basis of this observation. In the first section, I discuss bureaucratic 
change as perceived by the outside elite at various administrative levels. The second 
part draws on the experiences and understandings of bureaucratic change, as 
described by vernacular contributors, namely anganwadi workers and IMY group 
members. 
6.2: Elite Perceptions of Bureaucratic Change 
6.2.1: National Level 
At the national level, 7 academics and 4 NGO employees, as well as the Director of 
RMK, the funding body associated with IMY, were interviewed. Academics had 
varying degrees of knowledge regarding IMY. Whilst the DflD, CARE and RMK 
representatives all had direct working knowledge of the scheme, only two of the 
interviewees at the national level had seen the programme in action in UP. Therefore, 
opinions expressed by these individuals, whilst relating to the Indian bureaucracy, and 
to IMY where possible, are not primarily case specific regarding change in Uttar 
Pradesh. 
In Delhi, NGO workers and academics predominantly viewed high-ranking national 
level bureaucrats as part of the elite, but how they understood the nature of this elite 
contrasted significantly between interviewees. In some circumstances, individuals 
interpreted the situation as offering opportunity for collusion with politicians in the 
'vested interest' model. Others described the knowledge and power of this group as 
enabling substantial and sustained positive change. Where positive change was 
highlighted, it was described as having developed through the creation of closer 
relationships with outside agencies and a change of approach to development. The 
overriding factor in this shift was described as the influence of 'role models' in 
promoting and sustaining change. 
Interviewees almost exclusively differentiated between those individuals working at 
the higher bureaucratic levels, the IAS and PCS, and those at the lower levels. They 
argued that those at the highest levels were particularly powerful, and had the ability 
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to make significant decisions, both positive and negative. These interviewees, 
however, had very little faith in the possibilities of significant positive bureaucratic 
change at the local level, as they felt both the desire and ability to change were 
negated by other social, economic and political factors. 
Mr. Shurma, Director of the Indian NGO, Development Alternatives, was himself an 
ex-IAS officer. Having no direct involvement with the IMY scheme, his views 
epitomised the populist opinion of the bureaucracy in the 'vested interest' model of 
administration. He felt that the elitist, self-serving nature of the administration was 
unlikely to change. He suggested that new recruits are enrolled into long standing, 
authoritarian and corrupt ways of working, 
'The bureaucracy as it stands is a major problem- it's exploitative, 
institutionally corrupt, and political. .. it's elitist. It takes on young 
professionals, who, from the start they know they can do what they want. It 
creates an exclusive club, which is truly undemocratic' (Interview, 26th May). 
Attitudes towards the bureaucracy in general continue to perceive the organisation as 
one that negates change. Kamal Nayan Kabra, professor at the Indian Institute of 
Public Administration (IIPA), has worked for over 30 years on the nature of 
administration in India, and is well renowned for his work on the 'black economy' 
(1982). Professor Kabra argued in line with current literature (outlined in chapter 2), 
that institutional constraints placed on central government officials mean that it is 
difficult for an individual to bring about change within the system. 
'It's not that new recruits are the victims and those already recruited the 
perpetrators. Those joining have idealism and enthusiasm... It is just that 
through their experiences, these ideals usually fall by the wayside... Within 
the existing system there are restrictions on change. Some people have 
romantic ideas of change, which are simply not possible in the short-term. 
Even honest implementation of not so well designed policy will achieve little. 
In reality they have minimal capability to intervene in the social space. So the 
amount of blame that can be placed on the bureaucracy is not complete 
(Interview, 21st June)'. 
He also saw the bureaucracy at the sub-national level as a political tool, not powerful 
enough to independently change. For Kabra, the public administration represents 
nothing more than, 'the whistle in the kettle' of broader problems. 
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'There is a saying that administration is meant for administrators. They are 
kept in an ugly and unbecoming level of luxury. They are parasitic .... Another 
problem [preventing change] is that landowners are the power structures. They 
represent the 'creamy layer' - from them comes the power, mafia, and criminal 
seams. In UP you see this in the elections, and the farce of power. This is the 
ground reality. It is these people who are managing development so that the 
cream of the society are integrated in the global economy and the rest are left 
behind. It is north centrist development. Bureaucracy cannot control this. I see 
them more as part of the perpetuation of mal-development' (Interview, 21 51 
June). 
These types of opinions can be contrasted with those of individuals who work directly 
with officers involved in IMY at the national level. These include Mr. Sachdev, 
Director of RMK. He argued that there has been a cultural shift by those working in 
public administration, suggesting that government officials have now become more 
flexible, open and receptive to outsiders' ideas. In his work with IMY, he suggests, 
'Now if I want to speak to Mr. Tiwari or Mrs. Thakur I can just pick up the 
phone. It's not a case of having to go through twenty people. They always 
make time, and expect the same in return. Suggestions we make are now being 
taken on board. There are certainly fewer blockages. From what I've seen, the 
same is even happening at the State level' (Interview 151 September). 
He viewed the example set at the highest level as fundamental in encouraging (or 
resisting) broader bureaucratic change. 
'Whilst the bureaucracy has to be responsive to the village, change has to 
come from the highest level [the elite] ... It's only through setting an example 
that those lower down [the bureaucratic hierarchy] will ever have faith in the 
system. So often, there is a lack of trust in [and between] departments. But 
with more interaction at every level, this will change' (Interview, 151 
September). 
Mrs. Thakur is clearly part of the elite of which Mr. Sachdev speaks. She, in 
particular, has been a driving force in the design, promotion, and change incorporated 
through IMY. When I first met her, she had been attending an International 
Conference in Women and Development in Delhi, and noted her constant struggle to 
keep the issue of gender and development at the forefront of the minds of those 
working in international development and policy formulation. She acknowledged the 
difficulties of working in her department, but described the considerable 
achievements that can be made (see chapter 5). For Sachdev, this kind of 'leadership' 
was essential for a broader change in mind-set. This explanation supports Tolia's 
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assertion that the administration needs 'change agents' who pursue their goals through 
'vision crafting'. 
Others involved in IMY, including DflD and CARE representatives, drew similar 
conclusions regarding the essential role of key figures in the hierarchy. However, few 
at the national level had faith in the lower levels of the bureaucracy to translate 
change into reality, at the implementation stage. A senior DflD employee, argued that 
conscious change is occurring from within the Indian bureaucracy. He contended, 
because change is being enacted 'within existing power structures', policy will be 
diluted and distorted by the time it reaches implementation. Further, he argued that 
without change lower down, innovation at higher levels is largely futile, 
'The IAS is different. Their vision has shifted to a focus on performance, but 
this is not some new egalitarianism, it is due to fiscal crisis. The fiscal reforms 
were from the basis of what the state wanted, so this 'forced on from above' is 
rubbish - although this is not to say that I support the Bank. The problem is 
they [higher authorities] cannot communicate the change to lower levels. The 
bureaucracy are still too inward looking. If you look outside the key NGOs, 
the bureaucracy and the groups themselves - no-one will have heard about 
IMY. The point is that they have failed to generate consensus. Without this it's 
just a scheme- rather than part of a new ideology' (Interview, 261h August). 
Those who observed change at the national level argued that, in part, this related to a 
change in relationship between state and outside agencies in IMY. The World Bank 
has encouraged the targeting of the most vulnerable affected by liberalisation 
particularly through the use of NGOs (Desai, 2002). NGOs are generally promoted to 
deliver public services through grants from donors and governments (Robinson, 
1997). Edwards and Hulme ( 1997) have suggested an increase in the number of 
NGOs associated with this change in agenda, and that they have become a dominant 
force in development. 
Whilst NPM literature suggests that cooperation and coordination can be achieved 
with other organisations to promote development, at the national level academic 
interviewees were largely sceptical in this regard. Ratna Sudarshan, senior economist 
at the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), suggests rather, 
that the state has always responded to 'dominant others', whether this be politicians or 
other dominant elites. She argued, rather than state agents acknowledging the valuable 
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contribution offered by outside organisations, the relationship between the two is 
forced. Sudarshan argues, coordination with NGOs relates to the relative strength of 
the NGO sector and that such co-operative relationships are 'forced-marriages' 
(Mawdsley, 2002) rather than open acceptance. She offers the example, 
'Planning Commission meetings now have NGOs on them, this never 
happened in the past. But to surmise from this that the state has changed 
would be wrong. It is the NGO institutions that have changed their position. 
There has always been a framework of powerful people attending these 
meetings ... It is just now that the people who are influential have changed. The 
shift to NGOs took place in the 1980s - it is not a change in policy but a 
change in outputs. The NGOs are increasingly linked with donors and funded 
by them. What is more important is how this affects the environment in which 
the state works, rather than how the state has changed the environment' 
(Interview, 25th May). 
Mark Robinson, at the Ford Foundation, argues that in the majority of cases the 
'donor recipient' (Brehm, 200 I) is more the reality of the working relationship 
between government and NGOs. He suggests that 'the idea that NGOs are partners is 
debatable. Coerced provision, or acting as contractors is more often the case' 
(Interview, 27th May). 
Despite their strong opinions neither Sudarshan nor Robinson had direct experience 
with the IMY scheme. As head of the funding body working closely with IMY, RMK 
Director Mr. Sachdev said he was in a position to talk about change as, 'we are in the 
business of actually doing it!' He did acknowledge that 'some government officials 
are uneasy about parts of these ventures, as the work is largely outside of their 
control', but that bureaucratic change was actually occurring. He notes that, 
'It has been acknowledged that in examples like the Grameen Bank, there's a 
cultural difference from what was happening here ... [Now] since people are 
here longer [those inside and outside associated with IMY], the work is going 
well. People have a pride in what we have done, so they do more, and it works 
like that. It's been realised that state issues cannot be separate from others. [for 
example] Credit is important but on its own is not enough. Illiteracy and 
purdah require more than credit. Literacy and skill increase the options of the 
individual and increase their confidence. Without synergy with the state it 
wouldn't work' (Interview, 30th August). 
Whilst change and innovation was acknowledged at the highest levels, there was little 
faith in lower level functionaries (LLF) to translate this change into tangible outcomes 
in the scheme. However, as I will presently discuss, those working with government 
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officials at the State, District and Block levels, did acknowledge some significant 
positive changes in the culture of the bureaucracy lower down the hierarchy. 
6.2.2: State Level 
In line with findings at the national level, the most significant changes in bureaucratic 
culture at the State level were identified by those with closest working relationships 
with IMY. Of the 6 academics interviewed at the State level, Professor Singh at the 
Giri Institute of Development Studies (GIDS), and researchers at the Rural Institute of 
Development Studies in Lucknow, had direct knowledge of IMY. Others interviewed 
at Lucknow University and at GIDS, however, did not. NGO employees at the State 
level all had dealings with IMY. These employees worked for the international NGOs, 
CARE and UNICEF, and the local NGOs, Bharat Jyoti1 and Sabla. At the State level, 
both those who highlighted significant change in the bureaucracy, and those who did 
not, persistently referred to the very low starting point of UP, both in terms of its 
administrative and development status. Johan Fagerskiold, State Director of UNICEF, 
said that problems include the nature of the political environment, 'transfer mania', an 
'audit culture' and an obsession with creating SHGs in many government departments 
(Interview, 1st May). Despite substantial problems, he did see hope for bureaucratic 
change in Uttar Pradesh as part of a long-term evolutionary process. He explained, 
'The States such as Karnataka, and Maharashtra are 'pet-states'- where of 
course there are good projects. In UP there are definitely more difficulties -
but it is possible to find flowers amongst the weeds. The problem from a 
national or international perspective is that no one expects projects to work 
from the outset - so they don't. The most successful projects are village 
programmes in which the people develop their own frameworks. They work 
out their own problems as they see them, and design their own solutions. 
Within UP there are definitely pockets of success ... The sheer size of the place 
affects development - it's governance of an area two-thirds the size of the 
United States with little funds and infrastructure. The greatest opportunities 
are presented in Grass Roots developments - if it is done in a conscious way. 
But it involves training and a change in mind set. If you start weeding too 
vigorously you can damage the flowers as well - the State will be hurt as a 
result. There's need for interaction. In an economy of wealth and poverty we 
need evolutionary change. We can't just decide to change. The basic 
environment in which people live has to change in order for people to change 
their lives. There are still reams of stupid traditions. There are administrators 
who are transferred after six months, bureaucrats who are full of themselves; 
1 Bharat Jyoti was not working in Rae Bareli District with IMY so employees were only interviewed at 
the State level. 
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who think only of their posts and the personal benefit holding the post creates 
-but things are changing' (Interview, I 51 July). 
The majority of interviewees at the State level working directly with IMY tended to 
be positive about changes being made. These individuals overwhelmingly identified 
an attitudinal shift and the development of close relationships with NGOs. Mr 
Fagerskiold (UNICEF) noted that in IMY, 'the policies are correct on paper'. This 
may seem obvious, but was seen by those involved as a critical starting point. This 
observation is also supported by the comment made by Kabra at the national level, 
that without correct policy, any attempts at reform are likely to have only minimal 
impact. 
One element of this policy is the focus on training, which insiders (in chapter 5) 
described as effective in changing the ways in which they worked. One UNICEF State 
level employee described how she understood the change in government officials' 
outlook. 
'It's an attitude change. The officials [in IMY] are also listening more, they 
are not always giving the orders. There's a change in attitude on the part of 
some officials. I believe government want this change to happen. They're 
trying to make people aware. They are encouraging, and getting direct 
requests from society. They are providing energy to the process of change. 
There is increasingly the idea that the officials are not separate from the 
people' (Interview, 151h July). 
Another important element of the IMY policy, for Fagerskiold, was the coordination 
encouraged with other agencies. Support for coordination with NGOs has increasingly 
featured in Indian Government Development policy in recent years (Brehm, 200 I). In 
fact, Narman has argued that NGOs have become 'something of a sacred cow' in the 
development debate (1999: 168). Supporting the argument Pushpa Pathak notes in her 
study of urban poverty reduction, 
'in India co-operation between governments and NGOs appears to be a 
necessary and effective strategy for economic empowerment of urban poor 
men and women' (1999:261). 
Developing active relationships with NGOs is described as an integral part of the 
IMY programme. The IMY manual suggests that, in every Block, NGOs should be 
involved in the diverse and varied tasks of group formation and training, developing, 
monitoring and networking with the groups, and assisting in group development (Gol, 
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1998: 21 ). It should be stressed at this point that it is not my aim to analyse the work 
of the NGOs involved in IMY, or to discuss the merits (or otherwise) of this type of 
association. Rather, in this section, I discuss the ways in which NGO workers 
involved in IMY feel that government officials are responding to the ideas of 
partnership with other development agents. 
Bharat Jyoti is a local NGO focusing on social welfare and women's empowerment, 
Mr. Kumar, a State level employee, discusses how he sees his interaction with 
government officials involved in IMY. 
'We are having meetings together, creating plans, so there is more co-
ordination. But we [Mahila Ashram] have our own priorities, and they [the 
state] have theirs, so [partnerships are] not to the true extent I would say, but 
greater than before. There is a better working environment, and more trust' 
(Interview, 11th May). 
Dr. Pandey, State representative for CARE, concurred with this idea arguing that in 
IMY there are 'networks' for ideas with government officials, and more consultation. 
At the State level, change was being witnessed, though the process is inevitably a 
slow one. He said the achievements could be seen more easily when compared to 
other departments that focus on, 'window-dressing rather than any true participation' 
(Interview, 7th August). Though attempts at coordination and cooperation with other 
agents in development is not new (Anand, 200 I), it is reasonable to question why this 
apparent change been possible in the case of IMY and not in so many other schemes 
in UP. A summary of opinions offered at the State level is offered in the following 
statement by Mr. Fagerskiold, who argued that the bureaucracy is now. 
'open-minded - no longer a closed block. It is primarily the work of a small 
group of people that have made the changes. What happens [in the long run] 
we will see with time, but an attitude change is definitely there' (Interview, 
15th July). 
6.2.3: District Level 
The 7 District level NGO employees interviewed from CARE, Sabla, UNICEF and 
Avadh Lok Sewa Ashram (ALSA) (there were no academics interviewed at this level) 
had considerable working experience of those individuals involved in IMY. The 
majority of interviewees did acknowledge cultural change amongst government 
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officials, suggesting that this related to the way in which officers interacted with those 
on the scheme, treating NGOs as valuable contributors and attempting to empower 
beneficiaries to demand their rights. The changes highlighted by outsiders imply a 
shift to facilitation in IMY's dealings with beneficiaries, and externalisation in 
working with NGOs. There was one interviewee who suggested that little or no 
change was evident in the work of the bureaucracy involved in IMY. However, this 
criticism related more to the nature of the affiliations of the individual respondent, and 
the frustrations of working with the bureaucracy more widely. 
Mr. Tiwari, a District level employee of the local NGO Sabla, said that bureaucratic 
change could be visualised through the achievements the officers have made in 
relation to women's empowerment. He argued the change has been self-perpetuating. 
As SHGs gain more power and confidence they demand more of the bureaucrat, who 
in turn is encouraged to change the ways in which they work. 
'Since the project has started there is a huge change in the attitudes of the 
women [beneficiaries] involved. They're no longer passive bystanders in the 
development process. They discuss what they want as a group and then find 
who can provide it for them. It used to be that people said, "the word of the 
state is final" the people listened to what they said and accepted it, whether 
they agreed or not. Now they say, "the word of the people is what matters". If 
they don't like how some official is behaving then they will approach someone 
to do something about it. Because of this the officials are definitely more 
efficient, as there is more interaction with the people so they can find out what 
the people want' (Interview, 20th May). 
He continued, 
'Before there was a saying that "if the government is there then we are there", 
now they [the SHGs] say "if we are there then government is there". The 
people feel that they have more rights' (Interview, 20th May). 
Toolika Singh, an NGO worker, has worked for CARE in the District for three years. 
She works alongside IMY employees in 4 of the 8 IMY Blocks, and in agreement 
with other NGO workers interviewed notes, 
'at the village we are seeing real change. The supervisors believe in what they 
are doing and so the groups are working. They [the supervisors] have more 
confidence, more motivation' (Interview, 17th May). 
NGO workers at the District level recorded this change to relate to the involvement of 
key individuals in the process of developing positive relations, motivation and 
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support. When asked whether there has been a change in bureaucratic culture, Toolika 
said, 
'I wouldn't say there is a change in the bureaucracy in UP in general. It seems 
that within this scheme, there is a real motivation to assist the groups. There is 
a better relationship between the women [government officials] in the scheme, 
which is to a large extent due to the work of Lilly. But if you look outside the 
scheme, in the other departments I work with, there is very little change' 
(Interview, 241h May). 
She also spoke of the relationship she had with the women officers involved in IMY 
as one of mutual assistance, co-operation, and friendship. The relationship between 
Lilly and Toolika in particular, extended beyond the work environment. As two 
women living alone in the District, the bond between the two was very close and 
frequently witnessed both inside and outside their work environments. 
The structure of the scheme was seen to be a key element in the quality of the work 
individuals in the scheme performed. One important factor was seen to be the 
longevity of postings for those individuals working within IMY. I am still in regular 
contact with several officers who lived at the field hostel in Rae Bareli, and today 
only Lilly and one other officer of a similar rank (from approximately thirty senior 
District level posts) have not been transferred. For reasons outlined in chapter 5, 
including the lack of power and prestige in the sector, politically motivated transfers 
are not prevalent in the department. Lower down the administrative hierarchy, 
supervisors (and anganwadi workers) are also relatively free from the pressures of 
transfer. The time and effort needed to develop the programme necessitates a 
relatively long tenure, for the development of trust and the building of networks, both 
present in the majority of cases in my experience of IMY. 
The number of NGOs involved in IMY in Rae Bareli is intentionally limited (see 
chapter 5). I have already discussed how particular unscrupulous NGOs have given 
the sector a poor reputation in the District. The case of B. K. Shukla is resonant of 
Clark's (1995) work which suggests in extreme cases, NGOs are set up for the 
purpose of accessing funding, whereby members, beneficiaries and entire projects are 
fabricated in order to win funds that are then embezzled. Desai (2002) argues that in 
the 1980s and 1990s, new types of NGOs began to emerge, which were formed by 
retired bureaucrats, business people and political parties. For him, these types of 
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has dealings with many different government departments, so his opinions reflect a 
broader spectrum of experience than IMY, 
'The state's co-operation with us (ALSA) is OK, it's growing. But the amount 
of money we are given to do our jobs is too little ... There is some working 
with the officials but the state wants to keep its hold. The NGOs want to work 
freely but the state is always watching us ... and it's not just the state. There is 
pressure at every level, from the Block to the State level there is political 
pressure ... There is so much back door money. The BDOs and the support 
networks are taking their piece ... The motto of the (IMY) scheme is good, and 
the main emphasis is on the anganwadi worker and the women not those at the 
higher levels ... the bureaucracy are better staying out of it' (Interview, 191h 
May). 
Mr. Shurma's comments regarding corruption at the Block level, and arguments in 
favour of localisation, were both frequently described. They are, in part, supported by 
the circumvention tactics used by officers involved in IMY. Despite this, his attitude 
towards those on the scheme was far from usual. Mr. Shurma was critical about the 
amount of pressure and monitoring he felt officials within IMY placed on him. 
However, knowing the networks of individuals within the administration to whom he 
was aligned, the fact that IMY employees felt it necessary to monitor his work is not 
necessarily a bad thing. It was when I visited schemes run by the local NGO, A vadh 
Lok Sewa Ashram, that I realised how different the IMY scheme actually was. ALSA 
loans money to IMY groups and its own self-help groups. I visited several of its 
groups in the Rahi Block in Rae Bareli (see Map of Rae Bareli in chapter 3), and was 
accompanied to the villages by Mr. Shurma and Toolika Singh. The 3 ALSA self-help 
groups in Jhakrasi village were very different from those working with IMY. When 
we arrived, the group were sitting waiting for us, their husbands all close by. On being 
asked questions, the women did not answer readily but looked to their husbands and 
Mr. Shurma before they ventured an answer. 
There aren't any anganwadi workers involved in this scheme, but Mr. Shurma says 
his own staff, assist the groups. They have all been formed since January 1998 and 
meet once a month to collect their savings. When I asked about social aspects of self-
help, the members look blank, but Mr. Shurma insisted they have been involved in 
health, education, sanitation and nutrition programmes. The group said nothing but 
nodded dutifully. The women were not literate, though some could sign their names 
so a member's husband was responsible for the collection of money and the book 
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keeping. When prompted to answer, one woman said a few of the women have taken 
their children to be vaccinated, but this was not organised collectively as a group. 
They said that they understand about the loans and what they have to do to repay 
them, but mention no other benefits. 
All loans are large, between two and five thousand rupees per person. Every group 
member has taken a loan. One woman has taken a loan for a shop, but says she 
doesn't run it as she works in the fields, another woman has bought a cow. They say 
they have received information regarding other economic activities they could pursue, 
but they say they have no time. They assured me that their families support the 
scheme, which is unsurprising when it appears likely that these same members control 
the money borrowed. When I asked them what more they wanted, they said there was 
nothing, they had everything they needed. This was far from the case in IMY groups 
who tended to be animated and specific in asserting what they wanted. Toolika said 
that it was obvious that there was no kind of self-help group in the village, 
'The problem is that groups are set up solely for loans. They are given the 
carrot of cheap loans so the men tell the women to get together and form a 
group, so they can access the money. Once they have the loan the women's 
involvement is finished. They don't get any benefit. In these groups there is no 
empowerment, no social activity and no enthusiasm' (Interview, 19th May). 
As a result, Lilly, at the District level, had little trust in the work of ALSA, and had 
made her reservations clear at the State level. This situation parallels the situation 
identified by Veron et al. (2002) who suggest that in the case of the EAS 
(Employment Assurance Scheme), policy is reworked at the District level by those 
who lacked trust in those both higher in the hierarchy and those lower down. 
'The EAS was reshaped at the District level by officers who understood the 
workings of New Delhi or Patna only too well. The fact that they converted a 
demand-led employment programme into a more conventional programme of 
public works was not a product of misunderstanding, but of a lack of trust. . .If 
anything, it was a fear of rent-seeking by Block and Panchayat-level officers 
that prompted District-level officers to behave as they did, which is not to say 
that there was no corruption at this level' (p. 3). 
However, in the case of IMY it is primarily those (state and non-state actors) outside 
the scheme that are not trusted. 
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The majority of elites involved at the District level saw conscious and considerable 
change in the case of those individuals working on IMY. The case where change was 
not identified, appears to relate more to Mr. Shurma (and his NGO) than the scheme. 
The IMY scheme only works with a limited number of selected NGOs in the Rae 
Bareli District. These NGOs tend to be staffed by English speaking, western educated 
individuals with similar perceptions about the role of state as facilitator, to those 
government officials involved in the project. Other NGOs were excluded, according 
to those on the scheme, because of corruption and lack of genuine commitment to 
beneficiaries. However I was unable to assess this from the point of view of those 
NGO workers not included in the scheme. This aspect of the scheme raises questions 
about acceptable types of knowledge and ideas. It may be true that no other NGOs 
were suitable to be involved in the scheme. However, the fact that all involved NGO 
workers had been assimilated into the western discourse of NPM to some extent, 
could expose the fact that the scheme, through its selection, has negated the ability for 
any other types of knowledge to be seen as valid. 
Factors involved in change, according to elite outsiders, include the role of key 
individuals in the hierarchy and close personal relationships between insiders and 
outsiders on the scheme. Bourdieu, suggests that 'cultural capital' and 'symbolic 
capital' are important features in the promotion of 'social capital'. The term cultural 
capital refers to socially constructed qualifications, to which rank is attached, and 
symbolic capital, involves the production of prestige or honour. Harriss (2002: 20) 
argues that, 
'[T]he "possession" of durable social relationships is both a condition of 
differential access to resources and an aspect of social differentiation. 
Cultural/symbolic/social capital are, quite evidently, socially and historically 
limited to circumstances that create them ... they are contextual and 
constructed'. 
The evidence of elites involved in IMY would seem to suggest that social capital has 
been developed through training (described in chapter 5), networks and associations 
(within the bureaucracy and in association with outside organisations), and the 
promotion of a 'can do' attitude by key individuals involved in IMY. 
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6.3 Elite Perceptions of NPM 
The majority of elite outsiders involved in IMY, were English speaking, and in the 
case of NGOs, northern funded (with the exception of Sabla). They possessed a 
'shared vision' with government officials, which encompassed a specific type of 
development based on self-help and perpetuated through education and training in the 
discourse of new public management. Though there was a clear consensus of ideas 
developed between the various parties, the situation fits with Mawdsley et al.'s (2002) 
identification of an internationalisation of language and knowledge based on certain 
'big ideas' which do not allow much room for expression of alternatives. The reach of 
the discourse of NPM was experienced even at the District level, where interviewees 
spoke of such ideas as 'down-sizing' and 'right-sizing'. It could be expected, 
therefore, that these individuals would be assimilated into the discourse of NPM and 
promote its ideology. 
There was a constant theme running through interviews conducted at all geographical 
levels, identifying positive change in the bureaucracy, but there was also concern that 
reform associated with NPM should have definite limits. The elite outsiders spoke of 
the potentially damaging impact that elements of NPM had for development, 
including further moves towards rolling back the state. Obviously understandings of, 
and justifications for, the persistence of state as the prime actor in development 
varied. However, outsiders at all levels, despite the popular criticism of the public 
administration, could see no viable alternative. There was considerable support for 
reform from within, and the continuation of cultural change typical of that 
experienced in IMY. 
Many of the changes in bureaucratic culture highlighted by elite outsiders are those 
promoted through NPM, including a 'can-do' culture, 'facilitation' and 'working with 
outside agencies'. However, when questions regarding NPM were asked of this group, 
there was a resounding opinion that the cultural aspects of the discourse were the only 
elements appropriate in UP. At the national level, though acknowledging some 
internal transformation of the bureaucracy, a DflD interview was critical of the NPM 
discourse, suggesting, 
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'there is nothing new about new public management. It's an alternative 
term for right wing activists who want to roll back the state' (Interview, 
26th August). 
Externalisation through NPM was seen as a highly evocative issue by both academics 
and NGOs workers. At the State level a CARE employee suggested that, 'extra-
government organisations' is the new term for 'small government'. One NGO 
employee who works with IMY in Lucknow said of the change of approach, 
'Are the changes we see because of circumstance that dictate policy or out of 
new ideology? If it is through well thought out ideology it is good, but if it is a 
response to broader economic and political circumstances then it is not good ... 
Is this streamlining and increasing efficiency or is it passing the buck so it can 
blame someone else for failures (Interview, 20th July)'. 
Others saw the role of the state as one of continuing provision, a point to which I 
return later in this chapter. Mr. Fagerskiold in Lucknow, noted that whilst the state 
should be working towards increased partnership with outside bodies, its role should 
remain central. He said in many cases it is the NGOs that are 'problem partners', in 
that they are often subject to the same obstacles faced by the government 
administration, 
'Of course the government has made mistakes, but then so have we. [For 
example] In the approach to health, the original policy of UNICEF failed, it 
tried to do too much and spread its efforts too thin on the ground. That is not 
UNICEF talk as they w·ould draw only on the positive, but that is what 
happened. We thought that we didn't need them [state]. Now we are 
concentrating on specific Districts and specific programmes and working with 
the state as well as other NGOs ... ' (Interview, 14th June). 
Mr. Vikram Menon, at DfiD, concurred with this assessment. He suggested that whilst 
the state is seen as being controlled in its work, the same is true of NGOs and bilateral 
agencies, 
'I have sympathy with the NGOs for the endless monitoring and quantification 
they are doing. It's more important to have proxy measures. It's not even the 
bilaterals which have the power, we can't be innovative, as we have the same 
bureaucratic problems [as the Indian bureaucracy] to a lesser extent as we are 
controlled by the British government'. 
Not only were NGOs and the private sector seen as incapable of filling the role of the 
state, but such a shift was not seen to be in the interests of the development agenda in 
UP. Whilst privatisation espouses consumer choice, this necessitates knowledge of, 
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and access to, alternative providers, a situation at odds with that m UP. Mr. 
Fagerskiold argued, 
'Of course NGOs and the private sector are definitely working more with the 
state. But, the main part is, and should remain, the state. We shouldn't, and 
couldn't, replace that. If that's going to be the end aim of NPM, I dread to 
think what would happen' (Interview, 151 July). 
He said NPM terminology was frequently inappropriate to UP. He spoke of the Sakar 
Ma Bap culture, that views the state as ruler and provider. He argued it was unrealistic 
to expect women who are faced with the daily burden of survival to aspire to long-
term goals of empowerment of their own volition. He said that if, in the short-term the 
women gain a degree of financial independence, then this is an important start. 
'We need to change the mind-set of the people for success- as now they don't 
believe that it can succeed. They shouldn't say 'god took their baby back', 
when it dies of infant mortality. It is not that they are religious fanatics - they 
are fatalists ... Their greatest burden is financial. Money is lent at a usury rate 
this keeps the poor down. It reduces their independence. Self-help is not help 
in itself- but if it only acts as an alternative credit scheme- with the money 
borrowed at a fair rate, then it is still better' (Interview, 201h August). 
At the District level, Toolika of CARE, highlighted this problem. She said that, m 
India, NPM is not appropriate as 'beneficiaries are not consumers, no matter how you 
define the term'. This suggestion supports Sarah Jewitt's (2000) work on gender, 
environment and development planning in the Jharkhand region of India. Here, she 
argues, there are dangers in overestimating the ability of women to 'participate' in 
development projects based on socio-cultural constraints (For more recent work see 
Veron et al. 2002, discussed in chapter 7). 
The evidence provided in this section shows that elements of new public management 
associated with debureaucratisation and localisation, involving change in bureaucratic 
culture, are both highlighted and supported by outsiders. However, outsiders have 
neither witnessed not advocate, elements of administrative reform associated with 
externalisation, that involve the reduction in the role and scope of state intervention. 
6.4: Vernacular Perceptions of Bureaucratic Change 
Anganwadi workers and IMY group members were categorised as representing the 
vernacular in terms of language and knowledge. Both groups of women were 
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classified as offering vernacular perceptions as they did not speak English, they also 
lived and worked, almost exclusively, in the Blocks in which the scheme was being 
implemented. Their perceptions of change were also significantly different from those 
of bureaucratic insiders and elite outsiders. They did not, for example, mention 
'facilitation', or any other aspects promoted in line with the discourse of NPM. 
Members of 32 self-help groups were interviewed, along with 20 anganwadi workers. 
The evidence provided in this section, clearly, does not offer a representative study, 
but does provide detailed examples from which we might generalise. In Tiloi Block 
alone, for example, there are 124 anganwadi workers, of which I interviewed 4. 
However, evidence gained during these interviews supports that gained through other 
methods, and provides an important body of data, based on the views of the non-state 
implementers and intended beneficiaries of the state scheme. The opinions of 
anganwadi workers are discussed here as 'outsiders' as they are not (neither do they 
consider themselves to be) direct government employees. 
Some of the opinions of vernacular interviewees were quite unexpected. For example 
these interviewees expressed a strong feeling of disappointment in the state, arguing 
that it should provide more for them. They overwhelmingly saw the state as corrupt 
and politicised with government schemes perceived as a means to access money and 
resources, but they felt that, in general, no long-term benefit was likely. There is 
clearly nothing new in this assertion, particularly in relation to Uttar Pradesh. 
Concurrently, however, these same women supported both the achievements made, 
and the individuals working within IMY. So different were their perceptions of IMY, 
that during interviews it was quite usual to be given starkly contradictory opinions. 
One typical example was given by an IMY group member in Rangharpur village, in 
Singhpur Block, 
'We don't trust the Sarkar [state] schemes, we wouldn't be involved with 
them ... This is a good scheme, Neelam [the supervisor] is like parivar 
[family], we are getting stronger, but we need more. The state won't help us. 
She is good to us but her hands are tied, like ours' (Interview, 241h May). 
Criticisms offered by these interviewees were of specific government departments, 
the lack of state provision, and the failure and non-accountability of state and non-
state actors. Vernacular interviewees' felt that the difference in IMY related to the 
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closeness of relationships with those involved (both state and non-state actors) and the 
nature of the scheme. As I have already explained, my aim is not to analyse the 
effectiveness or otherwise of IMY, but rather to use the scheme as a means to analyse 
bureaucratic perceptions and perceptions of the bureaucracy, in this instance as 
described by grass roots implementers and beneficiaries. 
6.4.1 Anganwadi Workers Perceptions of Bureaucratic Change: 
The rationale for using anganwad[ workers in development service delivery is similar 
to that which justifies NGO involvement (see Clark, 1995), namely that in certain 
areas they are more effective in delivery than the state. with the discourse _of NPM, 
implementation through anganwadi workers represents externalisation of state 
functions, though working with, rather than instead of, the state in service delivery. 
Their capacity to reach the poor, and in particular gain access to the grass roots, is 
hoped to encourage participation. Anganwadi workers can offer essential 'local 
knowledge' to enhance the delivery of services to difficult to reach groups, the key 
focus here being poor women. In the case of IMY (as the scheme can be adapted at 
the local level), they are able to determine how the scheme can better serve different 
communities, and be tailored to specific groups. They are, theoretically, better placed 
to sensitise officials to the 'real' needs of the focus groups and can mobilise the poor 
to help themselves through savings, demanding social change and ensuring 
downwards accountability and probity of the project officers. These are all important 
elements of localisation through new public management that have been incorporated 
into the workings of IMY. 
Anganwadi workers felt that the relationships they built up with both government 
workers and the groups was more 'familial' than the donor-recipient relationship 
present in many schemes. Though anganwadi workers felt that the culture of 
government officials involved in IMY had changed, feelings towards government 
officials in general was low. Unfortunately, whilst the anganwadi workers felt they 
were supported by the IMY supervisors in the scheme, they were extremely negative 
about their relationships with other government and non-government departments. 
Despite efforts made within IMY, the low morale described by anganwadi workers is 
likely not only to affect their work with other departments but also override the 
positive efforts that have been attempted in IMY. 
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The perceptions of anganwadi workers are useful in detailing, not only how those 
officers involved in the IMY scheme are working, but also offer a useful insight into 
other development implementers in the bureaucracy outside. A typical example of the 
authoritarian manner in which many government officials respond towards 
anganwadi workers was experienced during an interview with the District Magistrate. 
During our meeting he was also involved in a discussion regarding the promotion of a 
particular vaccine by the Primary Health Care (PH C) Department. The outcome of the 
meeting was that private investors should be approached as sponsors for the 
information campaign, in return for free advertising on the posters, and that to cut 
costs on implementation, the anganwadi workers would be given the task for a small 
fee. Whilst this does represent a shift in approach to 'contracting out', the officers 
concerned had no interest in the extra burden on the anganwadi workers, or in any 
trianing that might have been necessary to complete the task effectively (interview, 
17th August). 
A typical view of 'the state' was offered by the anganwadi worker with the Jey Durga 
Group in Mahima village, Unchahar Block. 
'We want to work with government but we have no power. We are told we 
have an important job, we work long hours, we do all these tasks and then they 
give us Rs 500 a month. What does this do for our status? We have no social 
standing even the families are dubious about us. They don't trust us, they think 
that there must be something more in it for us. The primary school teachers get 
Rs. 5000. No one looks at me with any respect, and yet I have to do all this. 
(All the women were agreeing with her). I feel so strongly about it I want to 
take it to the government [other officials implied]' (Interview, 15th August). 
The Indian government has been under pressure from lobbyists to upgrade the status 
of anganwadi workers. It reacted by agreeing that anganwadi status should be 
improved, but let reforms be at the discretion of the State level governments. In Uttar 
Pradesh the allowance has not been increased, or job category changed, as the 
government argues that it is in too weak a financial position2. There has, however, 
been a move to upgrade some anganwadi workers to supervisors, if they have the 
qualifications and when a position comes available. I met several supervisors being 
trained in Lucknow who had been upgraded from anganwadi workers, however, none 
were part of the IMY scheme. The work of an anganwadi worker is undeniably 
2 The U.P. government is currently pursing policies to reduce costs and numbers of employees, so the 
opportunities for A W to gain full employment status which would include pensions, is slight. 
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difficult. It is perhaps surprising, based on this, the positive perceptions the majority 
of these women had for the supervisors involved in IMY. 
Despite the overworked and underpaid role of anganwadi workers performed, their 
relationships with officials in IMY were not particularly strained. Relationships 
between these individuals were so close that the IMY employees were not considered 
to be part of the state machinery by the groups and anganwadi workers. Those few 
anganwadi workers who felt negative about the IMY scheme tended to be those with 
no supervisor, or a supervisor who didn't appear dedicated. In such cases, the women 
did not feel like their work was either important or valued. The anganwadi workers 
complained quite extensively during interviews about state failures in the Blocks 
relating to their work and treatment. One anganwadi worker in Singhpur Block 
described how she saw her situation, 
'I am expected to encourage the ladies, but how can I feed them when I am 
still hungry? How can I expect people to respect me or do what I say? I am 
supposed to encourage the ladies to be literate and do things for themselves, 
but how is this possible when I am so dependent. I have a son who is at 
University, he qualified for engineering college but I couldn't send him on this 
money, so he had to go without. How does this make me feel or look in 
society? I have a postgraduate and want to help the women, but how can I help 
them like this. I have no resources, no funding, no transport. I feel so helpless, 
I know I could do so much for the women, but the lack of resources means I 
can't...The ladies are tired of the scheme. They have gained little. I beg them, 
'please deposit Rs. 10 and save my job'. How can I ask them to believe in it if 
I don't?' (Interview, 8th August). 
Most anganwadi workers differentiated between IMY supervtsors and 'state 
officials'. Government officials were almost always referred to as males, and 
frequently as bare log (literally big people), or Babu (Sir, when in direct contact), 
particularly when relating to those at the District level. Officials were not seen to visit 
the groups and were regarded as distant, both in geographical as well as social terms. 
In complete contrast, supervisors were referred to by anganwadi worker and IMY 
group members in familiar and familial terms, as sister and friend. 
The anganwadi workers in Barbalia village, (Bhadurpur Block) were working 
alongside both NGOs and the state. The supervisor in this village, Saroj Singh (her 
work is discussed in chapter 5) tried to co-ordinate with other state departments and 
NGOs, to enable the groups to access all relevant schemes and entitlements and avoid 
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effort duplication. In relation to her ~upen·i~or. the all~wrllwlr felt 'he nflereJ aJ, ice. 
'upport and encouragement. 
'She'-. helped u~ more than 1 can sa). She tell-. me'' hat other opt1on' arc open 
to u ..... whether it be for [in respect to] 'illage matter<.., or for the group. If 'he 
hears of something that will help u~ (through an NGO or other go,ernment 
department). \he telb us' (intenie" 7'h August). 
The clo'c and informal relationships that existed between ..,upervi'or" anJ C/ltl!,llllll'lltli 
worker.., were frequently witne:-.sed on field vis it-;. For example. Meena Singh a 
supervisor in Unchahar Block, was recent ly married. When I went with her to one 
group the angmnmdi joked, 
' I asked why she didn't stay at home with her hu ... banJ nuw. but i1·.., because 
she wou Id miss us all too much!· (Imervie'". 18111 August). 
The-.e apparently contradictory comment' were quite confLhing in the tiN in ... tance. 
The <>upcn i-.or ... are clearly all government officiab. The rca ... on "h~ I \I Y '"or~er'> 
are not con,idered <h go,ernment officiab i-.. due both to the informal -..truclllre of the 
scheme and the per-.onal relationships de\eloped between the indi,idual-.. imoheJ 
The angamwuli worJ...er:-. are familiar in the 'illage' ha\ ing \\ orJ...ed there for a numher 
of year-.. anJ the supen isors (in the majorit) of ca-..e ... ) dev.elop clo'e per ... onal 
relation~hip-; with many of the women through their frequent 'i-..ih. 
TEXT BOX: from Field Diary: 20tb August 
The first group we met was Lakshmi Group the angammdi worker was Nirmala Devi. 
The group has been formed for two years but has been meeting regularly for one year. 
We sat outside one house as the anganwadi centre was quite a walk and young 
children were stiiJ in lessons there. Nirrnala was clearly very fond of Muni (the 
supervisor) and they spoke as friends. They obviously knew each other weU and had a 
good relationship .... The next village we visited was Ragharpur. The Jeep stopped 
away from the village and we walked through to the anganwadi centre where several 
of the women were already talking. On our arrival there Muni made \Ome notes in 
their savings book, said hello to the women inside and went straight into the kitchen to 
help make tea. It is clear that she spends a lot of time with these ladies and they feel 
very comfortable with her. The angamradi worker here is Neelam Pandey and there 
are two groups called Lakshmi Pujan and Anapoona groups. 
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Though they did not refer to new public management, vernacular interviewees were 
sceptical about the possibilities offered by alternative providers to the state for 
development, although work with the key NGOs mentioned was, on the whole, seen 
as productive. Anganwadi workers often felt NGOs (and the private sector) as large 
(and often international) organisations were overly bureaucratic, paternalistic and 
unaccountable. White ( 1999) argues that many have become, 
'formidable institutions... Increased size has inevitably meant increased 
distance from the grassroots, and the early pioneering vision has been replaced 
by an ethic of efficiency and professionalism' (p. 321) 
An example was provided of a male CARE employee, whose role included 
overseeing the distribution of pushtahar (proteinous food) by anganwadi workers in 
the villages. One anganwadi working in the Singhpur Block described the way in 
which she felt her position and status had been undermined by the NGO employee. 
'One day I was giving out pushtahar to the village and he (an NGO worker) 
came to check on me. I was nervous with him around and instead of 75g I 
gave a woman 80g. Then he shouted at me and said he would report me to the 
higher authorities and I would lose my job. How does that make me look? 
What will people think of me after being spoken to like that? (Interview, 8th 
August). 
The lack of accountability of various NGOs and private sector firms was seen as a 
problem. Small NGOs, in many cases, were seen to offer little different to the 
moneylender contracts that predate them. SHGs in Singhpur Block even spoke of 
NGOs forcing them to put 'red-flags' in their fields to symbolise their debt. Other 
groups spoke of half hearted attempts by private sector and NGOs, which have 
resulted in little or no benefit to the groups. One anganwadi in Panhona village said of 
the assistance from Indo Gulf and various NGOs working in the area; 
'They come and offer us everything, but it never materialises. I have so much 
training but it's incomplete. I have been trained in packaging- for sweets and 
spices. I was taught to make petticoats and salwar suits, to make candles and 
bidis. I have no money, no materials and nowhere to sell the goods. Indo gulf 
promised a papad machine, it never came' (Interview, 7th July). 
6.4.2 IMY Member's Perceptions of Bureaucratic Change 
As with other groups of interviewees, opinions of IMY group members also ranged 
considerably. This was intensified by the fact SHG interviews took the form of focus 
groups. In general, however, differences were experienced between those groups in 
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more remote areas, and those in less remote areas, within the Blocks. There were 
many examples of successful social empowerment in each development Block in 
which IMY is implemented. The case of the Mahila Samu in Jayas village (Unchahar 
Block) is an interesting example. Each IMY group consists of approximately fifteen 
to twenty members who are assisted by the anganwadi worker in the village. For most 
groups the focus is on social empowerment and thrift savings, but for some, like the 
Lakshmi Group, income-generating ventures have also been pursued. Jayas is a 
majority Muslim village and the group structure reflected this. Of the eighteen group 
members, only one was Hindu. 
The ages of women in the group ranged from 18 to 42 years, and the group first 
formed in March 1999. They met officially every Friday and take a register for 
attendance, but because of their income generating schemes are based in the house 
also they also used for meetings they met almost every day. During a focus group 
(18th May) the women said the anganwadi worker has been a great assistance in 
advising them in terms of social and economic schemes they may want to participate 
in, but they felt the main achievements have been their own through hard work. They 
suggested the main emphasis of the group was on social development and to act as a 
forum for discussion on village matters. The social activities in which they have been 
involved are varied. These include health education, 'anti-arrack' (alcohol), 'school 
chalo' (see chapter 5), adult literacy, immunisation and anti-dowry work. They have 
also campaigned for better water provision and have gained several hand pumps in the 
area. One woman said, 
'Now people in the village respect us as they know we get things done' 
(Interview, 18th May). 
The main economic activity of the group was needlework. They made tablecloths, 
shawls, pillowcases, children's clothes and wedding clothes. Other work included 
fabric painting, making sari tops and woollen goods. They originally sold their goods 
locally and had begun to broadened their sales to shop keepers in Rae Bareli. They 
had very detailed registers for attendance, orders and products (bought and sold) with 
which the anganwadi worker helped them. One woman commented that initially the 
family members were sceptical about the scheme, the group meetings and even made 
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comment~ about 'what "-ind of \\ or"-· the '' omen "ere going out to tlo. She ... aid that 
now her husband says. 
·Go! You'll he late for work'. all the '"omen laugh at thi-, turn or C\Cllh. 
another woman says. 
'the} (their husbands) change their mind \\hen they ..,ee \\hat \\C cJn Jo· 
( l nten ic\\ 201h May). 
Though these women had not either collectively or indi\ idually been pan of an) other 
government scheme (this perhap!-> relates to the time and effort required to promote 
such activities). they spoke pm.itively about IMY. They noted their greatest help had 
been the ungwnmdi worker. but also so said Lilly Singh had offered them a lot or 
assistance, particularly in organising the licences and purchase or tobacco ho they can 
start making hidi cigarette!-.). They noted that neither the) nor the mH!,UIIIradi wor"-er 
would he able to organ ise thb. They stressed that they did ..,till need ... ome help from 
·outside·. hut '>aid that the most important factor in group dynamic.., and -,u-,taming the 
achicvcrncnh made is now the group member:-. them'>ehe-.. 
Some women in other I MY groups I interviewed (in each Bloc"-) had prc\ iou"l) been 
part or other :-.chcme:-.. but felt that the help offered by oflicial ... (and (/1/~(//1\I"Cidi 
wor"-crs) is difli::rcnt in IMY. Other !-.Chemes include DWCRA. IR DP. TRYSEM and 
the Muhila Yojww. a po:-.t office savings scheme that ended ahruptl). Groups 
members in Chak Bhoor village. Bhadurpur Block. said that, 
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'in the old scheme we just gave our money. We bought medicines and didn't 
have to borrow money (from lenders), but we weren't strong like we are now' 
(Interview 19th May). 
The majority of groups did feel that they had made considerable achievements, 
primarily through the assistance given to them by the anganwadi worker. One group 
member in Bhadurpur Block explained how she perceived the role of her anganwadi 
worker, Neeraj. 
'She gives us good support (Yes, we are more powerful now. We can put our 
opinions across).We are united'. 
However, the task of promoting IMY for Neeraj was a difficult one. The group had 
previously been part of the Mahila project for post office savings (see chapter 5), 
which was abruptly withdrawn without notice and left the savings inaccessible. One 
of the IMY members' explained, 
'It took a long time. We are poor and last time we saved 400Rs. The money is 
still in the bank and we can't get at it. We can't afford to lose that type of 
money. But we spoke to Madam (Neeraj) and decided that if we could save 
then we would be more independent. We feel better about this scheme. We've 
been given assurances we won't lose this time. We have our own passbooks. 
We aren't as worried about the scheme' (interview gth' August). 
The trust which developed between those employed by IMY, and those involved in 
self-help groups, can perhaps explain why opinions about the scheme and 'the state' 
or other schemes, differ so radically. In Purha Dixit village, Bhadurpur Block, I asked 
the women what they thought of government schemes. 
'We heard of DWCRA, but didn't join because of rumours about it. We didn't 
feel we could repay the loans for it so we haven't joined a government 
scheme' (interview ih August). 
When asked why they wouldn't join a government scheme they said they wouldn't 
'trust' it. 
Within IMY, power is increasingly devolved to the lower levels of the hierarchy. For 
anganwadi workers, this change met with a commensurate increase in the confidence 
of supervisors. As supervisors felt they had support from those higher up the 
hierarchy (and probably through added confidence in their ability through training) 
the amount of assistance they gave to those at the village level increased. Following 
decentralisation and increased powers given to the Panchayati Raj Institutions 
payment of anganwadi workers is now delegated to the village Pradhans. In several 
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cases, anganwadi workers told of the way in which Pradhans had withheld their 
payment and their supervisors had assumed the role of mediator in the situation. 
'I hadn't been paid for (four) months. When I went to see him (the Pradhan), 
he said he didn't have time to discuss it and told me to leave. Time went by 
and finally he said I hadn't done my work and didn't deserve the payment. I 
couldn't do anything. She (the supervisor) went to him and said, if he didn't 
pay she'd contact the PRI Officer. Eventually he gave me the money' 
(Interview 2ih May). 
The faith individuals had in the scheme also relates to the amount of time spent with 
groups by supervisors and anganwadi workers, and the tasks undertaken. Extra tasks 
undertaken with the groups ranged from acting as mediator in village disputes, 
speaking to family elders who were concerned about the group membership and 
putting women in touch with the relevant bodies in matters of divorce or pensions 
when legal advice was required. The SHGs suggested it was not just the roles being 
adopted by their anganwadi workers and supervisors, but essentially about the way in 
which they were now performing their roles. Group members in Asni village, 
Bhadurpur Block said, 
'we can talk to her about anything, any advice we need. One woman wanted to 
join the group but she was staying with her mother-in-law and her family 
were not happy about her joining. She (the supervisor) went to talk to the 
mother-in-law and explained that if the woman joined it would help the 
family, she could learn about health and educate the children' (Interview, 
August 81h). 
The IMY groups also noted a change in this respect. When I visited anganwadi 
centres (frequently the meeting place of IMY groups) the women had frequently 
designed their own PRA maps of the village, marking out where in the village 
pregnant women, breast feeding women and women with young children lived. The 
school, water pumps and other facilities were also on these maps. It was from this 
basis that the women of the groups decided where they would like to apply for a toilet 
or a water pump, rather than on the basis of the supervisors say so. It was in this way 
that the group members felt they had 'ownership' of the schemes. This is a key aspect 
of NPM, promoted through the Administrative Reforms of UP, and incorporated into 
IMY. 
Though the IMY groups are not part of formal cooperatives, the work of Hyden 
( 1988) provides a useful analysis on the cooperative behaviour of group members. He 
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argues that the ujamaa programme of co-operatives in Tanzania failed precisely 
because it was based on too simplistic assumptions about rural society, coupled with 
top-down management by state officials. Though successful cases of state run 
cooperatives in Latin America are rare, Sick ( 1999) identified one Costa Rican co-
operative processing and marketing coffee beans that could compete with private 
companies. He argues, again, that this scheme was based on the support from rather 
than management by the state. Esman and Uphoff, ( 1984) concur that co-operatives 
perform better with government support, rather than government control. Like 
positive cases of co-operatives elsewhere, the IMY is supported, rather. than 
controlled, by the Indian state. I would argue that in the majority of cases, government 
officials, along with anganwadi workers do actually 'facilitate' (social and sometimes 
economic) empowerment. I would suggest that this provides evidence of considerable 
bureaucratic change particularly in relation to the negative environment in Uttar 
Pradesh. 
Attempts to facilitate through IMY were not always successful. It suffers from many 
problems seen in other schemes. The social and cultural environment (detailed in 
chapters 2 and 3) in which the scheme is being implemented is, of course, a constant 
restricting factor. The opportunities offered for a population of women willing to 
'initiate' self-help are limited. When visiting Tiloi Block I was accompanied by Mrs. 
Souklar, a supervisor from Bhadurpur Block, as the Tiloi supervisors were being 
trained in Lucknow (see chapter 5). As we drove to the first village some women were 
walking towards Tiloi centre, which is six kilometres away. They were part of an 
IMY group and were going to the bank to pay in their savings. When we arrived at the 
village, we approached a house and asked the owner if we could sit in the shade of her 
porch whilst waiting for the anganwadi worker. The Muslim woman that lived there 
said, 
'Even though you are going to the group I will let you in, that's my gesture to 
you' (interview, ih August). 
She explained that because of village factions (she was aligned to a different group to 
the anganwadi), she wasn't a member of the group, even though the anganwadi lives 
close to her. She said she had asked other women about the groups but had been told 
that 'no one knows anything about it'. When the anganwadi worker arrived, she 
called from outside the house saying we could talk, but had to go to her house. 
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A large gathering of women came dO\\n to the tlll ~£111\\'adi centre. ~1 r:-.. SourJ..ar told 
u ... later that ... ome of the \\Omen thought \\C had come '' ith mcdrcinc. I a,.J..ed the 
angammdi \\het her '>he '' anted to :-.it on the chair~ the group had brought out for U'>. 
but :-.he '>aid her in- law:-. didn't under:-.tand wh) ''e \\ere there . ..,o ..,he couldn't. The 
~ocial :-.tatu:-. of v. omen in the village wa~ clearly \Cl')' low. There are four I ~IY group-. 
in the village all named after Hindu deitie~. The fir.,t formed o'er two )Car:-. ago. but 
the others have only been formed for a few months. I a..,J..ed the cmganii'Cu!i \\hat her 
ro le was in relation to IMY. She said that through fMY they were no longer 
dependent on moneylenders. 
In trying to uncover what social change had occurred through group member..,hip. I 
asked the groups whether they become more im ohed in \illage matter'>. The an..,\\er.., 
were given by the llll~Oillt'adi worker. 
AW': We aren't in\o lved with that sort of thing that i.., for the Pradlwn to do. 
AB: Arc any o f the members irl\·o lved in the Panclwrar? 
A W: There used to be. but no t no\v. 
AB: Why? Ha" there been a change in Panchayar'? 
A W: No they left. Some people left. and '>et up their O\\ n group. The) 
swapped to a bank scheme. 
A B: Why did they move? 
'A W: All,l!.llllll'at!i wor~t:r: AB: Amit Bajpai ( intr:rprctcr) 
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A W: The financial package was better. They were offered 1.5 lakhs after only 
3 months. Those who left got good postings. They can be president or 
secretary in the new group. 
AB: If it's better will you move? 
A W: No, some of the women are even moving back now. Some are in the 
newer (IMY) groups. The money offered is better but there is nothing else. 
AB: Are there any other NGOs involved in your area? 
AW:No 
AB: Are you involved in other things, for example for economic activities? 
A W: No, the government should provide us with some work. We just sit idle 
in the house all day and we have nothing to do. They should give us some 
business. 
AB: Do you get enough help from the government for this scheme? 
A W: We were given a form to fill in (to say what else we wanted). We have 
filled it in and are waiting for the supervisor to collect it. 
AB: What did you ask for? 
AW: We asked for money. We want to open a shop and start our own 
business. 
AB: Is the group literate? 
A W: Some are (no more than one in ten), but most are not. There used to be a 
scheme run by Indo-fertilisers and CARE but it stopped. Then there was an 
informal education government programme4. 
AB: Did you not ask for the government to provide you with a literacy 
programme? 
A W: No, we just asked for money. 
AB: Are you going to start economic activity in the future? 
A W: Yes but we are seeking it from the government side. It hasn't started yet, 
but we have asked (interview, ih August). 
As we left the village, I felt disheartened about what I had seen. Not only did it appear 
that the group was gaining little from the scheme in social terms. Village factions 
seemed to prevent women joining this apparently 'all-inclusive' programme. The 
anganwadi (quoted above) acted differently to many others I had met. She was more 
part of the group than an advisor to it, and was not clear of her role as an 'enabler' for 
4 This point refers to the lack of accountability in the case of some NGOs. In certain circumstances 
already detailed, private firms and NGOs have become involved in development work which has been 
abruptly halted. without any explanation. Though this has also happened in the case of state schemes 
contradicts the idea of NGOs being closer to the people and more accountable. 
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the women. Whether or not, the dispute was simply between two women in the village 
rather than factionalism, as the supervisor I visited the Block with maintained, there 
were clear problems in the area which can only have suffered from the lack of 
monitoring within the scheme. The lack of a supervisor, for whatever reason, can only 
have intensified the problems. 
Mrs. Sourkar, was positive about successes in the village. She said that although the 
women themselves did not mention they were benefiting from the scheme, several 
years ago it is unlikely they would have been free to walk around the village, let alone 
walk to Tiloi. In relation to education, she said in remote villages like this one, the 
men (and often other family members) don't want the women to be literate, so it is 
difficult for women to demand it. She felt that when the groups develop, they will 
eventually demand more. Despite this reassurance, it does not appear that the 
bureaucracy have 'facilitated' the women in demanding their rights, although this may 
increase with time. The women in the groups were adamant that the state should 
'provide' for them. The experience highlights what has been called the Ma Bap 
Sarkar culture (discussed in chapter 2). In the Amethi constituency in particular, this 
idea has been perpetuated and even encouraged by politicians in their attempts to 
guarantee electoral success. This is the type of area specifically referred to by outside 
elites to justify the limits of new public management. 
However, the above observations require clarification. Whilst elements of NPM are 
clearly unsuitable, others may have in fact contributed to any achievements made. 
First, as outlined earlier the starting point in many villages is one of excessively high 
levels of illiteracy, female mortality and oppression. It is only when these things are 
taken into consideration that the achievements of the officers within IMY can be fully 
appreciated. Of course, both within IMY, and in other state and non-government 
schemes, there are SHGs where women have achieved much. It is specifically the fact 
that IMY does not have to meet targets for groups formation and development, that it 
can 'afford' to concentrate on groups such as the one described in Tiloi. Scott in his 
book 'Seeing like a State', also refers to this point, arguing that for state action to be 
effective, it must concentrate on 'small steps' that can be furthered, adapted or even 
reversed. Specifically, he makes the case for institutions that are, 'multifunctional, 
plastic, diverse and adaptable' (1998: 251 ). This is very much the case in IMY. Where 
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those individual government officials and the SHGs feel that leaps of progress can be 
made in a sustainable manner, they are attempted. However, the project is not pushed 
ahead at the risk of destroying what has already been achieved. For example, the 
group members in Gopalpur village in Singhpur Block for example said that they felt 
their greatest achievement was the group purchase of wedding utensils. Not only were 
different women (religious and castes) using the same equipment, the women rented 
the utensils out to other families for wedding parties, something that may not seem 
important on first impression, but does suggest the facilitation by individuals involved 
in the scheme, to develop sustainable group dynamics. 
The evidence presented in this section suggests that, in line with Judith Tendler's 
experience of health work in Caera, the use of village level workers can be highly 
effective in project implementation ( 1997). The majority of anganwadi workers and 
SHG members, whilst supportive of the scheme and the individual government 
officials involved in it, were resentful of the state and what they perceived as neglect 
and a lack of provision. If the low status and neglect of anganwadi workers by the 
state continues, it is likely to have negative implications for their motivation and, as 
such, the success of the scheme. 
6.4: Conclusions 
Throughout this chapter I have tried to explore the diverse and often contradictory 
changes within the bureaucracy as perceived by those outside the state. Outsider 
perceptions were analysed to represent 'elite' and 'vernacular' understandings of the 
nature of bureaucratic culture and change. At the national level, elites acknowledged 
the power and autonomy of high-ranking bureaucrats, in Delhi, but felt that lower 
ranks, at the implementation stage, would resist change. In contrast, those individuals 
actually working with lower level functionaries, did acknowledge significant and 
sustained change in bureaucratic working practices. 
Individuals are motivated by a combination of complex, 'material, institutional and 
ideological goals' (Fox 1993:30). Therefore, while some state actors are inclined to 
pursue the state's private capital accumulation interests, others may value the tasks of 
strengthening political legitimacy more. Fox notes that others, 'may simply be 
concerned with career advancement or material gain. However this does not mean that 
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individuals within the system are free to act as they wish, 'they face structural-
institutional constraints and limitations' (P. 31 ). All the assertions made in this 
chapter must be viewed in the context of the governance and social structures in Uttar 
Pradesh. I would argue, therefore, that shifts towards cooperation and coordination, as 
viewed by outside elites, and changes in attitude and approach highlighted by those 
catergorised as representing vernacular perceptions, represent considerable cultural 
shifts in the workings of individual officers involved in IMY. 
Fox argues that change by state officials is possible, but that it 'is closely related to 
the influence of social forces that are pushing them in the direction, whether or not 
they consider themselves allies'. Within IMY, these social forces (outlined in chapter 
5) include the development of trust within the department, training of officials at all 
levels, and support for change from the highest to the lowest levels. However, as seen 
in chapter 5, there are, of course, those within the organisation that chose not to 
follow the new cultural rules and norms. For outsiders, attitudinal change was 
witnessed in several forms relating to the increase of power at lower levels, the 
intensity of involvement with the groups, and the increasing acceptance of outsiders' 
vtews. 
In relation to NPM (whether or not it was described as such), opinions were broadly 
consistent both at all levels of the hierarchy, and in the arguments expressed by a 
variety of actors. There was a general acknowledgement that positive cultural change 
had occurred in those government officials working in IMY, but the limits of 'new 
public management' or 'entrepreneurial governance' should be recognised. Any 
further shifts including privatisation and downsizing, were not supported, even by 
those who criticised the working of the current bureaucracy. 
In the next chapter, I draw together the arguments made in chapters 5 and 6 to suggest 
what conclusions can be drawn regarding bureaucratic culture and IMY. I also 
consider the ways in which these changes relate to the adoption of administrative 
reforms influenced by the discourse of NPM. In the second part of the chapter, I 
discuss how my finding fit with broader debates about governance. I argue that 
elements of new public management can be utilised to empower lower level workers, 
and help in the pursuit of development. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND REFERENCE TO BROADER 
DEVELOPMENT DEBATES 
7.1 Introduction: 
I began this thesis by citing the recent work of Desai and Imrie who suggested that 
research is necessary to explore, 
'the different ways in which state and/or governance structures are being 
recast, and to document the role and importance of locally embedded socio-
political and institutional structures and systems in framing governance 
outcomes. It would also be interesting to explore the precise transmission 
mechanisms which lead to the adoption and/or adaptation of managerialist 
ideas from one country to another. Moreover, as our paper suggests, the 
complexities and variations within and between bureaucratic-professional 
regimes are clearly important in interpreting and shaping the ways in which 
the new (governance) arrangements are being constructed. Given this, one 
research task is to explore the contrasts between the old, bureaucratic 
professional, approaches and the new managerialist ones in ways which seek 
to highlight the differences in the old as well as the new. These, and related 
ideas, provide possibilities for further research into the changing nature of 
governance systems' (1997: 647, emphasis mine). 
Within this thesis I have tried to research the ways in which Indian government 
officials have engaged with the processes of change associated with new public 
management. Through the case study scheme of Indira Mahila Y ojana, in Uttar 
Pradesh, I have also considered the ways in which these ideas have impacted upon the 
'culture' of the bureaucracy. This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first I 
summarise the preceding chapters and reiterate the main themes and arguments that 
ran through them. In the second I relate my analytical conclusions to two broader 
debates in the area of governance. The first of these, in section (7.3) relates to the 
issue of social capital, one of the features of the Post-Washington Consensus 
recommendations. I focus particularly on the recent work of John Harriss (2002). 
Whilst I am sympathetic to certain elements of his critique, I feel that his arguments 
focus too heavily on research conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s, whilst 
largely ignoring the shifts associated with the Post-Washington Consensus of late 
1990s. The second area of discussion (7 .4) in this chapter considers the extent to 
which the adoption of elements of the new public management discourse in India 
represents neo-imperialism based on the hegemony of western 'truths'. 
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7.2 M a Bap or Manager : the experience of Indira Mahila Y ojana 
Within this section I reiterate and reflect on the main points of discussion raised in the 
previous two chapters. In order to do this I use the three main elements of NPM 
(according to Sharma, 2000) namely externalisation, localisation and 
debureaucratisation, and consider the extent to which these have been adopted and 
adapted in the case of IMY. The evidence presented and analysed in chapters 5 and 6 
shows that, although partial and contested, there has been an adoption of key 
institutional reform elements of NPM by those government officials involved in IMY 
in Uttar Pradesh. 
The case of Indira Mahila Yojana in Uttar Pradesh offers a valuable case study that 
demonstrates how elements of new public management can be used to assist positive 
change in bureaucratic culture. This is not to say that these changes are happening in 
every scheme in the State, or that new public mangement always has positive results. 
Whilst certain elements of NPM have been incorporated to facilitate change, in the 
case of IMY there are other specific factors present that contributed to the change 
experienced. In the same way as Tendler's (1997) experience has shown the 
difference two reformist governors can make in the implementation of health care 
policy in Caera, key factors outside the structural change imposed are also important 
in the the processes of change described in IMY. 
The first factor relates to the status of the department in which change was being 
enacted. The social sector in general, and IMY specifically, has little power and 
controls only minimal finance. The corrupting influences, identified by interviewees 
in other departments were notable for their absence in this case. Second, the role of 
charismatic individuals has been fundamental in enabling cultural. Whilst, the Indian 
bureaucracy is widely critiqued for its authoritarian and corrupt ways of working this 
was not seen to be the case in IMY. Here key individuals acted as 'change agents' at 
each level in the hierarchy, helping to promoted and sustain substantial cultural 
change. It is within this environment of support from the highest level, and minimal 
interference with the working of the scheme from outside, that change has been 
adopted. 
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Within this working environment positive change associated with NPM can clearly be 
highlighted, and are detailed in this chapter. However, these outcomes are not an 
automatic result of structural change. Whilst devolution has occurred, for example, it 
requires constant support from those above in the hierarchy, something that can not be 
enforced through policy change alone. Institutional elements are central to the cultural 
change seen through the adoption of new public management in the case of IMY 
though they cannot be pointed out in the general discourse. 
Externalisation: 
The element of NPM most heavily influenced by public choice theory is 
externalisation. This implies the reduction of the role of the state to its core functions 
and the privatisation or contracting out of non-essential functions to more 'efficient' 
non-government organisations, whether that is in the private, NGO or community 
sectors. The main form of contracted labour within the IMY scheme is through the 
use of village level anganwadi workers who are responsible for group formation and 
scheme implementation. The reasons used to justify the use of these workers are that 
they have greater access to and knowledge of the realities at the grass roots level. 
However whilst the majority of anganwadi workers felt positive about the scheme and 
the individual government workers on the IMY scheme they were in general negative 
about 'the state'. Anganwadi workers said their pay and conditions were excessively 
low, they felt undervalued and often had a low morale in their work. The vast range of 
tasks that are now being devolved to anganwadi workers, by various departments, 
was highlighted as being unreasonable. Reasons for low morale related to the fact 
they are not salaried but are given a small fee for their work, and they did not feel 
adequately trained for many of the tasks expected of them. 
Anganwadi workers highlighted the difference between other departments and their 
experiences in IMY, where they felt part of a team of more adequately trained 
implementers and had a sense of being appreciated for the tasks they fulfilled. Efforts 
had been made within to increase morale of these women including training, rewards 
from the District Magistrate for exceptional work, and the promotion of some 
anganwadi workers to supervisors. Furthermore, anganwadi workers felt that changes 
in bureaucratic culture enhanced their own contribution to the scheme. The increasing 
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externalisation of government functions to anganwadi workers, without adequate 
training primarily related cutting expenditure without due care for the quality of the 
service provided by these women. The anganwadi workers did have positive 
perceptions about the work of government officials in IMY, but the amount of 
pressure placed on them by the 'state' and the lack of appreciation and payment, is 
likely to have a negative impact on the IMY scheme's work in the long run. 
Non Government Organisations (NGOs) have a negative press in Uttar Pradesh and 
many government officials, particularly at the grass roots level, had little faith in the 
sector. Government officials and anganwadi workers complained about the autocratic, 
paternalistic and unaccountable nature of many of the organisations in this sector. 
This was described by high-ranking officials as one reason for the limited number of 
NGOs involved with the scheme in Rae Bareli District. The NGOs that are involved 
in IMY are selected on a case specific basis. The majority of those NGOs working 
with the government officials for IMY argued that there had been a considerable 
cultural shift in the attitudes and working practices of those individuals in the scheme, 
whilst noting little change in the bureaucracy in general. 
NGOs working in Rae Bareli were primarily, western funded, staffed by well 
educated, English-speaking individuals many of whom had attended the same training 
courses (both in the UK and elsewhere) as the government officials in IMY. These 
individuals had a 'shared vision' of what could and should be achieved through the 
scheme. These organisations sought to instil new working practices amongst their 
own workers, adopting key elements of new public management, including 
downwards accountability, flexibility and working practices more akin to private 
sector working practices. This 'internationalisation of ideas' could be the reason that 
certain NGOs were integrated with the scheme whilst others were not. I will discuss 
the extent to which certain understandings and interpretations dominate others later 
(in section7.3). 
Limiting the degree of externalisation in IMY was supported by those both inside and 
outside of the scheme. The socio-cultural environment in Uttar Pradesh was described 
not conducive to the idea of a 'cultivated consumer', who decides which services they 
want provided, and by who. As government officials in IMY have no set targets they 
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felt more responsive to the needs of individual groups. In contrast, both government 
and NGO employees highlighted the continuing, 'audit culture' in the non-
government sector, preventing them working as they would wish. 
Localisation: 
Localisation consists of the dual actions of devolution and deconcentration so that 
power (in larger societal terms as well as intra-organisational ones) is directed 
downwards, as is the flow of information. Through this, it is hoped, significant 
networks and expertise can be built up at the lowest practical level within the 
bureaucracy. According to Dunleavy (1991 ), it is precisely through this dispersal of 
power that the bureaucracy can become more responsive and effective service 
providers. 
In organisational terms, within IMY there is a conscious devolution of power to the 
District and Block levels with the implementers of the scheme, able to adapt it in light 
of local conditions and needs. This follows Clark and Newman's theory that through 
changes associated with NPM, officials (as well as those outside the bureaucracy) can 
shift to a concentration on local needs away, 'from generic fields of public provision' 
(1997: 79). However, whilst power and authority is vested in the lowest levels within 
the IMY hierarchy, circumvention tactics were used to minimise the effect of 
'corrupting influences' on the scheme. Officers that were considered to be 
uncooperative, at the State and District levels, were consciously sidelined in the 
programme. Neither was power devolved to locally elected leaders, or Pradhans, 
within IMY. The Panchayati Raj Institutions have been allocated considerable power 
in recent years, but were seen to be, at best uncooperative and at worst corrupt, in 
relation to their dealings with IMY. 
In societal terms, the scheme is accountable to the lowest level, namely the IMY 
groups. Through 'facilitation' of empowerment of the groups, the group members are 
encouraged to act as monitors of the scheme, and demand their rights of the state, and 
society more generally. The case of IMY mirrors the experiences of Judith Tendler 
( 1997) where power was devolved to the local level in health care policy in Ceara, but 
at the same time, traditional power and autonomy was taken away from those at 
higher levels, in an effort to increase the schemes efficiency. 
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Debureacratisation: 
The term debureaucratisation has been used by supporters of public choice theory to 
suggest a reduction of the bureaucracy. This includes contracting out, in order to 
streamline the service and improve efficiency. Other elements of debureaucratisation 
involve the reduction of 'bureaucracy' in administration through the removal of 
'bureau-pathologies' including red-tape, excessive hierarchy, and a culture of 
authoritarianism. IMY officials have clearly focused on the latter rather than the 
former, changing the culture of the bureaucracy to make it more efficient. 
The World Bank supported Civil Service Renewal for Uttar Pradesh, suggests that, 
training of officers at all levels is necessary for a change in the 'working culture' of 
the administration (2000: 4). It is this element that constitutes the primary change in 
the working of IMY according to interviewees both inside and outside of the 
bureaucracy. This has involved exposure visits both in India and abroad to see 'best 
case practices' of governance for those at the District level and above, whilst training 
courses organised by th~ UP government of up to four weeks have begun for District 
level officials. The roles and obligations of each individual within the scheme are 
fully explained, and manuals provided for reference material. Refresher courses are 
periodically conducted with government officials after the initial training programme. 
Though the focus on training for officers at lower levels is a relatively new 
phenomenon, a cultural change in the relationship between officers (and towards 
beneficiaries) was highlighted as the dominant factor supporting a change in working 
culture in the administration. The World Bank suggests that it is through individuals 
acting as 'change agents' that new working practices and procedures become 
sustainable. Within the IMY programme, debureaucratisation has occurred through 
the removal of what Tolia calls 'fear psychosis' in the administration, whereby 
individuals are afraid to act for fear of reprimand (a factor that has only been 
increased in other contexts with the transfer mania in the State). Those officials 
involved in the IMY programme described an environment of mutual trust and 
appreciation within the departments (DOWC and ICDS) involved in the programme. 
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Several factors are responsible for this shift. First is the very significant role and 
influence of key individuals within the programme offering support, guidance and by 
setting an example to those lower down. Second the development of 'femi-sociability' 
within the departments involved in the sector. This has been developed through 
creating and sustaining networks of trust and support within IMY. Both these factors 
are important because although trust within the scheme is important, without support 
networks many officials would not have the strength independently to have faith in 
their actions and decisions lower down the hierarchy, for example in relation to 
difficult Pradhans. 
A third factor, ironically, derives from the low status of the department in terms of 
economic leverage and power. This has meant those not committed to its goals and 
methods have pushed for transfer, leaving the majority with a genuine commitment to 
the department and the beneficiaries. In order to maintain the relationships within the 
scheme higher officials would, when necessary, circumvent other government and 
non-government departments who it was felt would negatively affect the scheme. It 
was the use of personal networks and skill, rather than interdepartmental co-
ordination, that minimised the amount of hierarchy in the scheme, and hence the time 
delays so frequently associated with public administration. 
It is impossible to present a singular definition of new public management, because as 
Polidano (1998) suggests a singular form of the discourse only exists in abstract 
terms. However, several assertions about the changing influences on the discourse of 
NPM in recent years can be made. In the late 1980s and early 1990s NPM, associated 
with the Washington Consensus, was heavily influenced by public choice theory and 
neo-liberal ideas of rolling back the state in order to reduce the room for manoeuvre 
of a vested interest bureaucracy. Research in the early 1990s, including the work of 
Evans and Tendler, has suggested that this narrow deterministic perception of 
government officials is inaccurate. They argue that it sits uneasily with research on 
good working practices in public sector firms which have been seen to improve in 
performance through increased flexibility and the 'empowerment of middle level 
managers' (Tendler, 1997). This research has fed into recent shifts in NPM practices, 
at the same time as a parallel move within governance debates associated with the 
Post-Washington Consensus. The Post-Washington Consensus, though remaining 
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faithful to the necessary role of the market, accepts that there is an important and 
valuable role to be played by the public bureaucracy, amongst other institutions. 
Elements increasingly associated with this changing face of NPM, including 
localisation and debureaucratisation have led Desai and Imrie to argue that it may 
even be possible to conceive of a 'Post-managerial phase' (1998: 646). This phase is 
essentially represented by a shift away from questioning the raison d'etre of state to 
one questioning how it performs its functions. I would argue that the case of IMY, 
government officials at all levels are engaging with the processes of change associated 
with new public management or even Post-managerialism. 
In the next section of this chapter I consider how the evidence of IMY sits in relation 
to the claim that the adoption of NPM in India represents the hegemony of western 
discourses. 
7.3 Neo-imperialism and the hegemony of western discourses 
to conclude with an issue that opened this thesis we may ask the extent to which the 
adoption of elements of new public management in the case of IMY represents the 
hegemony of western discourse in the developing world. There has been a 
considerable amount of literature regarding the forms of knowledge and power that 
regulate practices in development. for Watts ( 1999) hegemonic development has, 
'penetrated, integrated, managed and controlled countries and populations in 
increasingly pernicious and intractable ways. It has produced 
underdevelopment, a condition politically and economically manageable 
through 'normalisation', the regulation of knowledge and the moralisation and 
technification of poverty and exploitation' (1999: 90). 
A Foucauldian analysis of the state in India would claim that the hegemony of 
western discourses in the Third World are almost complete (Escobar, 1995). There are 
some aspects of NPM in Uttar Pradesh that may encourage such a perception. The 
discourse of NPM was created in, and primarily for reform of public bureaucracies in 
the west (Desai and Imrie, 1998). The financially constrained State of Uttar Pradesh 
was encouraged to adopt a civil service reform policy in line with new public 
management, as conditional for being granted loans. 
The IMY training is sponsored by DfiD and as such, the training methods and ideas 
are those promoted by the bilateral agency. Many of the elites within the IMY have 
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been trained in England, and as such adopted ideas based in the west. There are 
certainly 'privileged circuits of information' (Mawdsley et al. 2002: 77) through 
which information flows. The individuals who are trained overseas then train those 
lower down the hierarchy, so that there is a downwards filtration of ideas, that have 
their origin in the west. The NGO workers involved in the IMY programme, are in the 
majority, employed by international NGOs. They speak English and use the same 
language of 'enabling', 'facilitation' and even 'right-sizing' (a World Bank phrase) in 
speaking about new public management. The fact that very few local NGOs are 
involved in the IMY scheme could symbolise the 'suppression of ideas' of the 'other' 
highlighted by Kabeer ( 1999). 
Dr. Tolia at the Administrative Training Institute in Nainital, co-author of the 
Reforms in Governance, was certainly part of a 'privileged circuit of information', in 
his direct dealing with Bank representatives. During interview (9th June) Dr. Tolia 
used World Bank-popularised narratives to justify change, include the idea that the 
NPM discourse is part of a natural process of growth and development, as 
'evolutionary' and 'organic'. He also used the language of NPM as a new and 
progressive force, actively seeking change for the better. The metaphors used in this 
sense include 'reinventions' of the old and 'visions' of the future order. 
Of course there are those who have taken on the ideas of NPM in their totality. 
However was not the case I found in the case of those government officials involved 
in IMY. Evidence provided in chapters 5 and 6 suggests that whilst elements of new 
public management have been adopted, they have been adapted at the local level and 
other elements have not been adopted at all. I would suggest therefore that IMY, 
offers an example of 'little ideas' of local change within the 'big idea' of new public 
management. 
Critiques of Western development discourses frequently infer the direct transfer of a 
discourse from one environment to another. In the assessment of ideas being 
transferred from the North to the South there is a tendency to analyse the translation 
as direct power over, with depictions of Southern 'others' that implies passive, 
receptive, individuals that have little (if any) power to modify, subvert, relocate or 
contest the change. This is certainly not the case in IMY. That elements of the 
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discourse have been adopted is undeniable but that government officials in UP have 
simply been passive recipients of the change is not true. No matter how extensively 
powerful ruling elements in any given society have conditioned the interpretation of 
concepts, even of words, in their own interests (or what they perceive as the interests 
of others) they cannot completely remove alternatives, or suppress resistance. For 
there to be only one understanding and translation of the NPM discourse it would be 
necessary to use language that is so narrow that it offers no room for alternative 
interpretations- a situation that is clearly not possible. 
This was my experience in the case of IMY. The promotion of some aspects of the 
discourse and dismissal of others shows the power of government officials to adapt, to 
some degree at least, discourse and policy directions. The flexible nature of NPM in 
UP has led to an environment in which people of different philosophical and moral 
standpoints can wax lyrical about the benefits of 'effectiveness', 'decentralisation', 
'right-sizing' and 'participation'. Whilst one person may infer 'cutting costs', 
'externalisation', 'redundancies' and 'slimming-down the state'; another using the 
same language may translate meaning to reflect 'improved provision', 'local level 
involvement', 'increased employment' to meet development demands, and 
'community participation' and debate. It is perhaps this very reason that the NPM has 
achieved such global dimensions. As I discussed in chapter 5, whilst training has been 
influenced by national and even global agendas, including the promotion of 
flexibility, decentralisation and devolution of power, the inherently flexible nature of 
the discourse has led to its selective adoption and adaptation at the implementation 
level. 
James Scott ( 1998), in his book 'Seeing like a state', argues that for effective state 
action it is necessary to heed this advice. He argues that an experimental approach to 
government action involving 'small steps' is necessary. Policies should favour 
reversibility as some interventions will inevitably fail. Policies should plan for 
surprises as the relationship between policy and intended outcome is rarely realised in 
totality. Human inventiveness refers to the fact that those who become involved later 
are likely to have or develop the experience and insight to improve on design. This he 
calls a metis friendly approach to institutions. He makes the case for institutions that 
are 'multifunctional, plastic, diverse and adaptable' (251 ). I would argue that the case 
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of IMY does meet the criteria and as such is not subject to the domination of any 
fixed ideas abut what new public management should entail. 
How long this relative independence of the state will continue in Uttar Pradesh is 
debatable. Since the State has begun to negotiate as a single entity with the Bank, it 
has considerably less negotiating power than it had as part of the sub-continent. It 
may be the case therefore, in future years that the Bank places increased demands and 
control on the State. This would seem to be suggested by the recent threats of funding 
withdrawal if transfers aren't controlled (Ff, 2002). Furthermore, much of the 
institutional change that has occurred through IMY has been assisted through the use 
of anganwadi workers. If the status and conditions provided to these women is not 
improved, the continued successes of state schemes such as IMY will inevitably be in 
jeopardy. 
India has been and remains a relatively powerful international force with considerable 
power in relation to International Financial Institution's, including the World Bank. 
This can be seen in the way India adopted its new economic policy in 1991, to a very 
considerable extent, on its own terms. It has also been an active participant in 
negotiating the terms of its reforms in governance. Bureaucratic reforms were not 
solely imposed from above in Uttar Pradesh, in fact, research by the Indian Institute of 
Public Administration, as well as within the Department of Administrative Reforms, 
were suggesting change along entrepreneurial Hnes form the early 1990s. But, how 
long this relative independence of the state will continue in Uttar Pradesh is debatable. 
Since the State has begun to negotiate as a single entity with the Bank, it has 
considerably less negotiating power than it had as part of the sub-continent. It may be 
the case therefore, that in future years, the Bank places increased demands and control 
on the State, possibly adversely affecting the ability of the officials to locally shape 
the NPM agenda. The IMY scheme may be atypical within Uttar Pradesh, but it does 
demonstrate the importance of supporting institutions and the potential value of 
bureaucratic reform for provoking positive change and development. 
A more general argument that can be drawn from this thesis, is the necessity of paying 
close attention to the ways in which development discourses and agendas are 
mediated, manipulated and sometimes significantly changed by various agents -
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including the subject of this work, the bureaucracy. This is not to deny the pressure of 
broader trends, or the limitations to choice and agency, but the complexities of local, 
regional and national contexts allow for greater room for manoeuvre than some post-
development theorists allow for. A second more general observation, pace Tendler, is 
that elements of the state can work for positive development and local empowerment. 
It is therefore, misguided to always pit a parasitic and/or hostile state against a 
virtuous community. Just as 'the community' is now widely understood to be 
heterogenous and conflictual, so too 'the state' (or, in this case 'the bureaucracy') 
must be recognised more dynamically as a diverse set of people, relations, outlooks 
and institutions. 
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APPENDIX 1 
CIVIL SERVICES, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 
I) All-India Services : 
i) Indian Administrative Service 
ii) Indian Foreign Service 
iii) Indian Police Service 
II) Central Services : 
i) Indian P & T Accounts & Finance Service, Group 'A" 
ii) Indian Audit and Accounts Service, Group 'A' 
iii) Indian Customs and Central Excise Service, Group 'A' 
iv) Indian Defence Accounts Service, Group 'A' 
v) Indian Revenue Service, Group 'A' 
vi) Indian Revenue Service, Group 'A' 
Appendices 
vii) Indian Ordnance Factories Service Group 'A' (Assistant Manager Non-teaching) 
viii) Indian Postal Service, Group 'A' 
ix) Indian Civil Accounts Service, Group 'A' 
x) Indian Railway Traffic Service, Group 'A' 
xi) Indian Railway Accounts Service, Group 'A' 
xii) Indian Railway Personnel Service, Group 'A' 
xiii) Posts of Assistant Security Officer, Group 'A' in Railway Protection Force 
xiv) Indian Defence Estates Service Group 'A' 
xv) Indian Information Service (Junior Grade), Group 'A' 
xvi) Indian Trade Service, Group 'A' (Grade-iii) 
xvii) Posts of Assistant Commandant, Group 'A' in Central Industrial Security Force 
xviii) Central Secretariat Service, Group 'B' (Section Officer's Grade) 
xix) Railway Board Secretariat Service, Group 'B' (Section Officer's Grade) 
xx) Armed Forces Headquarters Civil Service, Group 'B' (Assistant Civilian Staff 
Officer's Grade) 
xxi) Customs Appraisers' Service, Group 'B') 
xxii) Delhi and Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Lakshadweep, Daman & Diu and Dadra 
& Nagar Haveli Civil Service, Group 'B' 
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xxiii) Posts of Deputy Superintendent of Police in the Central Bureau oflnvestigation, 
Group 'B' 
xxiv) Pondicherry Civil Service, Group 'B' 
xxv) Pondicherry Police Service, Group 'B' 
Source: Government of India, New Delhi, Employment News (Special Supplement), 
14-20 December, 1996. 
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Appendix 2: Statistical data in map form of population. literacy (female) 
and sex ratio's from Census 200 I. 
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APPENDIX: 3 Rae Bareli Information 
Development Blocks in Rae Bareli (2002) there are now 21, at the time of research 
there were I 9 
1. Amawan 
4. Chhatoh 
7. Dalrnau 
10. Lalganj 
13. Rahi 
16. Salon 
19. Shivgarh 
2. Bachhrawan 
5. Deeh 
8. Harchandpur 
11. Maharajganj 
14. Rohaniya 
17. Sataon 
20. Tiloi 
Main District Level Offices -
Sr. Treasury Officer 
District Supply Officer 
District Agriculture Officer 
District Information Officer 
District Informatics Officer (NIC, GOI) 
District Economics & Statistical Officer 
District Savings Officer 
District Sports Officer 
District Employment Officer 
Field Publicity Officer (GOI) 
Trade tax Officer 
Income Tax Officer (GOI) 
Entertainment Tax Officer 
District Prosecution Officer 
District Excise Officer 
General Manager, District Industry Centre 
Plant Protection Officer 
District Panchayat Raj Officer 
District Programme Officer 
Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Basic Education) 
District Inspector of Schools 
Sp. Land acquisition Officer 
District Social Welfare Officer 
Minority Welfare Officer 
Project Manager (U.P.L.D.C.) 
Asst. Regional Transport Officer 
Asst. District Election Officer 
District Soldier welfare Officer 
3. Bahadurpur 
6. Deen Shah Gaura 
. 9. Kheeron 
12. Jagatpur 
15. Sareni 
18. Singhpur 
21. Unchahar 
Bold Signifies those individuals who are theoretically at least members of the District 
Level Coordination Committee for IMY, in addition to these the District Magistrate is 
also a member of the committee. 
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Rae Bareli Tehsils, Blocks and Nayay Panchayats 
TEHSIL: MAHARAGJANJ 
BLOCK: Bachhrawan 
Nayay Panchayats: Rampur Sudauli, Neem Teeker, Sayhgao Panchchim Gaon, 
Tilenda, Bhairampur, Bhulendi, Kherahni, lchauli, Rajamau. 
BLOCK: SHIVGARH 
Nayay panchayats: Beraroo, Baiti, Kasna, Rewan, Basantpur Sakatpur, Shivgarh, 
Bhaushi. 
BLOCK: MAHRAJGANJ 
Nayay Panchayats: Halore, Dhurauna, Hardoi, Kubna, Kair, Kotwa 
Mohammadabad, Maugarbi, Chandapur. 
TEHSIL: TILOI 
BLOCK: SINGHPUR 
Nayay Panchayats: Kukaha Rampur, Chilauli, Khara, Rampur Pawara, 
Panhauna, Inhauna, Fatepur, Phoola, Y entaypur. 
BLOCK: TILOI 
Nayay Panchayats: Semrauta, Viraj, Bhalaipur, Ramaie, Semvasi, Tiloie, 
Rajanpur, Jamukha, Dhodhanpur, Shahmau. 
BLOCK: BHADURPUR 
Nayay Panchayats: Brahmani, Mohaiva Kersaria, Pothaie, Nigoha, Sarai 
Mahesh, Odari. 
TEHSIL: RAE BARELI 
BLOCK:HARCHANDPUR 
Nayay Panchayats: Panchchimgaon, Johuwa Sharki, Manjhgawan Hardoi, 
Harchandpur, Dighaura Sommau, Rahawan, Gulpur, Toda. 
BLOCK: AMAWAN 
Nayay Panchayats: Balla Bawan Buzurg, Pahremau, Paharpur, Hardaspur, Kodras 
Buzurg, Sidhauna, Abhawan, Sandi Nagin. 
BLOCK: SATAON 
Nayay Panchayats: Sataon, Shahjaura, Kotihar, Aurara Buzurg, Dedaur, Nakpholha, 
Kalayanpur Raili, 
BLOCK: RAHI 
Nayay Panchayats: Rahi, Rustampur, Salempur Siki, Bibipur, Garhi Mutwalli, 
Khagipur Sandwa, Belamela, Bhano, Bhadokhar, Lodhwari, Kanauli. 
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TEHSIL: LALGANJ 
BLOCK KHIRON 
Nayay Panchayats: Attarhar, Paho, Kheeron, Bhitergaon, Tiklamau, Deogawan, 
Semari, Bakuliha, Nihastha, Aaikauni. 
BLOCK: SARENI 
Nayay Panchayats: Rasulpur, Bhoremau, Murar mau, Bhojpur, Chautar, Daulatpur, 
Neebi, raipur, Sareni, Malkegaon, Chiblaha, Sader Khera. 
BLOCK: LALGANJ 
Nayay Panchayats: Gahiri, Behata Kalan, Mubarakpur, Govindpur Balauli, 
Semarpaha, Bahuria Khera, Khajoorgaon, Untra Gaun, Bahaie. 
TEHSIL: DALMU 
BLOCK: DALMAU 
Nayay Panchayats: Madhukarpur, Aaihar, Lodhipur Utyrawan, Govindpur Bheera, 
Kathgar, Ghurwara, Narendrapur, Radha Balampur, Makhdoom Pur, Dalmau, 
Bharsana, Barara Buzurg. 
BLOCK: JAGATPUR 
Nayay Panchayats: Bhulrai, Bannawa, Gaurahardo, Sukkha Hardo, Rassulpur 
Dharawan, Jaalalpur Dhai, Dhoot, Sarai Sribux, Khajuri, Dhobaha, Jagatpur, Jamodi, 
Purabgaon. 
TEHSIL: SALON 
BLOCK: DIH 
Nayay Panchayats: Pothai, Mau, Tekari Dadu, Deehh Birnawa, Khetaudhan, Atawa 
Aroha Rampur. 
BLOCK: CHHATOH 
Nayay Panchayats: Naseerabad, Ashrafpur, Hajipur, Parriva Namaksar, Chatah, 
Bhabalpur Shisni, Bara 
BLOCK: SALON 
Nayay Panchayats: Soochi, Umari, Salaun, Barbalia, Matka, Pari, Kharahni, 
Pahargarh, Mamoni, Ashikabad, Mahonganj, Dharai, Rampur Kasiha, 
Nuruddinpur. 
BLOCK:UNCHAHAR 
Nayay Panchayats: Matrauli, Rohania, Rasulpur, Umran, Delauli, 
Kiahundaspur, Ramsanda, Kharauli, Urakha, Khurrampur, Saraini, Salimpur 
Bhaira. 
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APPENDIX 4: Total Interviewee numbers and justification 
National State District Block 
Government 6 (8) 22 + 3* + 6* 12 17 
Academics 7 6 
Anganwadi 20 
Workers 
NGO 4 7 7 3 
employees 
SHGs 32 
Other 1 (RMK) 
Key: 
(8) Refers to interviews conducted at LBSNAA. This includes an interview with the 
head of the training institute Mr. B. S. Baswan Director of the Academy. Insights 
gained from these interviews were not however specifically related to IMY, but rather 
the changing culture of the bureaucracy more generally. 
22 State level government officials with direct contact with IMY, both past and 
present (due to transfers) were interviewed 
3* refers to the number of interviews conducted at the State level with (A)CDPOS at 
NPCCD, however I also conducted a focus group with course participants and gained 
further information participating in the course. 
6* refers to the interviews that took place at the ATI in Nainital. 
Numbers included in the table above reflect the numbers of interviews conducted, as I lived with 
academics and then government officials other insights gained are not expressed in the table. 
Furthermore interviews and focus groups conducted in the Durham and during the first two field visits 
to India are not included as these did not contribute to my understanding of changes experienced in 
IMY but rather assisted my general understanding of change within the bureaucracy. 
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APPENDIX 4.2 
QUESTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NATIONAL, STATE AND 
DISTRICT. 
Interviews were conducted in English with government officials at these levels. Some 
questions were more appropriate than others, and conversations during interview 
tended to move in various directions, so not all the questions were always relevant. 
I. What have you observed as the major changes in foci and strategies of 
development policy over the last decade? 
2. Why do you think these changes have occurred? 
3. What implications have these changes had on the working of your department? 
The 5th Pay Commissions suggests a change in the priorities of the public 
administration and development: 
Does the activity need doing? 
Does the government have to do it? 
Does it have to carry it out itself? 
Is the organisations properly structured to do it? 
4. To want extent have you observed these changes? 
(e.g. factoring out, internal competition) 
The Discussion Note 1996 for the Chief Secretaries of State Governments, in 
response to liberalisation suggests changes in the effectiveness and responsiveness of 
government. It suggests that the role of the bureaucracy in assisting the market is a 
crucial one. 
5. Are there any changes that you have seen that have made the bureaucracy 
more market orientated? (cost effectiveness, change of approach of programmes, 
privatisation etc.) 
6. In line with this document what efforts have you seen in attempting to increase 
effectiveness? (co-ordination within and between departments/ at various levels in 
the hierarchy/ through the use of new technology/ training/ ideas) 
7. Have you witnessed any changes in responsiveness of the bureaucracy? (to 
the public's demands /flexibility within programmes) 
The document continues to say that the bureaucracy should act as, 'enabler and 
facilitator rather than a direct provider of goods and services. 
8. In what ways is the bureaucracy able to 'enable' people for development? 
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9. Has there been a shift from a provider administration to a facilitator 
administration? How? 
I 0. If so who are the new providers'? How successfuUy is this change working? 
To what extent is this shift possible in India? 
The document further suggests that there should be a separation of formulation and 
implementation of policy. A greater need for customer orientation and the 
decentralisation of powers to the local level are also seen as important. 
11. To what extent has the separation of formulation and implementation 
happened? 
12. How accountable are the formulators and implementers of development 
policy? 
13. How and to what extent are the public participating in development 
programmes that you have seen? Is this a change? 
14. To what extent do their views get interpreted into development policy? 
15. What is your opinion on the citizen's charter? 
16. There is seen to be a need to reduce the estrangement of people from the 
providers of governance- to what extent do you see this has happened in the 
bureaucracy I within other provides? 
17. The decentralisation of power to the PRI's is very new in UP- but what do 
you think the effects of this change will be? 
18. What effect have these changes in provision and workings had on those 
working within public administration? 
19. What are the remaining problems that affect the effectiveness and 
responsiveness of those working in the bureaucracy? (quality of recruits, 
politicization, transfers, funds, technology, etc.) 
20. How do you think these problems could be remedied? 
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QUESTIONS FOR SUPERVISORS AND ANGALWADI WORKERS 
All the interviews with supervisors and anganwadi workers took place in vernacular 
Hindi, and had a great deal of space for discussion/answers. If respondents led 
naturally onto a topic that formed a later question, we would follow it, and then return 
to the point we had left off. Often when the 'formal' part of the interview had ended 
we would carry on talking notes from the discussion the questions had provoked. 
Village: 
Name of supervisor/anganwadi worker: 
1) How long have you been involved in IMY? 
2) How many groups do you help? 
3) What is your background prior to working as an angalwadi worker/ supervisor? 
4) What do you see as your role as supervisor/AW (are you involved with any other 
schemes apart from IMY)? 
5) What training have you had for this post? 
6) How often are you able to meet each group? 
7) Which government officials/ departments have you had dealings with in this role? 
(in what capacity?) 
8) Have you been informed of other government programmes that the groups could 
benefit from? 
9) How often do you meet government officials? 
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I 0) Which Non Government organisations have you had dealings with? In what 
capacity? 
11) What do you see as the major successes of the project? (Social and Economic-
which is the major focus?) 
12) Are some groups doing better than others? Why do you think this is? 
13) Prior to IMY were you involved in any other government/Non-government 
programme? 
14) If so, how does this project differ from previous schemes? 
15) Do you think the way in which this government project is implemented is 
different - why? 
16) Do you think people have more faith in government schemes or those run by 
NGOs? 
17) Do you feel that your ideas and the ideas of the people involved in the projects are 
taken into consideration when new schemes are designed? 
18) Do you feel you receive enough help from government and NGOs in your 
capacity as supervisor/ A W? 
19) What additional facilities do you feel would benefit the further progress of the 
groups? (financial/ staff/ training/ information) 
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Which NGO do you work for? 
How long have you held this post? 
1) What is your role in the NGO? 
2) What was your background prior to working for this NGO? 
3) Are you involved in IMY? 
4) If so in what capacity? 
5) What do you see as the major aims of the project? 
Appendices 
6) How much do you feel the government are encouraging your involvement in 
schemes? How? 
7) Ho much do you think the government is involving the PRI (public in general) in 
its schemes? 
8) Do you think that the type of projects the government is now providing differ 
from those in the past? If so in what ways? 
9) Do you think reservation in posts has made a difference in the workings of the 
civil service? 
I 0) What do you see as the major successes in schemes provided by the government? 
11) What do you see as the major failures in schemes provided by the government? 
12) Do you feel it is committed to these schemes? 
13) Do you think the people have faith in government schemes? Why (not)? 
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14) How accountable do you think the government is for its schemes? 
15) How do you think government could attempt to improve its development schemes 
for the public? 
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QUESTIONS FOR WO MENS' GROUPS INVOLVED IN IMY 
Name of Village/ Block: 
Name of Group: 
1. How long have you been involved in Indira Mahila Y ogana? 
2. How many members are there in your group? 
3. How old are your members? 
4. How often do you meet? Where do you meet? 
5. Were you organised as a group prior to IMY? (If so, what government scheme 
were you involved in?) 
6. Is the group literate/ was the group literate when you formed the group? 
7. Do you meet with other groups? 
8. What activities have you undertaken as part of IMY? 
9. Do you borrow from the savings/ if so what for? 
10. What do you think of the scheme? 
11. Are you involved in the local panchayat? Have you helped in making village level 
Plans? 
12. Have you undertaken any economic activity have you undertaken as part of IMY? 
If so did you get credit? (Who from) 
13. IF SO -Is the economic activity working well? Where do you sell your goods? 
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14. How much time do you spend on group activities? 
15. What do your family think of the group's activities? 
16. What do you think of 'state schemes'? 
17. Have you had any dealing with NGOs? What do you think of them? 
18. What help have you received from outside A W/ supervisors? 
19. Do you think this scheme differs to other projects you have heard of/ been 
involved in? IF SO How? 
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